FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

INDEX

VOLUME 36

Nos. 1-4

October 1957 – July 1958

The Library
Ball State Teachers College
Muncie, Indiana

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
58 East 68th Street
New York 21

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME 36

NO. 1—OCTOBER 1957

The Silence in Russian Culture . . . . . *Isaiah Berlin* 1
Challenge and Response in United States Policy
John Foster Dulles 25
A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy . . . . *John F. Kennedy* 44
Britain and America at Loggerheads . . . . . *Aneurin Bevan* 60
On Certain Current International Questions . *Josip Broz-Tito* 68
Mao and Moscow . . . . . *G. F. Hudson* 78
Carrot and Stick in Rural China . . . . . *Wolf Ladejinsky* 91
The Ambassadorial Issue: Professionals or Amateurs?
Clare Boothe Luce 105
The Soviet Intelligentsia . . . . . *L.* 122
Prospects for the European Common Market . *Robert Marjolin* 131
The Differing Faces of Africa . . . . . *Lord Hailey* 143
Antarctica in a Two-Power World . . . . . *Walter Sullivan* 154
Nuclear Weapons: "Haves" and "Have-Nots" . . . *Klaus Knorr* 167
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 179
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 196

NO. 2—JANUARY 1958

Alternatives for Security . . . . . *Edward Teller* 201
An Inward Look . . . . . *Robert Oppenheimer* 209
Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy . . . . *Lloyd V. Berkner* 221
The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities . . . . *John S. Badeau* 232
The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking *Herbert S. Dinerstein* 241
Gandhi Ten Years After . . . . . *Frank Moraes* 253
Laws and Men in Soviet Society . . . . . *John N. Hazard* 267
NATO: Deterrent or Shield? . . . . . *Malcolm W. Hoag* 278
The Political Impact of New Population Trends . *Kingsley Davis* 293
Last Chance in North Africa . . . . . *Lorna Hahn* 302
The Intelligentsia in Changing China . . . . . *Y. Chu Wang* 315
Where India, China and Russia Meet . . . . . *Kusum Nair* 330
Communism in Iceland . . . . . *Mary S. Olmsted* 340
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 348
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 365

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NO. 3—APRIL 1958

The Illusion of Disengagement . . . . . *Dean Acheson* 371
Missiles and the Western Alliance . . . . *Henry A. Kissinger* 383
Anglo-American Shibboleths . . . . *The Marquess of Salisbury* 401
Canada Rediscovers Its History . . . . . *Michael Barkway* 409
Foreign Aid: Next Phase . . *M. F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow* 418
The China Impasse: A Formosan View . . . . *Lí Thian-hok* 437
Italian Democracy Faces Another Test . . . *Amintore Fanfani* 449
New Initiatives for a New Age: A German View
Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz 460
The European Idea . . . . . *Peter Thorneycroft* 472
Indonesia Between the Power Blocs . . . . . *Mohammad Hatta* 480
Mexico Forges Ahead . . . . . *Antonio Carrillo Flores* 491
Mexican Resistance to Communism . . *S. Walter Washington* 504
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 516
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 533

NO. 4—JULY 1958

Disengagement: Why? How? . . . . . *Hugh Gaitskell* 539
Khrushchev's New Economic Gambit . . . *Philip E. Mosely* 557
Soviet Political Life Today . . . . . *Cyril E. Black* 569
Cambodia Neutral: The Dictate of Necessity
Prince Norodom Sihanouk 582
Rival Economic Theories in India . . . *John Kenneth Galbraith* 587
The U.N. and National Security . . . . . *Lincoln P. Bloomfield* 597
Germany's Economic Goals . . . . . *Ludwig Erhard* 611
Economic Strategy of the West . . . . . *Lord Salter* 618
Massive Alternation in Canadian Politics . . . *Steven Muller* 633
Toward a Policy for the Middle East
Richard H. Nolte and William R. Polk 645
Self-Confidence and Self-Criticism in South Africa
Edwin S. Munger 659
The Triumph and Disaster of Eduard Benes . *Edward Taborsky* 669
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 685
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 701

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINTED IN U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This Is Your Wife

How the telephone helps her to be five busy people

This is the pretty girl you married.

She's the family chef. And the nurse. And the chauffeur and maid. And when she's all dressed up for an evening out—doesn't she look just wonderful!

How does she do it?

Of course she's smart and it keeps her busy, but she never could manage it without the telephone.

When the "chef" needs groceries, she telephones. Supplies from the drugstore? The "nurse" phones her order.

A train to be met? The telephone tells the "chauffeur" which one. A beauty shop appointment? A call from the "glamour girl" makes it easily and quickly.

Handy, ever-ready telephones—in living room, bedroom, kitchen and hobby room—mean more comfort, convenience and security for everybody.

Working together to bring people together . . . **BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM**

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1957. Vol. 36, No. 1. Published quarterly at 10 McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and business offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year to any address. Second-class mail privileges authorized at Lancaster, Pa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



weighing the facts

about business abroad

From vantage points in key cities all over the world, Chase Manhattan continuously gathers and assesses pertinent business facts, figures and trends.

Because this information originates *on the spot* and is supplied by a leading local bank with which Chase Manhattan has reciprocal arrangements, it is characterized by accuracy, thoroughness and up-to-dateness.

If you are an importer, exporter or businessman with interests in any part of the world,

"Why don't you talk to the people at Chase Manhattan?"

THE

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK

HEAD OFFICE: 18 Pine Street, New York 15, N. Y.

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

OVERSEAS BRANCHES
London
Paris
Frankfurt/Main
Beirut
Tokyo
Osaka
Havana
Marianao
San Juan, P.R.
Santurce
Rio Piedras
Panama
Colon
David
Cristobal
Balboa

Offices of Representatives:
Washington, D.C.
Bombay
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Continental Europe (Paris)
Mexico, D.F.
Rome

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



...on the engineer and national security

"With our national security at stake, engineers have responsibilities greater than in any preceding age. They face two vital questions: What military *posture* will ensure greatest security? What *means*. —what weapon systems—will provide the desired military posture? These questions cannot be answered in purely technical terms; in addition to those factors with which engineers are at home, social, political, strategic, tactical, and operational factors must be considered. Today their influence on national policy decisions must be understood if we are to build and deploy a military capability that can deter war. In choosing weapon systems it is no longer enough to maximize speed, power, altitude, and payload. As more and more powerful weapons become attainable it is imperative that their use be increasingly determined by the real needs of our civilization."

—*E. J. Barlow, Head of the Engineering Division*

THE RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

A nonprofit organization engaged in research on problems related to national security and the public interest

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Guaranty's Foreign Department Can Serve You the World Over

Guaranty's Foreign Department officers keep in close touch with financial conditions the world over, through the bank's 2,000 carefully selected foreign bank correspondents, through its branches in London, Paris, and Brussels, and through personal and business contacts abroad. Last year Guaranty officers traveled in more than 50 countries, getting first-hand information from industrialists, bankers, and government officials.

Guaranty's vast experience in world trade is available to all its customers. If you do business abroad, or plan to, call or write our Foreign Department. We will be glad to show you how this bank can serve you.

Guaranty Trust Company of New York

Capital Funds in excess of $400,000,000

140 Broadway, New York 15

Fifth Ave. at 44th St. New York 36 · **Madison Ave. at 60th St.** New York 21 · **40 Rockefeller Plaza** New York 20

LONDON: 32 Lombard St., E.C. 3 · Bush House, Aldwych, W.C. 2

PARIS: 4 Place de la Concorde **BRUSSELS: 27 Avenue des Arts**

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ENJOY FIRST CLASS LUXURY

Beautiful Jetstream lounge offers the ultimate in decor and comfort.*

FLY TWA AMBASSADOR

EUROPE

Most luxurious service overseas! Non-stop TWA Ambassador flights aboard magnificent Super-G Constellations or the new, mighty Jetstream. Featuring complimentary cocktails, delicious full-course meals with vintage wines ...the gracious hospitality that has made TWA service famous throughout the world. (Sleeper-Seats and full-length berths available at extra cost.) Fly trans-Atlantic from New York or take the swift Jetstream Polar route from California. Make reservations today. See your travel agent or call your nearest TWA office.

NOW! NEW JETSTREAM SERVICE—NON-STOP NEW YORK TO ROME

Fly Jetstream de luxe Ambassador—non-stop coast to coast in the U. S.

FLY THE FINEST

FLY TWA

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES

* *Jetstream is a service mark owned exclusively by TWA*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Established 1873 *Incorporated 1926*

MATHER & CO.

226 WALNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 6 WAlnut 5-0118



Insurance Brokers and Average Adjusters

MATHER, LTD.

225 BROADWAY, NEW YORK 7 BArclay 7-5023

Branches or Correspondents in Major Centers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Progress Is Our Most Important Product...

PEOPLE... OUR MOST VITAL CONCERN

People everywhere in the world benefit from General Electric's 77 years of research, engineering, planning and manufacturing skill. General Electric products are manufactured in 130 factories in the U. S. A. plus factories in many countries around the world. This policy helps in the industrial development... creates employment and makes living more enjoyable for everyone. Look for the G-E monogram on the products you buy — it's a sign you can trust. *International General Electric Company, 150 East 42nd Street, New York 17, New York, U. S. A.* C-57-1

GENERAL ELECTRIC

—U. S. A.—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



a cargo of hope for him

This is a special ship, and it meets a special need. It is the need you see today throughout Asia, Africa and the lands of the Pacific – the demand for machines to do work better and faster.

Throughout this area Standard-Vacuum tankers are plowing the seas, deep-laden with the petroleum required for new industry. Stanvac finds, transports, refines and supplies oil to those who need it—all within the area where Stanvac operates.

Peoples of these areas dream of building a new kind of life for themselves and their children. And Stanvac is doing its best to help them make this dream come true.

STANDARD-VACUUM OIL COMPANY POWERS PROGRESS

White Plains, New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



How bankers "on the scene" make the difference overseas

You enjoy definite advantages when you bring your international trade and financing questions to our Overseas Division. For The First National City Bank of New York has a staff of over 5,000 Citibankers actually "on the scene" in 71 Overseas Branches, Offices and Affiliates.

This staff is supervised by First National City officers who speak the language and know the customs of the countries where they reside. Their years of experience with local business methods — combined with their thorough understanding of American business and banking procedures — make their advice and assistance invaluable. They offer you complete banking services.

First National City also has correspondent banks located in every commercially important city in the world.

The facilities of our Overseas Division are available to you through any of our 74 Offices in Greater New York, as well as through Head Office. You'll find that the prestige you've built up in this country follows you abroad when you do business through First National City's world-wide branch banking system.

As a customer of First National City, you are entitled to receive our Foreign Information Service. This unique, up-to-date source of overseas business information can be invaluable when you do business abroad.



The **FIRST**
NATIONAL CITY BANK
of New York

Head Office: 55 Wall Street

71 Overseas Branches, Offices and Affiliates

75 Offices in Greater New York

1957—Our 145th Anniversary Year

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Future of Socialism

By C. A. R. CROSLAND

"Anthony Crosland's book is the first detailed account of right-wing Labor Party re-thinking."

—H. H. Wilson, *The Nation*

In this penetrating, 540-page interpretation, Mr. Crosland, university economist and Labor M.P. from 1950 to 1955, reassesses the goals of the British Labor Party. Stressing the improved economic and social status of the British workingman and the consistent rise in his standard of living, the author shows why such socialist aims as nationalization of industry need no longer be part of the Labor program. He feels that the emphasis should be on the continuance of full employment, advocacy of savings and avoidance of inflation. $7.00

American Nationalism

An Interpretative Essay

By HANS KOHN

author of *The Idea of Nationalism, Prophets and Peoples, The Twentieth Century*

"In his new book, Hans Kohn, who is a Professor of History at City College and has spent many years of his fruitful life studying comparative nationalism, has cast a fresh and discerning eye on American nationalism. A major merit of the book is its broad perspective. . . . Furthermore, he brings to this task of interpretation the power of analysis and the qualities of imagination and literary felicity that have marked his entire career as a historian. The result is an engrossing and stimulating book."

—*N.Y. Times Book Review*

$5.00

The Macmillan Company
60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1957

The Silence in Russian Culture	*Isaiah Berlin*	1
Challenge and Response in United States Policy	*John Foster Dulles*	25
A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy	*John F. Kennedy*	44
Britain and America at Loggerheads	*Aneurin Bevan*	60
On Certain Current International Questions	*Josip Broz-Tito*	68
Mao and Moscow	*G. F. Hudson*	78
Carrot and Stick in Rural China	*Wolf Ladejinsky*	91
The Ambassadorial Issue: Professionals or Amateurs?	*Clare Boothe Luce*	105
The Soviet Intelligentsia	*L.*	122
Prospects for the European Common Market	*Robert Marjolin*	131
The Differing Faces of Africa	*Lord Hailey*	143
Antarctica in a Two-Power World	*Walter Sullivan*	154
Nuclear Weapons: "Haves" and "Have-Nots"	*Klaus Knorr*	167
Recent Books on International Relations	*Henry L. Roberts*	179
Source Material	*Ruth Savord*	196

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

PHILIP W. QUIGG
Assistant Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

ALLEN W. DULLES
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
GEORGE F. KENNAN
WILLIAM L. LANGER
JOHN J. McCLOY
CHARLES H. McILWAIN
PHILIP E. MOSELY
HENRY M. WRISTON

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 McGovern Ave., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

Vol. 36, No. 1.

Copyright 1957, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

ISAIAH BERLIN, Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, Oxford University; attached to the British Embassy in Washington, 1942–45, and in Moscow, 1945–46, with rank of First Secretary; visiting professor at Harvard, 1949; author of "Karl Marx," "The Hedgehog and the Fox," "The Age of Enlightenment" and other works * * * *JOHN FOSTER DULLES,* Secretary of State of the United States * * * *JOHN F. KENNEDY,* United States Senator from Massachusetts; Member of Congress, 1947–53; author of "Why England Slept" and "Profiles in Courage" * * * *ANEURIN BEVAN,* P.C., Member of Parliament since 1929; Minister of Health, 1945–51; Minister of Labor and National Service, 1951 * * * *MARSHAL JOSIP BROZ-TITO,* President of Jugoslavia * * * *G. F. HUDSON,* Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford, in charge of the Center of Far Eastern Studies; formerly on the editorial staff of *The Economist,* London; author of "The Far East in World Politics" * * * *WOLF LADEJINSKY,* Adviser to the Government of Viet Nam; formerly with the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and former scientific consultant on the staff of SCAP, Tokyo * * * *CLARE BOOTHE LUCE,* recently Ambassador to Italy; Member of Congress, 1943–47; author of several books and plays * * * *L,* Anonymous * * * *ROBERT MARJOLIN,* Professor of Economics, University of Nancy; Assistant High Commissioner, Modernization and Equipment Plan, 1946; Secretary-General of O.E.E.C., 1948–55; author of "Europe and the United States in the World Economy" and other works * * * *BARON HAILEY OF SHAHPUR,* P.C., O.M., for 40 years a British official in India; Governor of the Punjab, 1924–28; Governor of the United Provinces, 1928–34; Director of the African Research Survey, 1935; Member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, 1935–39; author of "An African Survey," "The Future of Colonial Peoples" and other works * * * *WALTER SULLIVAN,* on the staff of *The New York Times;* author of "Quest for a Continent" * * * *KLAUS KNORR,* Professor in the Center of International Studies, Princeton University; author of "British Colonial Theories," "The War Potential of Nations" and other works.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 36 OCTOBER 1957 No. 1

THE SILENCE IN RUSSIAN CULTURE

By Isaiah Berlin

ONE of the most arresting characteristics of modern Russian culture is its acute self-consciousness. There has surely never been a society more deeply and exclusively preoccupied with itself, its own nature and destiny. From the eighteen-thirties until our own day the subject of almost all critical and imaginative writing in Russia is Russia. The great novelists, and a good many minor novelists too, as well as the vast majority of the characters in Russian novels, are continuously concerned not merely with their purposes as human beings or members of families or classes or professions, but with their condition or mission or future as Russians, members of a unique society with unique problems. This national self-absorption is to be found among novelists and playwrights of otherwise very different outlooks. An obsessed religious teacher like Dostoevsky, a didactic moralist like Tolstoy, an artist regarded in the West as being dedicated to timeless and universal psychological and aesthetic patterns like Turgenev, a "pure" unpolitical writer, careful not to preach, like Chekhov, are all, and throughout their lives, crucially concerned with the "Russian problem." Russian publicists, historians, political theorists, writers on social topics, literary critics, philosophers, theologians, poets, first and last, all without exception and at enormous length, discuss such issues as what it is to be a Russian; the virtues, vices and destiny of the Russian individual and society; but above all the historic rôle of Russia among the nations; or, in particular, whether its social structure—say, the relation of intellectuals to the masses, or of industry to agriculture—is *sui generis,* or whether, on the contrary, it is similar to that of other countries, or, perhaps, an anomalous, or stunted, or an abortive example of some superior Western model.

From the eighties onwards a vast, now unreadably tedious,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mass of books, articles, pamphlets began to flood upon the Russian intelligentsia, mostly concerned to prove either that Russia is destined to obey unique laws of its own—so that the experience of other countries has little or nothing to teach it—or, on the contrary, that its failures are entirely due to an unhappy dissimilarity to the life of other nations, a blindness to this or that universal law which governs all societies, and which Russians ignore at their peril. The writers of Western countries, as often as not, produce their works of art or learning or even day-to-day comment (even in America where there exists similar self-consciousness, though not on so vast a scale) without necessarily tormenting themselves with the question whether their subject matter has been treated in its right historical or moral or metaphysical context. In Russia, at any rate since the second half of the nineteenth century, the reverse obtained. There no serious writer could think of taking a step without concerning himself with the question whether his work was appropriately related to the great ultimate problems, the purposes of men on earth. The duty of all those who claimed to have the insight to understand, and the moral courage to face, their personal or social or national condition was always the same: in the first place to relate the relevant problems to the path which the given society (*i.e.* Russian; and only after that, human) was inexorably pursuing (if one was a determinist), or should be pursuing (if one thought one had freedom of choice), at the particular historical (or moral or metaphysical) stage of its development.

No doubt the Romantic doctrines, particularly in Germany, with their emphasis on the unique historical missions of different groups of men—Germans, or industrialists, or poets—which dominated European literature and journalism in the eighteen-thirties and forties, are partly responsible for this pervasive Russian attitude. But it went further in Russia than elsewhere. This was partly due to the fact that the effective advance of Russia to the center of the European scene (after the Napoleonic wars) coincided with the impact of the Romantic Movement; it derived partly from a sense of their own cultural inferiority which made many educated Russians painfully anxious to find a worthy part of their own to play—worthy, above all, of their growing material power in a world that was apt to look down upon them, and cause them to look down upon themselves, as a dark mass of benighted barbarians ruled by brutal despots and good only for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crushing other freer, more civilized peoples. Again there may be, as some writers maintain, a strong craving for teleological and indeed eschatological systems in all societies influenced by Byzantium or by the Orthodox Church—a craving that the Russian priesthood, lacking as it conspicuously did the intellectual resources and tradition of the Western churches, could not satisfy, at any rate in the case of the better educated and critically inclined young men.

Whatever the truth about its origins, the state of mind of virtually all Russian intellectuals in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (there were some exceptions) was dominated by the belief that all problems are interconnected, and that there is some single system in terms of which they are all in principle soluble; moreover, that the discovery of this system is the beginning and end of morality, social life, education; and that to abandon the search for it in order to concentrate upon isolated or personal ends, say, the pursuit of knowledge, or artistic creation, or happiness, or individual freedom for their own sakes, is willful, subjective, irrational, egoistic, an immoral evasion of human responsibility. This attitude is characteristic not merely of the left-wing Russian intelligentsia, but of the outlook of civilized Russians of all shades of political opinion, spread widely both in religious and in secular, in literary and in scientific circles. Almost any philosophical system that affected to give a comprehensive answer to the great questions found a marvellously, indeed excessively, enthusiastic welcome among these eager, over-responsive, idealistic, impeccably consistent, sometimes only too rigorously logical thinkers.

And the systems were not slow in arriving. First came German historicism, particularly in its Hegelian form, which conceived of history as the essential, indeed the only genuine science. True, Hegel looked on the Slavs with contempt as "unhistorical," and declared that (like the "extinct" Chinese civilization) they had no part to play in the march of the human spirit. This part of Hegel was quietly ignored, and adequate room made in the universal schema for the Slavs in general, and (on the authority of Hegel's formidable rival, Schelling) for the Russians in particular. After the infatuation with Schiller, Fichte, Hegel and other German Idealists came a similar faith in French social prophets—Saint-Simon, Fourier and their many disciples and interpreters, who offered cut-and-dried "scientific" plans of reform or revolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion for which some among their Russian disciples, with their will to believe in literal inspiration, were ready to lay down their lives. This was followed by many another *Lebensphilosophie*—inspired by Rousseau, by Comtian Positivism, Darwinism, neo-mediævalism, Anarchism, which in Russia went far beyond their Western prototypes. Unlike the West where such systems often languished and declined amid cynical indifference, in the Russian Empire they became fighting faiths, thriving on the opposition to them of contrary ideologies—mystical monarchism, Slavophil nostalgia, clericalism, and the like; and under absolutism, where ideas and daydreams are liable to become substitutes for action, ballooned out into fantastic shapes, dominating the lives of their devotees to a degree scarcely known elsewhere. To turn history or logic or one of the natural sciences—biology or sociology—into a theodicy; to seek, and affect to find, within them solutions to agonizing moral or religious doubts and perplexities; to transform them into secular theologies—all that is nothing new in human history. But the Russians indulged in this process on a heroic and desperate scale, and in the course of it brought forth what today is called the attitude of total commitment, at least of its modern form.

Over a century ago Russian critics denounced European civilization for its lack of understanding. It seemed to them characteristic of the morally desiccated, limited thinkers of the West to maintain that human activities were not all necessarily interconnected with each other—that what a man did as a writer was one thing and what he did as a citizen was another; that a man might be a good chemist and yet maltreat his family or cheat at cards; that a man might compose profound music and yet hold stupid or immoral political views that were no business of the critics or of the public. This notion of life, according to Russians of almost all shades of opinion, was artificial and shallow and flew to pieces before the deeper insight of the all-embracing view, according to which the life of individuals and the life of their institutions was one and indivisible. Every faculty and element in the individual were in a state of constant interplay; a man could not be one thing as a painter and another as a citizen, honest as a mathematician and false as a husband; it was impossible to draw frontiers between any aspects of human activity, above all between public and private life. Any attempt to insulate this or that area from the invasion of outside forces was held to be founded upon the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

radical fallacy of thinking that the true function and purpose of a human being does not penetrate every one of his acts and relationships—or worse still, that men had, as men, no specific function or purpose at all. It followed that whatever most fully embodies this ultimate total human purpose—the State, according to the Hegelians; an élite of scientists, artists and managers, according to the followers of Saint-Simon or Comte; the Church, according to those who leaned towards ecclesiastical authority; an elected body of persons embodying the popular or national will, according to democrats or nationalists; the class designated by "history" to free itself and all mankind, according to Socialists and Communists—this central body had a right to invade everything. The very notion of the inviolability of persons, or of areas of life, as an ultimate principle was nothing but an effort to limit, to narrow, to conceal, to shut out the light, to preserve privilege, to protect some portion of ourselves from the universal truth—and therefore the central source of error, weakness and vice.

The doctrine that there is one truth and one only, which the whole of one's life should be made to serve, one method, and one only, of arriving at it, and one body of experts alone qualified to discover and interpret it—this ancient and familiar doctrine can take many shapes. But even in its most idealistic and unworldly forms, it is, in essence, totalitarian. Even those critical versions of it which permit doubts about the nature of the central truth, or about the best method of its discovery, or the title of its preachers, allow none about the right and the duty, once it is established, to make everyone and everything obey it; they allow no intrinsic virtue to variety of opinion or conduct as such; indeed, the opposite. For there can be no more than one truth, one right way of life. Only vice and error are many. Consequently, when Marxism finally came to Russia in the seventies and eighties it found an almost ideal soil for its seeds.

II

Marxism contained all the elements which the young *révoltés* in Russia were looking for. It claimed to be able to demonstrate the proper goals of human existence in terms of a pattern of history of which there was "scientific" proof. The moral and political values which it preached could, so it claimed, be determined "objectively," that is to say, not in terms of the subjective and rela-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive and unpredictable attitudes of different individuals or classes or cultures, but in terms of principles which, being "founded" on the "objective behavior of things," were absolute and alone led to the salvation and liberation of all men to the degree to which they were rational. It preached the indissoluble oneness of men and institutions. It claimed, just as the eighteenth century French philosophers had in effect claimed, that all real, that is to say soluble, problems were fundamentally technological; that the ends of man—what human beings could be, and, if they knew their true interests, would necessarily want to be—were given by the new scientific picture of the universe. The only problem was how to realize these ends. This was not a moral or political problem but a technical task: that of finding and using the right means for the "demonstrably" valid, universal goal; a problem of engineering.

Stalin's famous and most revealing phrase about intellectuals as "engineers of human souls" was faithfully derived from Marxist premises. The duty of intellectuals was to elucidate the correct social goals on the basis of a "scientific" analysis of society and history; and then, by means of education, or "conditioning," so to attune the minds of their fellow citizens that they grasped demonstrated truths and responded accordingly, like the harmonious constituents of a properly regulated and efficiently functioning mechanism. The simile which Lenin used in one of his most famous statements of political doctrine—*State and Revolution*—according to which the new free society, liberated from the coercion of one class by another, would resemble a factory or workshop in which the workers did their jobs almost out of mechanical habit, was a piece of imagery drawn from this technocratic view of human life. The watchwords were efficiency, tidiness, security, freedom for the good to do what they wanted; this last being necessarily one and the same goal for all those who were rational and knew the truth, not freedom to do anything whatever, but only what is right—the only thing which any rational being can wish to do—that which alone will make for true, everlasting universal happiness. This is an old Jacobin doctrine, and indeed much older—in its essentials as old as Plato. But no one, perhaps, had believed it quite so naïvely or fanatically in any previous age.

During the decade that followed the October Revolution these principles—the moral and metaphysical foundations of totali-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tarianism—were genuinely accepted, at any rate by some among the Communist leaders. Whatever the personal shortcomings of Trotsky or Zinoviev or Bukharin or Molotov or the heads of the secret police, and perhaps even of Stalin at this stage, there is no reason for doubting the sincerity or depth of their convictions or principles. A great many disagreements arose, of course, but they were concerned not with ends but with means; when they went sufficiently far they were stigmatized as deviations. Thus Trotsky thought that there was a danger of a too-well-entrenched bureaucracy which would function as a brake—like all vested interests—upon the progress of the Revolution which needed agents who were more imaginative, more bloody, bold and resolute—men not tempted to stop halfway on the path of the world revolution. The so-called Workers' Opposition objected to the concentration of authority in the hands of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and wanted more equality, and more democratic control exercised by workers' organizations. The Right-Wing Deviationists thought that over-rapid collectivization of agriculture would produce a degree of economic dislocation, pauperization and ruin likely to be more damaging to the Soviet economy than the adoption of a slower pace in the harsh process of liquidating peasant property and its defenders together with other so-called survivals of the capitalist régime; and advocated a less urgent tempo and milder measures. There were disagreements as to how far the army might be used in the regimentation of industry. There were memorable disagreements about foreign policy and the policy towards Communists abroad.

The acutest of all disagreements occurred, perhaps, on the cultural front: there were those who thought that any "slap in the face" (as it used to be called) to the bourgeois culture of the West, in whatever form—aggressive futurism and modernism in the arts, for example, or any violent revolt against tradition—was *eo ipso* an expression of Bolshevism, in so far as it was a blow at the Western establishment, lowered its morale and undermined its moral and aesthetic foundations. A good deal of experiment, sometimes bold and interesting, at other times merely eccentric and worthless, occurred at this time in the Soviet Union in the guise of cultural warfare against the encircling capitalist world. This was the "Cultural Bolshevism," particularly popular in Germany, against which Communist policy later so sternly set its face. For one thing the audacities of the cultural Bolsheviks were,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as might be expected, the personal acts of individual artists and therefore found little favor in the eyes of those members of the Party for whom Communism meant belief in the task of creating a specifically proletarian culture by means of collective action, and for whom the aberrations of the *avant garde* poets, painters and producers were merely so much individualist eccentricity—an *outré* and decadent perversion of the very bourgeois civilization which the Revolution was out to destroy. Lenin, be it noted, disliked all forms of modernism intensely: his attitude to radical artistic experiment was bourgeois in the extreme. But he made no attempt to enforce his aesthetic views, and, under the benevolent patronage of the Commissar of Education, Lunacharsky, a failed critical playwright but a sincere opponent of open barbarism, the controversies continued unabated. There were splits within factions: the champions of "proletarian" culture could not agree on whether it was to be produced by individual men of gifts who distilled within themselves the aspirations of the proletarian masses, actual and potential, acting, as it were, as their mouthpieces or rather megaphones; or whether, as the extremer ideologists proclaimed, individuals as such had no part at all to play in the new order, for the art of the new collectivist society must itself be collective. These latter in effect believed that works of art must be written collectively by groups, and criticism—reviews, essays, directives—by squads of critics, bearing collective responsibility for their work, each member being an anonymous component of a social whole. Again, some maintained that the business of proletarian art was to present the new reality in an intenser form, to heighten it if necessary by the inventions of the socialism-impregnated imagination; others thought that the business of artists was strictly utilitarian: to help with the making of Communist society by documentary reportage of the new life—the building of factories, collective farms, power stations, the destruction of the old installations, the production of the essentials of the socialist economy—tractors, combines, uniform food, identical clothing, mass-produced houses, books, above all good, happy, uncomplicated, standard human beings.

One could go on to multiply examples; the point I wish to make is that these "programmatic" controversies were, in the first place, genuine; that is to say, the contending parties, on the whole, believed what they were saying, and the disagreements between them could justly be described as real differences in the interpre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tation of an accepted Marxist doctrine. Moreover they were, to some degree, carried on in public; and, most important of all, they were differences not about ends but about means. The ends had become universally accepted since the opponents and doubters had been eliminated or silenced. The intransigence of the Comintern in dealing with foreign Communist and still more Socialist parties, and the merciless heresy hunts, probably derived, for the most part, from the honest belief that these parties might compromise on the central truth—on the dogma of what constituted the desired society—or else that they had chosen, or might choose, paths that could lead away, however imperceptibly at first, from these sacred and undisputed goals.

It was its own conception of itself that divided Bolshevism so sharply from its parent, Western Marxism—a conception which made it not merely a set of political or social or economic beliefs or policies, but a way of life, all-penetrating and compulsory, controlled absolutely by the Party or the Central Committee of the Party in a way for which little authority can be found even in the most extreme pronouncements of Marx or Engels. This was the "Tsarism in reverse," which Herzen in the early fifties had gloomily and accurately predicted that Communism in Russia would become, and which it owes primarily to the personality of Lenin himself. No doubt the conditions of Russian life, which molded both him and it, in part created the need for religious certainty and messianic doctrine which Marxism provided. But the authoritarian element is among Lenin's specific contributions—the conception of the Party as a sect ruled ruthlessly by its elders and demanding from its members the total sacrifice upon its altar of all that they most cherished (material goods, moral principles, personal relationships), the more defiant and horrifying to tender-minded morality the better. It was this streak of stony fanaticism enlivened by a sardonic humor and vindictive trampling upon the liberal past that unnerved some of Lenin's socialist colleagues and attracted such disciples as Stalin and Zinoviev.

It was part and parcel of this vision of the millennium, disguised as a rational doctrine, to ignore the fact that as a scientific theory, claiming to be able to explain and predict social and economic change, Marxism had, by the beginning of the twentieth century, been decisively refuted by events in ways which have been described too often and too fully to be worth recapitulation. In the West, efforts to save the theory from intellectual bank-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ruptcy, some orthodox, some heretical, were from time to time made by conscientious socialists and others. In Russia this was, by and large, not required. In Russia, especially after the October Revolution, Marxism had become a metaphysics, professedly resting on an analysis of history but stubbornly ignoring all awkward facts, designed by force or persuasion to secure conformity to a set of dogmatic propositions with its own esoteric, half-intelligible terminology, its own "dialectical" techniques of argument, its own clear and rigid *a priori* notions of what men and society must, at whatever cost, be made to be.

One of the most striking differences between the Soviet Union and the West was (and is) that in Russia those who were defeated in these internal Soviet controversies were liable from the very beginning of the régime—even before the official beginning of the terror—to be at best silenced, at worst punished or executed. Yet even these Draconian measures did not make the controversies less real. Indeed they had the opposite effect—the fact that the fruit of victory was power, and of defeat elimination, added an element of violent excitement to the duels in which the antagonists had so much to lose or win. I do not mean to assert that all or even the majority of those engaged in these febrile and perilous controversies were persons of integrity or moved by disinterested motives; a great deal of ruthless or desperate fighting for position or survival, with little regard for the professed principles of Marxism, was evident enough in Russia in the twenties. But at least some sort of wage was paid by vice to virtue; the protagonists in these struggles still felt traditionally obliged to advance some kind of theoretical justification for their conduct, and since some of them seemed to believe deeply in what they said, the issues were at times matters of genuine principle. This was most obviously the case on the "cultural front," which has at all times yielded the most reliable symptoms of what was going on in other spheres of Soviet life. Moreover, among the controversialists, men of remarkable gifts and temperament were to be found, and their attitudes, whether honest or opportunist, were those of exceptional human beings. Lunacharsky, Vorovsky, Averbakh were not, by any possible standard, critics of the first water, but they possessed a genuine revolutionary eloquence; Bukharin, Trotsky, Radek were as thinkers negligible, but one of them was a man of genius, and the others were at the very least gifted agitators. And among the creative writers and artists there still

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were some figures of the first rank who had not emigrated, or had returned. This alone made the twenties memorable, not only in Russian history but in Russian culture.

To all this Stalin put an abrupt end, and a new phase began.

III

The ideological policy of Stalin's régime is a fascinating topic, deserving separate study to itself, which no one has yet attempted seriously, and towards which I should like only to make one or two suggestions.

Once it had become clear to Stalin and his henchmen that an early world revolution was not to be expected, and that the doubtless inevitable fulfillment of Marxist prophecies in the capitalist world might take place at a time and in ways very different from those which the earlier, more optimistic founding fathers had prophesied, he concentrated upon three interconnected purposes. Firstly, the perpetuation of the Bolshevik régime, and in particular of those of its leaders who were prepared to accept his own authority. Secondly, the maintenance and increase of Soviet power, political, economic and military, in a hostile world, by every possible means short of those entailing a radical change in the Soviet system itself. And thirdly, the elimination of all factors, whether at home or abroad, likely to jeopardize either of these two central purposes, whether or not such elimination was consistent with Marxism, Socialism or any other ideological attitude.

Stalin has at times been compared to Napoleon. It is, on the whole, a fanciful and misleading comparison. Stalin did not suppress or pervert the Bolshevik Revolution as Napoleon "liquidated" the Jacobins. There never was a Thermidor (still less a Brumaire) in the Russian Revolution: neither in the mid-twenties (where Trotsky naturally placed it), nor after the assassination of Kirov, nor after the death of Stalin. But there is something also in this analogy that is illuminating. To ask whether Stalin was a faithful Marxist or even a faithful Leninist is like asking whether Napoleon believed in the ideals or ideas of the French Revolution. Napoleon was sufficiently a child of the Revolution to be instinctively opposed to everything connected with the pre-revolutionary régime, and to wish to come to terms with some of its survivals solely for limited periods and for reasons of expediency. Just as Napoleon took it for granted that the relics of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feudalism in Europe were doomed beyond recall, that the dynastic principle was not worth respecting, that nationalism was a force that must be used, that centralization and uniformity were policies favorable to his rule and the like, so it may be assumed that Stalin was Marxist and Leninist enough to believe that capitalism was inescapably doomed to be destroyed by its own "internal contradictions," although it might here and there engage in a desperate struggle for survival, whether it realized this or not and however useless such a struggle might be. Similarly Stalin probably accepted the tactical corollary that wherever such "contradictions" reached an acute stage, those who wished to survive and inherit the earth must seek to exacerbate these critical situations and not to palliate them; whereas in situations where these contradictions had not yet reached a critical point the path of prudence on the part of the members of the new society, *i.e.* the Communists, was not to promote premature risings but to bore from within and concentrate on Popular Fronts and Trojan horses of various kinds. It is clear that he genuinely believed that the future of human society was inevitably collectivist and not individualist; that the power of religion and the churches was collapsing; that control of economic power was more important (*i.e.* capable of effecting greater changes or stopping them) than, say, nationalist sentiment or political power; and in all these respects he was, of course, a true, if exceedingly crude follower of Marx. But if it be asked whether he was a Marxist in the sense in which Lenin undoubtedly was one—*i.e.* of believing that as the result of the dreadful birth pangs a new world would be born in which men would in some sense be freer than before, capable of developing their faculties on a vastly more productive scale, living in a world without wars, starvation and oppression, it seems doubtful whether he troubled himself with such questions any more than the Emperor Napoleon reflected about the ultimate validity of any of the ideals of the French Revolution. And, to his intellectual credit be it said, Stalin paid little enough regard—even by way of lip service—to the many utopian elements in Lenin's outlook.

It is, perhaps, a second point of similarity with Napoleon that Stalin firmly grasped a truth which perhaps Napoleon was the first among secular rulers fully to realize and act upon, namely that discussion of ideas—disputes about issues apparently remote from politics, such as metaphysics or logic or aesthetics—was, by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

promoting the critical spirit, in principle more dangerous to despotic régimes engaged in a struggle for power than belief in any form of authoritarianism. Napoleon's open hostility to the *Idéologues*—the empiricists and positivists of his day—is well known. He openly preferred the implacable legitimist and ultramontane Bonald, who abused him and would have no truck with him, to the politically mild and conformist liberal, Destutt de Tracy. Similarly Stalin, when he felt himself securely in power, decided to put an end to all ideological controversy as such in the Soviet Union. He did this by proclaiming one school to be victorious over all others (it does not historically matter which). The new directive was that the business of the intelligentsia—writers, artists, academics and so forth—was not to interpret, argue about, analyze, still less develop or apply in new spheres, the principles of Marxism, but to simplify them, adopt an agreed interpretation of their meaning and then repeat and ingeminate and hammer home in every available medium and on all possible occasions the selfsame set of approved truths. The new Stalinist values were similar to those proclaimed by Mussolini: loyalty, energy, obedience, discipline. Too much time had been wasted in controversy, time which could have been spent in promoting enforced industrialization or educating the new Soviet man. The very notion that there was an area of permissible disagreement about the interpretation of even unquestioned dogma created the possibility of insubordination; this, beginning indeed in spheres remote from the centers of power—say musical criticism or linguistics—might spread to more politically sensitive areas and so weaken the drive for economic and military power for which no sacrifice was too great or too immoral. The celebrated Marxist formula—the unity of theory and practice—was simplified to mean a set of quotations to justify officially enunciated policies. The methods taken to suppress the least symptom of independence on the part of even the most faithful Stalinist intellectuals (let alone so-called deviationists or unreconstructed relics of older dispensations)—and, let it be added, the success of these methods—are a phenomenon without parallel in the recorded history of human oppression.

The result has been a long blank page in the history of Russian culture. Between 1932 and, say, 1945 or indeed 1955, it would not be too much to say that—outside natural science—scarcely any idea or piece of critical writing of high intrinsic value was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

published in Russia, and hardly any work of art—scarcely anything genuinely interesting or important in itself and not merely as a symptom of the régime or of the methods practised by it, that is to say, as a piece of historical evidence.

This policy was, perhaps, chiefly due to Stalin's personal character. He was a half-literate member of an oppressed minority, filled with resentment against superior persons and intellectuals of all kinds, but particularly against those articulate and argumentative socialists whose dialectical skill in the realm of theory must have humiliated him often both before the Revolution and after it, and of whom Trotsky was only the most arrogant and brilliant representative. Stalin's attitude towards ideas, intellectuals and intellectual freedom was a mixture of fear, cynical contempt and sadistic humor that took the form (a touch of Caligula) of discovering to what grotesque and degrading postures he could reduce both the Soviet and foreign members of his cowering congregation. After his death this policy has on occasion been defended by his heirs on the ground that when an old world is being destroyed and a new world brought into being, the makers and breakers cannot be expected to have time for the arts and letters, or even ideas, which must, at any rate for the moment, suffer what befalls them without protest.

It is interesting to ask how such absolute subservience, and for so long a period, could have been secured on the part of an intelligentsia which had after all not merely contributed the very term to the languages of Europe, but had itself played so prominent and decisive a rôle in bringing about victory of the Revolution. Here was a body of persons the blood of whose martyrs had been the seed of the entire revolutionary movement, a body to which Lenin, far more than Marx, had assigned a leading rôle in the task of subverting the old order and of keeping the new one going; and yet, when it was crushed, not a mouse stirred: a few indignant voices abroad, but inside the Soviet Union silence and total submission. Mere intimidation, torture and murder should not have proved sufficient in a country which, we are always told, was not unused to just such methods and had nevertheless preserved a revolutionary underground alive for the better part of a century. It is here that one must acknowledge that Stalin achieved this by his own original contributions to the art of government—inventions that deserve the attention of every student of the history and practice of government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

The first invention has been called by Mr. Utis "the artificial dialectic."[1] It is well known that according to the systems of Hegel and of Marx events do not proceed in direct causal sequence but by means of a conflict of forces—of thesis and antithesis—ending in a collision between them, and a Pyrrhic victory, in the course of which they eliminate each other, and history takes "a leap" to a new level, where the process, called dialectical, begins once again. Whatever may be the validity of this theory in any other sphere, it has a very specific applicability to revolutionary situations.

As every student of the subject must know, the principal practical problem before those who have successfully brought off a large-scale revolution is how to prevent the resultant situation from collapsing into one of two opposed extremes. The first—let us, following Mr. Utis, call it Scylla—is reached when the zealots of the revolution, observing that the new world which the revolution was meant to create has somehow not yet come to pass, seek for explanations, culprits, scapegoats, blame it on criminal weakness or treachery on the part of this or that group of their agents or allies, declare the revolution in mortal peril and start a witch hunt which presently develops into a terror, in the course of which various groups of revolutionaries tend to eliminate each other successively, and social existence is in danger of losing the minimum degree of cohesion without which no society can continue to be. This process tends to be checked by some form of counter-revolution, which is brought on by a desperate effort on the part of the majority, whose security is threatened, to preserve itself and achieve stability, an instinctive social recoil from some imminent-looking collapse. This is what occurred during the great French Revolution, to some extent during the Commune of 1871, in some parts of Eastern Europe in 1918, and might have occurred in 1848 had the extreme left-wing parties begun to win. The mounting spiral of terror was, in fact, what Trotsky was suspected of wishing to promote.

The opposite extreme—Charybdis—is subsidence into a weary indifference. When the original impetus of the revolution begins after a time to ebb, and people seek a respite from the terrible tension of the unnatural life to which they have been exposed,

[1] See "Stalin and the Art of Government," by O. Utis, *Foreign Affairs,* January 1952.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they seek relief, comfort, normal forms of life; and the revolution slides by degrees into the ease, *Schlamperei,* moral squalor, financial chicanery and general corruption of the kind which marked, for example, the French Directoire; or else subsides into some conventional dictatorship or oligarchy, as has happened so often in Latin America and elsewhere. The problem for the makers of the revolution, therefore, is how to keep the revolution going without falling foul of either the Scylla of utopian fanaticism or the Charybdis of cynical opportunism.

Stalin should be credited with having discovered and applied a method which did, in fact, solve this particular problem in a certain sense. Theoretically, history or nature (as interpreted by Hegel or Marx) should, by pursuing its own dialectical process, cause these opposites to collide at the crucial stage, forcing reality to ascend a creative spiral instead of collapsing into one-sided forms of bankruptcy. But since history and nature evidently tend to nod, man must from time to time come to the aid of these impersonal agencies. The government, as soon as it sees signs of the fatal hankering after the fleshpots of the older life, must tighten the reins, intensify its propaganda, exhort, frighten, terrorize, if need be make examples of as many conspicuous backsliders as may be required to stop the rout. Malingerers, comfort-lovers, doubters, heretics, other "negative elements" are eliminated. This is the "thesis." The rest of the population, duly chastened, dominated by terror rather than hope or desire for gain or faith, throw themselves into the required labors, and the economy bounds forward for a while. But then the élite of the revolutionary purists, the fanatical terrorists, the simon-pure heart of the Party, who must be genuinely convinced of the sacred duty of cutting off the rotten branches of the body politic, inevitably go too far. If they did not, if they could stop in time, they would not have been the kind of people to perform the task of inquisition with the desperate zeal and ruthlessness required; hypocrites, half-believers, moderates, opportunists, men of cautious judgment or human feeling are of no use for this purpose, for they will, as Bakunin had warned long ago, compromise halfway. Then the moment arrives when the population, too terrorized to advance, or too starved, becomes listless, downs tools, and efficiency and productivity begin to drop off; this is the moment for clemency. The zealots are accused of having gone too far, they are accused of oppressing the people, and—always a popular move—they are in their turn publicly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disciplined, that is, in Stalin's heyday, purged and executed. Some small increase of freedom is allowed in remote fields—say, that of literary criticism or poetry or archæology, nothing so near the center of things as economics or politics. This is the "antithesis." The people breathe again, there is optimism, gratitude, talk of the wisdom of their rulers now that their eyes have been opened to the "excesses" of their unfaithful servants, hope of further liberties, a thaw; production leaps up, the government is praised for returning to some earlier, more tolerant ideal, and a relatively happier period ensues.

This once more leads to the inevitable relaxation of tension, slackening of discipline, lowering of productive effort. Once more there is (the new thesis) a call for a return to ideological purity, for the reëstablishment of fundamental principles and loyalties, for the elimination of the parasitical saboteurs, self-seekers, drones, foreign agents, enemies of the people who have in some way managed to creep into the fold. There is a new purge, a new spurt of ideological fanaticism, a new crusade, and the heads of the counter-revolutionary hydra (the new antithesis) have to be cut off once again.

In this way the population is, as it were, kept perpetually on the run, its development proceeds by a zigzag path, and individual self-preservation depends on a gift for perceiving at which precise moment the central authority is about to order a retreat or an advance, and a knack for swiftly adjusting oneself to the new direction. Here timing is all. A miscalculation, due to inertia or political insensitiveness or, worse still, political or moral conviction, causing one to linger too long on a road that has been condemned, must almost always, particularly if persisted in, mean disgrace or death.

It cannot be denied that by this deliberate policy of carefully timed purges and counter-purges of various intensities, of contraction and expansion, Stalin did manage to preserve in being a system that cannot be actively approved or felt to be natural by most of those concerned, and indeed to keep it going for a longer period than that for which any other revolution has, thus far, managed to survive. There is a full discussion of the method in the article by Mr. Utis already cited. Although, as the author there maintains, the method, to be successful, requires the master hand of its inventor, it appears to have survived him. Despite the grave shocks to the system caused by the struggle for power

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among Stalin's successors, the emergence into the open of conflicts and factions, the risings of oppressed peoples in the West totally unforeseen in Moscow, what Mr. Utis calls the "artificial dialectic" appears to be functioning still. The succession, in strict sequence, during the last five years, of "liberal" and repressive moves by the Soviet rulers, both at home and abroad, although no longer conducted with the virtuosity (or the deep personal sadism) of Stalin, has too much regularity of pattern to be unintended. The hypothesis advanced by the author to explain only Stalin's own methods of government seems to fit his successors.

The method is an original political invention, and Stalin deserves full credit for it. One of its deliberate by-products has been the total demoralization of what is still in the U.S.S.R. called the intelligentsia—persons interested in art or in ideas. Under the worst moments of Tsarist oppression there did, after all, exist some areas of wholly free expression; moreover, one could always be silent. This was altered by Stalin. No areas were excluded from the Party's directives; and to refuse to say what had been ordered was insubordination and led to punishment. "Inner emigration" requires the possibility of the use of one's mind and means of expression at least in neutral ways. But if one's chances of sheer survival have been made dependent on continuous active support of principles or policies which may seem absurd or morally abhorrent; and if, moreover, the whole of one's mental capacity is taxed by the perpetual need to chart one's course in fatally dangerous waters, to manœuvre from position to position, while one's moral fiber is tested by the need to bow one's head low not to one but to many capricious, unpredictably changing divinities, so that the least inattention, slackness or error costs one dear—then there is less and less possibility of thinking one's own thoughts, or of escaping into an inner citadel in which one can remain secretly heterodox and independent and know what one believes. Stalin went further. He forbade more than a minimum degree of official intercommunication between one academic faculty and another, between laboratory and institute, and successfully prevented the growth of any center of intellectual authority, however humble and obedient, however fraudulent and obscurantist. No priesthood of dialectical materialism had been allowed to arise, because no discussion of theoretical issues was permitted; the business of the Academy of Sciences or the Institute of Red Professors or the Marx-Engels Institute was to quote Marx in supporting Stalin's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

acts: the *doctrine* he, or some other member of the Politbureau (certainly not a professor), would supply for himself.

Where there is an official church or college of augurs, with its own privileges and mysteries, there is a relatively fenced-off area, with walls within which both orthodoxy and heresy can flourish. Stalin set himself to repress ideas as such—at a very high cost, be it added, not merely in terms of the basic education of Soviet citizens (not to speak of disinterested intellectual activity, "pure" research and so on), but even in the useful and applied sciences which were gravely handicapped by the lack of freedom of discussion and suffered an abnormally high admixture of adventurers, charlatans and professional informers. All this was effective in stifling every form of intellectual life to a far greater degree than was realized by even the most hostile and pessimistic observers in the West, or, for that matter, by Communist Parties outside the Soviet orbit. To have created such a system is a very striking achievement on Stalin's part, whose importance should not be underrated. For it has crushed the life out of what once was one of the most gifted and productive societies in the world. At any rate for the time being.

V

There is yet a second consequence of this system which is worthy of remark, namely that most of the standard vices so monotonously attributed by Marxists to capitalism are to be found in their purest form only in the Soviet Union itself. Most readers of this journal will be familiar with such stock Marxist categories as capitalist exploitation, the iron law of wages, the transformation of human beings into mere commodities, the skimming off of surplus value by those who control the means of production, the dependence of the ideological superstructure on the economic base, and other Communist phrases. But where do these concepts best apply?

Economic exploitation is a phenomenon familiar enough in the West; but there is no society in which one body of men is more firmly, systematically and openly "exploited" by another than the workers of the Soviet Union by their overseers. True, the benefits of this process do not go to private employers or capitalists. The exploiter is the state itself, or rather those who effectively control its apparatus of coercion and authority. These controllers —whether they act as Party officials or state bureaucrats or both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—act far more like the capitalists of Marxist mythology than any living capitalists in the West today. The Soviet rulers really do see to it that the workers are supplied with that precise minimum of food, shelter, clothing, entertainment, education and so forth that they are thought to require in order to produce the maximum quantity of the goods and services at which the state planners are aiming. The rest is skimmed off as surplus value far more conveniently and neatly than it can ever have been detached in the unplanned West. Wages are regulated in the most "iron" way possible—by the needs of production. Economic exploitation here is conducted under laboratory conditions not conceivable in Western Europe or America.[2] It is again in the Soviet Union that official professions of "ideology"—principles, slogans, ideals—correspond least to actual practice. It is there, too, that some intellectuals can most truly be described as lackeys (some sluggish and reluctant, others filled with a kind of cynical delight and pride in their own virtuosity) of the ruling group. It is there, far more obviously than in the West, that ideas, literature, works of art act as "rationalizations" or smoke screens for ruthless deeds, or means of escape from the contemplation of crimes or follies, or as an opium for the masses. It is there that the state religion—for that is what the dead and fossilized "dialectical materialism" of the official Soviet philosophers has, in effect, more or less avowedly become—is nothing but a consciously used weapon in the war against the enemy, within and without; and lays no claim to "objective" truth.

The materialist theory of history teaches us that the primary factors that determine the lives of individuals and societies are economic, namely the relationships of human beings in the productive system; while such cultural phenomena as their religious, ethical, political ideas, their judicial and political institutions, their literature, arts, scientific beliefs and so forth belong to various tiers of the "superstructure," that is, are determined by—are a function of—the "base." This celebrated and justly influential doctrine, embodying as it does a great deal that is new, important, illuminating and by now very widely accepted, has, nevertheless, never been easy to fit in detail to any given society or

[2] Mr. Milovan Djilas corroborates this forcibly in his book, "The New Class" (New York: Praeger, 1957). Whether the system is to be called state capitalism (the state being anything but a democracy) or a "degenerate workers' state" or a naked autocracy is a question of the most appropriate label. The facts themselves are not in doubt.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

period of history in the past. Every attempt to apply it narrowly[3] always encountered too many exceptions: if these were to be explained away, they usually had to be stretched till the theory became too vague or encrusted with too many qualifications to retain any utility. But it holds only too faithfully of Soviet society. There it is absolutely clear to everyone what is part of the base and what is part of the superstructure. Writers and architects can have no illusions about which level of the pyramid they constitute. Economic, military and other "material" needs really do wholly determine—because they are deliberately made to determine—ideological phenomena, and not vice versa. It is not nature nor history that has produced this situation, but a piece of highly artificial engineering, by which Stalin and his officials have transformed the Russian Empire.

It is an extraordinary irony of history that categories and concepts invented to describe Western capitalism should turn out to fit most closely its mortal enemy. But this is scarcely an accident, a *lusus historiae*. Every student of the Russian Revolution knows that the issue that divided the Bolsheviks most deeply from the orthodox Marxists—the Mensheviks—was the practicability of an immediate transition to socialism. The Mensheviks maintained that according to any interpretation of Marx, genuine socialism could be established only in a society which had reached a high degree of industrialization—where the organized proletariat formed the majority of the population, and was, through the working of the "inexorable" and mounting "contradictions" of economic development, in a position to "expropriate the expropriators" and initiate socialism. No one could maintain that this stage had yet been reached in the Russian Empire. But the Bolsheviks, mainly under Trotsky's inspiration, claimed that instead of semi-passively waiting for capitalism (a bourgeois republic) to do the job, leaving the workers insufficiently protected from the free play of "history," "nature," etc.—this process could be controlled by a proletarian dictatorship; Russia could be made to go through the stages demanded by the "dialectic of history" under hothouse conditions regulated by the Communist Party. This was to be the famous "transitional" period of the dictatorship

[3] Say, to demonstrate that the writings of Thomas Love Peacock could not possibly have arisen save in the economic conditions of early nineteenth century England; and that these in their turn made some such writings as those of, let us say, Aldous Huxley (or others like him) quite inevitable a century later.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the proletariat—the artificial or controlled equivalent of "natural" capitalist development in the West: two roads leading equally to full-blown Communism, but the Russian corridor less painful because not left to the vagaries of "nature," but planned by men in control of their own fate owing to their possession of the "scientific" weapon of Marxist theory and able, therefore, to "shorten the birth pangs" by a well executed revolution. If, like Lenin, one begins with fanatical faith in the truth of the Marxist analysis of history, the fact that it does not too well fit even the capitalist West, which it was designed to describe, will make little difference. If the pattern does not correspond to the facts, the facts must be made to tally with the pattern. There was relatively little capitalism, and a feeble proletariat, in Russia in 1917. But the dialectic of history cannot be cheated. Unless Marxism rested on a gigantic fallacy there *could* be no salvation without the equivalent of the capitalist phase. Hence the corresponding phenomena had to be synthetically produced—made to emerge by artificial means.

This can sometimes be done with success, as in Japan, for example. But the Japanese followed the light of reason and experience. They modernized themselves by the methods that seemed to work best, without being chained to a dogmatic theory. They achieved their purpose not without brutalities, but rapidly and with spectacular success. This course was not open to Lenin and his followers. They were compelled by their fidelity to the Marxist classics to subordinate their practical judgment to the demands of theory: the social and economic development of Russia had to proceed by fixed steps whose order was laid down by the Marxist manuals. This created fantastic handicaps that were overcome at a terrible human cost. Russia *had* to go through phases which, according to Marx, Western capitalism passed during and after its industrial revolution. Russian reality had to be altered to resemble a model constructed, not too competently, to account for the progress of a society very unlike itself. A society was vivisected, as it were, to fit a theory which began life as no more than the explanation of its evolution. Something which began as descriptive became normative: a theory intended to account for the development and behavior of Western Europe in the nineteenth century had been turned into a blueprint for Eastern Europe in the twentieth.

Actions founded upon errors of social observation do not neces-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sarily end badly. There is, for all to see, that part of American constitutional development which was inspired by Montesquieu's mistaken interpretation of British political theory and practice. Lenin's error proved more costly. Russia was precipitated into unheard-of horrors of industrialization largely because Marx had drawn a dark picture of Western capitalism and said that no society could escape something analogous. The imposition of the Bolshevik system upon an economically retarded country is a unique and monstrous monument to the power of a few men's wills and their sovereign contempt for history and empirical evidence; and a bloodcurdling interpretation of the Unity of Theory and Practice.

VI

Faced with crises and the possibility of collapse, Lenin executed a partial retreat. And his successors, under the pressure of events, substituted various practical makeshifts and realistic devices and policies in place of the extravagant utopian design which dominates Lenin's thinking. Nevertheless the violent break with reality that is at the heart of the Bolshevik Revolution can evidently not be eliminated without causing the régime to collapse; at any rate no serious attempt to do so has ever been made. For this reason Soviet society is not, in the normal sense, a civil society at all.

The purpose of normal human societies is in the first place to survive; and, after that, to satisfy what Mill called "the deepest interests of mankind," that is to say, to satisfy at any rate a minimum number of men's normal desires after their basic needs are satisfied—say, for self-expression, happiness, freedom, justice. Any government which realizes these values to a reasonable degree is held to fulfill its function. These are not the principal ends of Soviet society, or of its government. Conditioned by its revolutionary origins, it is organized to achieve objectives, to respond to challenges, win victories. Like a school, a team of players, still more like an army on the march, it is a specialized institution designed for specific purposes that must be made explicit to its members by the leaders. Soviet life is constructed to strive for goals. It makes little difference what the particular goals may be —military or civil, the defeat of the enemy within or without, or the attainment of industrial objectives—announced goals there must be, if Soviet society is to continue to be. The leaders under-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stand this well, and whether or not they are to be regarded as prisoners of their own system, they know that they must continue to exhort their subjects to greater and greater endeavors if they are to avoid the disintegration of the régime. They are in the position of army commanders in a war, who realize that unless their troops see a minimum amount of active service, the discipline, the esprit de corps, the continued existence of the armies as fighting units cannot be guaranteed.

The leaders of the Soviet Union, for all we know, may by now be secretly hankering after the peaceful existence, to abandon the exiguous splendors and unending cruelties and miseries of the régime and subside into "normal" existence. If they harbor any such desires, they know that in the short run, at least, this is not practicable. For Soviet society is organized not for happiness, comfort, liberty, justice, personal relationships, but for combat. Whether they wish it or not the drivers and controllers of this immense train cannot now halt it or leap from it in mid-course without risk of destruction. If they are to survive and above all remain in power, they must go on. Whether they can replace parts of it while it is moving, and so transform it (themselves) into something less savage, less dangerous to themselves and mankind, remains to be seen. At any rate that must be the hope of those who do not think war inevitable.

In the meanwhile this caricature of *dirigisme* has discredited the tradition of social idealism and liquidated the intelligentsia connected with it, perhaps more decisively than unaided persecution could have done. Nothing destroys a minority movement more effectively than the official adoption and inevitable betrayal and perversion of its ends by the state itself. There are cases where nothing succeeds less well than success.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN UNITED STATES POLICY

By John Foster Dulles

THE 35th anniversary of the founding of *Foreign Affairs* is a suitable occasion for comment on the evolution of United States foreign policy and the rôle we can play today in accord with our enduring national principles. During this third of a century, the American people have altered their conception as to the proper part which their Government should take in world affairs.

Since the founding of this nation, the American people have believed that it had a mission in the world. They have believed that "their conduct and example" ("The Federalist," No. 1) would influence events throughout the world and promote the spread of free institutions. But they have traditionally felt that it would be better for their Government to avoid involvement in international issues. So, with rare exceptions, the United States left the field of international politics to the governments of the "Great Powers" of the nineteenth century.

It took the First World War to bring us into major involvement in world crises and conflicts. Then in the decade of the thirties a series of critical events culminated in the greatest of all wars. By its end, a transformation had been effected. It had become obvious that the conduct and example of our people no longer, alone, sufficed to prevent recurrent challenges to our security and our way of life. It was also apparent that only in association with others could we repel such challenges. Furthermore, our national power had grown to be so impressive as to preclude its being merely a reserved, negative force.

Thus, since 1945, our Government has played a leading rôle in a coalition of free nations dedicated to the principles of international order to which our people have long subscribed.

There still remains a nostalgia for the "good old days." This is reinforced by recurrent demonstrations that, great as is our strength, we are not omnipotent. We cannot, by fiat, produce the kind of a world we want. Even nations which depend greatly upon us do not always follow what we believe to be the right course. For they are independent nations, and not our satellites. Our power and policy are but one significant factor in the world in which we live. In combination with other factors we are able

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to influence importantly the course of events. But we cannot deal in absolutes. This, to many Americans, is a source of worriment.

The American people may not yet have completely accepted the rôle that history has made inevitable. But at least a good beginning has been made. It is unlikely that there could now be a successful effort to withdraw the United States Government from official and active participation in international affairs. But in order that such participation should command popular support, our foreign policies should be more than politics. They must evidently reflect the traditional aspirations of our people.

II. COMMUNIST HOSTILITY

United States foreign policy since 1945 has been forced to concern itself primarily with one major threat to the peaceful and orderly development of the kind of international community the American people desire. This is the threat posed by those who direct the totalitarian system of International Communism. Because orthodox Communism represents a materialistic and atheistic creed, it inevitably is repugnant to those who believe in the supremacy of the spirit. Because it seeks world rule through the domination of all governments by the International Communist Party, it is repugnant to all who understand its purposes and, as patriots, cherish national independence. And because it employs fraud and violence to achieve its ends, it is repugnant to all who seek a world society of decency and order.

The United States, as the strongest nation of the non-Communist world, has had the major responsibility for meeting this challenge which, since 1950, has been able to exploit the resources of most of the Eurasian land mass and one-third of the world's population.

Since the death of Stalin in March 1953, there has been a Soviet disavowal of the ruthlessness of the Stalinist period. Internally, that disavowal has found some practical expression. Externally, Soviet policy has been marked by a more diversified range of political, diplomatic and economic tactics vis-à-vis the non-Communist world. This became especially pronounced in 1955. There were such gestures as the sudden consent to a long-overdue Austrian treaty and the overtures to Jugoslavia. At the "summit" conference at Geneva there were professions of peaceful intent and an agreement to reunify Germany by free elections. There

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were profuse offers of "assistance" to many nations and a plea for "cultural relations."

But nowhere, except perhaps in Austria, did the Soviets yield anything of substance or enter into genuine negotiations on basic issues. Economic and military "assistance" was a Trojan horse whereby influence could be gained to promote political subversion. There was no honest acceptance of Jugoslavia's right to have a national Communist government not dominated by International Communism. And in November 1955 at Geneva the Soviet Government flatly repudiated the July "summit" agreement for German reunification.

The year 1956 gave further evidence that the new rulers in Moscow were not essentially changed. Enticements were mingled with threats. When "de-Stalinization," proclaimed by the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, was interpreted in the satellites as justifying more freedom and independence, there were fierce reactions first at Poznan, Poland, and then in Hungary. Obviously, those who presently dictate the doctrines of International Communism are not in fact prepared to accept the consequences of their professed liberalization.

In all the 40 years of Bolshevik rule there is no episode more brutal than the Red Army suppression of the Hungarian people's 1956 uprising against intolerable oppression. And recent Soviet policies in the Near East are inexcusably mischievous.

That area, rich in cultural and religious tradition, yet stricken with historic dissensions and tragic poverty, was chosen in 1955 to be the scene of a new Communist hunt for power. Communist propaganda studiously sought to inflame animosities. The Soviet Government, drawing upon its semi-obsolete war equipment, stimulated an arms race. As a direct or indirect result, violence and bitterness were increased and abject poverty was riveted more firmly as some governments mortgaged the future economic productivity of the people in order to buy Soviet arms. It has indeed been a cynical performance by those who profess to love peace and to desire to uplift the masses.

More than a decade of cold war experience has confirmed our earlier judgments of International Communism. It, and the governments it controls, are deeply hostile to us and to all free and independent governments. Its basic doctrine precludes its changing of its own accord. Self-advertised changes must be considered as mere stratagems.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We need not, however, despair. International Communism is subject to change even against its will. It is not impervious to the erosion of time and circumstance. Khrushchev's speech of February 1956, the July 1957 shake-up in the ruling clique at Moscow, and Mao's speech of February 27, 1957, indicate that even in Russia and the China mainland Soviet and Chinese Communist régimes are confronted with grave internal pressures and dilemmas. The yeast of change is at work, despite all the efforts of "democratic centralism" to keep matters moving in a strictly Leninist pattern. The rulers in Russia do not find it possible to combine industrial and military modernization with the personal repressions of the Middle Ages; and the rulers in China will not find it possible to fit the richly diversified culture of the Chinese into a Communist mold of conformity.

The time may come, indeed we can be confident that it will come, when the nations now ruled by International Communism will have governments which, whatever their label, in fact serve their own nations and their own peoples rather than the insatiable world-wide ambitions of an international Party. There will be broadening participation in government. There will be increasing personal security under law. There will be a significant degree of freedom of thought and expression. And the workers will be permitted to have some choice of the work that they do and to enjoy more of the fruits of their labor. Under those conditions, the people, if not the masters of their government, will at least not be its abject slaves. Vast military power will no longer be completely at the disposal of those who accept no restraints either of a governmental or moral character and whose goal is world-wide rule. When that day comes, we can rejoice. Until that day comes, we shall need to remain on our guard.

III. COLLECTIVE SECURITY

During the last two decades, the United States has found it necessary to recast its ideas and policies regarding national security. The course of our thinking and planning has been in the direction of collective security. In our modern world no nation, however powerful, can find safety in isolation, and security for one is only to be achieved through coöperation with other like-minded nations.

The society of nations is undergoing the transformation that occurs whenever primitive societies develop. There is a gradual

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evolution from conditions where security is a matter of each for himself and the Devil take the hindmost,-to a condition where security is a collective effort to which each contributes and from which each benefits. In that way there is greater security at less cost. The society of nations is gradually and painfully evolving from a primitive condition to one where security is a matter of collective effort and where defense is a common defense.

It is not easy to realize these principles in a world where people have long thought of sovereignty as a status unqualified by interdependence. Yet after a second generation of bitter experience, the United States, with many others, sees the indispensability of interdependence. Today we seek security through the strengthening of universal institutions, by regional arrangements, by maintaining military capabilities in conjunction with our allies, and by determined efforts to diminish the risk of surprise attack and to limit and control armaments.

In 1945 the United States took the lead in organizing the United Nations. We hoped that it would become an effective instrument of collective security. But it still falls short of being that. United Nations action in a divided world has often been paralyzed. For example, the U.S.S.R. has exercised the veto in the Security Council about 80 times. No joint U.N. military force has been set up as contemplated in the Charter, although Korea and Suez point to possible progress in this direction. Also, the Assembly, in the Suez and Hungarian crises of last fall, displayed surprising determination and virtual unanimity.

It is sometimes said by way of reproach that in these matters the United Nations applied a "double standard"—severity toward Israel, France and the United Kingdom, and leniency toward the Soviet Union. This charge has no basis in fact. The Assembly resolutions directed against the use of force in Egypt and in Hungary were equally peremptory.

The double standard was not in the United Nations, but in the nations. There was the moral sensitivity of the Western nations, and their decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There was the immorality of Soviet Communism, and its contempt for the opinions of mankind. We can rejoice that, among the nations, there are governments having standards higher than those of the Government of Soviet Russia. That is not a matter of reproach to them, or to the United Nations.

Despite hopeful indications of progress in the United Nations,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the nations of the free world which felt endangered have, for the most part, felt it necessary to resort to collective, and usually regional, arrangements to safeguard their security. This has been in entire accord with the Charter. In this development the United States has assumed a major rôle and responsibility. Since 1945 we have entered into collective security treaties with 42 other nations and we have less formal arrangements with several more.

The first such treaty—the Rio Pact—was with our own neighbors of this hemisphere. We went on to broaden the base of collective security through a series of multilateral and bilateral pacts which now encompass much of the free world. The forces of NATO, now including the Federal Republic of Germany, stand guard over the treaty-defined North Atlantic region which includes the vital area of Western Europe. In the West Pacific and Far East, the SEATO and ANZUS pacts and four bilateral treaties establish the principle that a threat to one is the concern of all. In the Middle East, the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine assure collective response to Communist aggression at points of special danger or weakness. This nearly world-wide system of regional collective security has served all the participants well. It has deterred aggression and given much-needed assurance to peoples who are especially exposed to attack.

We must, in candor, admit that all of the participants do not look upon these arrangements alike. Some consider them broad political alliances, binding the parties, at least morally, to support each other generally. But the net result has been to further the application of the principle of collective security within the society of nations.

IV. THE STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Collective security must, of course, be buttressed by military capabilities to deter armed aggression and to cope with it if it should occur. In December 1950, in an address before the American Association for the United Nations, I spoke to this problem, pointing out that, "With more than 20 nations strung along the 20,000 miles of Iron Curtain, it is not possible to build up static defensive forces which could make each nation impregnable to such a major and unpredictable assault as Russia could launch. To attempt this would be to have strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere." I went on to say, "Against such military power as the Soviet Union can marshal, collective security de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pends upon capacity to counterattack against the aggressor;" and I pointed to our Strategic Air Force and our stock of weapons as constituting an arsenal of retaliation.

During the ensuing years the military strategy of the free world allies has been largely based upon our great capacity to retaliate should the Soviet Union launch a war of aggression. It is widely accepted that this strategy of deterrence has, during this period, contributed decisively to the security of the free world.

However, the United States has not been content to rely upon a peace which could be preserved only by a capacity to destroy vast segments of the human race. Such a concept is acceptable only as a last alternative. In recent years there has been no other. But the resourcefulness of those who serve our nation in the field of science and weapon engineering now shows that it is possible to alter the character of nuclear weapons. It seems now that their use need not involve vast destruction and widespread harm to humanity. Recent tests point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation effects of which can be confined substantially to predetermined targets.

In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt. For example, terrain is often such that invasion routes can be decisively dominated by nuclear artillery. Thus, in contrast to the 1950 decade, it may be that by the 1960 decade the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can possess an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack and thus confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country. Thus the tables may be turned, in the sense that instead of those who are non-aggressive having to rely upon all-out nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a successful conventional aggression, but must themselves weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war.

It is precisely this evolution that Soviet diplomacy and propaganda strive most vigorously to prevent. They oppose all such experimental testing of nuclear devices as is necessary to find ways to reduce fall-out and to reduce size. They seem to prefer that nuclear weapons be only the "horror" type of weapons. They apparently calculate that humanitarian instincts will prevent us

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from using such weapons. They know that if Soviet conventional forces were operating in Europe the megaton-type weapon with large fission fall-out could not be used by Western forces without endangering the friendly peoples of the area. Under these conditions Sino-Soviet manpower and its conventional weapons would become the dominant military force in Eurasia. Such considerations make it important to combine the suspension of testing with other measures which will limit armament and the possibilities of surprise attack.

The Soviet Union, in its May 10, 1955, disarmament proposals, said:

> There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation the security of the States signatory to the international convention can not be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving states.

The foregoing is certainly true, at least as regards the use of existing stocks of fissionable material. That is why we do not seek to control existing stocks. We accept their inevitability, limiting our control proposals to newly created fissionable material that can be controlled.

The Soviet statement continued:

> Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality there will be a danger of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and hence the threat of surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all its appalling consequences for the people.

This, again, is a true statement. Unless there are effective measures to reduce "the threat of surprise attack," whether nuclear or otherwise, it would be imprudent to interrupt the safeguarded search for methods to apply nuclear power to weapons in a manner to enlarge the possibilities of defense greatly and at the same time greatly reduce the lethal fall-out factor inherent in weapons which are still in a relatively early stage of development.

As nuclear weapons come to provide greater possibilities for defense this will require changes in military and related political strategy. So long as collective security depends almost wholly upon the deterrent of retaliatory power and the ability to wreak great destruction upon an aggressor nation, there has to be almost

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sole dependence upon the United States. No other nation can afford the cost of maintaining adequate deterrent power. This requires a vast arsenal of planes, weapons and perhaps long-range missiles. These must be constantly renewed to overcome increasing defensive capabilities. This in turn requires vast outlay for experimentation.

However, as nuclear weapons become more tactical in character and thus more adaptable to area defense, there will inevitably be a desire on the part of those allies which are technically qualified to participate more directly in this defense and to have a greater assurance that this defensive power will in fact be used. Such factors are already leading to study of a so-called "atomic weapons stockpile" which could be established by the United States in the European NATO area, and, as becomes appropriate, made available to NATO.

A concomitant of this problem is how to prevent the promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Without safeguards, such weapons might in the future get into the hands of irresponsible dictators and be used as a form of international blackmail. The world would indeed become an unhappy place to live in if humanity had to accept an ever-present threat of this character.

We are only beginning to envisage the drastic changes in political-military relations which will be consequent upon the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and operating experience in the nuclear field. New weapons possibilities are opening up in rapid succession. Political thinking finds it difficult to keep up with that pace. And, of course, there is inevitably some interval between the thinking and the institutionalizing of the results of thinking.

The development of a common defense has meant, and will continue to mean, heavy outlays for an effective and modern United States military establishment. It has also required, and will continue to require, the United States to give military assistance and support to the military forces of those nations associated with us in collective arrangements or in special need or danger. Such assistance is in no sense to be viewed as charity. It is based on a hard-headed appraisal of our own defense needs. Without it, our own defense costs would be far greater and our security far less. The aggregate military and economic resources of the free world coalition represent the greatest and least costly insurance against war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V. "DISARMAMENT"

The United States recognizes that armaments alone are no lasting guarantee of peace. We are, therefore, pursuing a policy designed to set up safeguards against surprise attack, and to bring national armaments, both nuclear and conventional, under effective international limitation and supervision. It is true that so-called "disarmament" efforts in the past have proved futile. The Hague Peace Conferences, the Versailles Treaty, the Washington Naval Limitation Agreement, the League of Nations Disarmament Conferences, are recent conspicuous examples of failure. But there are important differences today.

Past efforts have usually proceeded from the assumption that it is possible to establish and maintain certain defined levels of military strength and to equate these dependably as between the nations. Actually, military potentials are so imponderable that this always has been and always will be a futile pursuit. Today there is a new approach. It is proposed to establish a system of international supervision which will make massive surprise attack unlikely. If this happens, then general war becomes less likely and the level of armaments will almost automatically go down.

Today, the great military establishments derive largely from one of two calculations. A potential attacker calculates that he may be able to accumulate the power to gain a decisive initial advantage by surprise attack. Those who feel that they may be attacked calculate that the only effective deterrent to attack is to possess, collectively, power so great and so decentralized that it cannot be rendered nugatory by a massive surprise attack.

New discoveries and their application lead to constantly mounting exertions to develop means of attack and of retaliation and of means of survival. The only effective way to stop the cycle is to establish such international supervision of the great sources of military power that it becomes unlikely that there can be undetected preparation for an attack massive enough to destroy the opposing source of power. That was President Eisenhower's "open skies" concept, first put forward at the Geneva "summit" conference of 1955.

A potential aggressor, subject to inspection from the air, supplemented by a ground component, will know that he probably cannot use vast armament to advantage. And nations exposed to aggression will know that they probably cannot be wiped out at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a single blow and that therefore they can rely more than now upon potential military strength rather than strength actually in being. Thus there will be no stimulation, as at present, for an arms race. This will not solve all the problems of armament, or guarantee peace. But the new approach could create an atmosphere in which other measures, now impossible, would become possible.

The most important difference from the past is, of course, the fact that never before has there been such need to reduce the risk of war. Today a general war between the great military Powers could destroy almost all human life, certainly in the northern latitudes. Our working hypothesis must be that what is necessary is possible. We assume that the forces which man has created, man can by wisdom, resourcefulness and discipline harness and control. We persevere in common efforts to free the world from the continuing threat of destruction by the weapons that its civilization has produced.

VI. FREE WORLD HEALTH AND VITALITY

Nations, like individuals, cannot live to themselves alone. Realizing this, the American people have always given generously of their substance to victims of disaster in many parts of the world and have engaged in innumerable programs of humanitarian assistance. These, until recently, have been the outcome mainly of philanthropic motives. During the past decade they have reflected enlightened national self-interest.

We now see that the world has become so much a unit that wherever the body politic is afflicted the whole is endangered. We realize that peace and prosperity for one requires, in the long run, that all should have the opportunity to pursue happiness. We see the need for more vital domestic forces in all free lands, to resist Communist subversion or attack.

Since 1945, our nation has granted, outright, nearly $50 billion in aid, military and economic. That has evidenced an enlightened conception of our own national interest. It is significant that, despite this assistance to others at the rate of about $5 billion a year, our own economy has developed in a healthy manner. This has been a decade of rising prosperity. In 1946 our national income was approximately $180 billion. In 1951 it was approximately $277 billion. In 1956 it was approximately $344 billion.

The Marshall Plan was the most dramatic of our economic as-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sistance efforts. It provided Western Europe with some of the means, and with the time and opportunity, to save itself. Now we see in Western Europe the development of a degree of unity which had been the vision of enlightened statesmen for many years. There has been, first, the Coal and Steel Community, then the Brussels Treaty for European Union, and now the treaties for a Common Market and Euratom. These developments are momentous in terms of developing unity, strength and well-being in an area which for centuries has been the seat of recurrent wars threatening the very existence of Western civilization.

In recent years, as the Western European economy has been reëstablished, the United States has placed increasing emphasis on economic and technical assistance to the newly awakened and needy peoples of Asia and Africa. As upwards of 800,000,000 people, representing 20 new nations, have won political liberty, one of the momentous issues of our time has been whether this political liberty would also mean the liberation of the people from a quagmire of economic misery and hopelessness. If not, present political liberty may prove a mere transition from one form of colonial rule to another far worse.

All of our aid programs, whether military, economic or technical, are rightly viewed as ventures in mutual security. If we have given more than others, this reflects our greater ability to give. An important question now raised about our mutual security policies is, will there be an early end to them? Recent studies by expert commissions all attest to their continuing necessity.

The time to end such assistance will be when it no longer serves the enlightened self-interest of the United States. Military assistance and defense support represent about 70 percent of the entire program. That is part of our own defense. As regards economic assistance, we can expect private capital gradually to assume increasing responsibility for promoting the development of less well-developed areas, provided there is political stability. It is to be noted that while the dollar value of our mutual security spending has not greatly declined in recent years, an increasing amount of this is in terms of loans rather than of grants. Also, the total of public loans and grants now represents only about 1 percent of our national income, whereas a few years ago grants alone represented about 3 percent.

A cessation of our mutual security programs would, under present conditions, be disastrous. What is needed is to put neces-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sary aid programs on a more long-term, businesslike basis, reducing grant aid to a minimum and applying our assistance in ways that will best help needy peoples to help themselves. As a result of intensive studies independently initiated by the Executive and the Congress, one new instrumentality is now being inaugurated, the Development Loan Fund. This, when adequately capitalized, will place major responsibility on the receiving countries and stimulate self-help and private investment.

United States foreign economic policy has been vigorous in fields other than aid. President Eisenhower's speech to the United Nations in December 1953 dramatized the possible peaceful uses of atomic energy. Much has been accomplished to realize these possibilities through bilateral agreements. Recently the United States ratified the Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency, which should be a milestone in the general application of this marvelous new resource for the benefit and not for the destruction of mankind.

We recognize that governmental restrictions on trade have in the past throttled world commerce to the detriment of every nation. We have entered into international undertakings, notably the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to prevent this and to promote the interchange of goods and services. This expansion materially benefits the United States and friendly nations. Measures which might adversely affect a nation are avoided. Economic growth is stimulated throughout the world. The benefits of advances in one country are readily diffused to others.

We do not forget that every government has a primary duty to serve its own people. But usually that service can be best rendered by finding ways which help others also, or which at least do not hurt others. Occasionally, and happily only rarely, situations arise which cannot be resolved by this formula. But in general we seek an international society in which men, goods and ideas flow freely and without obstruction throughout a wide area and in which the opportunity to pursue happiness is open to every man and woman. The United States market, which dependably offers so much that others want, and which dependably buys so much that others would sell, is the great economic stabilizer of the free world. It helps to combat Communism and the self-centered nationalisms which are alike in rejecting the concept of interdependence.

Few economic theories are today as obsolete as those of Marx.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They were propagated nearly a century ago in relation to a society which since then has rapidly transformed itself through the force of its own dynamic qualities.

The social and economic basis of democracy has been widened throughout the Western world and the same process is beginning and accelerating in other free world areas. International Communism is a reactionary movement. Its "planning" makes slaves of the producers and creates a new exploiting and ruling class. It is replete with contradictions which, in free countries, have been resolved by a peaceful, yet dynamic, evolution.

We cannot, of course, claim perfection. The dramatic and peaceful development of the social and economic structure of our free societies must and will go forward. But even though we do *not claim perfection, we can claim that the social goals which* Communism pretends to seek are in fact achieved to a far greater extent within our free society than they are achieved in Soviet Russia or Communist China.

VII. PEACEFUL CHANGE

As our country has been swept more fully into the broad currents of human affairs, we have been made more and more conscious of those rapid world movements of our century which seem incessantly to transform the international landscape. Change is the law of life, and that includes international life. Our common problem, in a world of rapid and often momentous change, is to ensure that necessary changes occur in peaceful fashion without upheaval or war. Violent change is never selective change. It destroys the good as well as the bad. Change is beneficent when it is selective, continuing and developing the good while shedding that which is evil, outmoded or inadequate.

We have already alluded to some of the areas where change is most conspicuous. There is first of all the change which will inevitably result from the splitting of the atom. A vast new source of power is available to man, and we can be sure that it will be used to effect momentous changes. It can destroy man, or it can enrich him. The choice is up to man himself. The United States first had the power of fission and used it in war to defend freedom. We feel a special responsibility to help to assure that man's momentous choice shall be "Atoms for Peace."

Another vast force for change is political nationalism. This is operating strongly in Asia and Africa. Since 1945, it has resulted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the creation of a score of new nations. Other peoples are well on their way to political independence.

But the mere act of granting political independence does not of itself assure that the newly independent peoples will in fact have governments of their own choosing or governments able and willing to serve the governed. It does not of itself mean that the society of nations is enriched by new recruits dedicated to principles of interdependence and an international order of law and justice. It is going to be necessary to find policies to cope with new demands of colonial peoples, with strident and embittered nationalisms, and with social unrest among those who tend to feel that political liberty automatically should provide them with new economic opportunity.

The United States, once itself a colony, shares and sympathizes with the aspirations of peoples for political independence. Also, we know the extent to which liberty, for its own self-preservation, requires the self-restraint of moral law and the education to make sound judgments. We can and should play an important part in finding the policies to cope with the political and social ferment of much of the human race.

We recognize, as does the United Nations Charter in Article 14, that there will be constantly arising particular situations likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations and calling for peaceful adjustment. We have noted in recent years the emergence of such situations, for example the disputes over Cyprus, Kashmir and West Irian; between Arabs and Israelis; and over Suez. These not only disrupt world peace and comity. They provide fertile soil for Communist propaganda and penetration.

The United States recognizes that, in the case of such disputes, all of the merits are not on one side. Therefore we do not identify ourselves with any purely partisan approach. The Soviet rulers, unconcerned with the merits and eager only to extend their power, are prepared to back one side against the other if, in return, they obtain political advantages. Because they sometimes gain advantages out of such disputes, their interest lies in creating and exacerbating disputes and preventing their settlement.

This illustrates how important it is for the free world to establish regular procedures for the settlement of disputes between its members. This has already been done in the Western hemisphere through the Organization of American States. Within the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

past few years several serious disputes between American States have been successfully dealt with by the procedures of this Organization. Its members deserve the highest praise for their loyalty to the peaceful processes of law and justice which they have established. They have set a notable example which ought to be followed more generally.

Largely as a result of United States initiation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now developing processes for the settlement of disputes between its members. Last year the Secretary-General of NATO was given new responsibilities in this respect.

There are, in the long run, great potentialities in Article 14 of the United Nations Charter which authorizes the Assembly to recommend change in the status quo. The exercise of this delicate function requires knowledge, wisdom and self-restraint. It becomes particularly difficult for the Assembly to exercise this function when a powerful minority of members seeks not fair and just settlements but unsettlements which lend themselves to the use by International Communism of its revolutionary tactics.

Sometimes it is felt that the United States ought more often to use its power to effectuate settlements. The United States can and does exert an influence in quiet and inconspicuous ways as a friend of all the parties. We stand ready to exercise our good offices if and when invited to do so under adequate terms of reference. But we do not assume the right to meddle or be the arbiter of other peoples' affairs.

The most dangerous of all unresolved disputes are those within the areas now under the rule of International Communism. The pattern here is classic. There is the inevitability of change, but the situation is dominated by those who do not believe in peaceful change at the expense of their power. Such a state of affairs has historically produced violent eruptions. Some of the areas in question are especially explosive as they involve the artificial division of historic nations—Germany, Korea and Viet Nam. Others, as lately demonstrated in Hungary and Poland, contain resentments so bitter that many patriots would die in revolt against hopeless odds rather than continue to suffer in silence.

United States policy, as proclaimed repeatedly, will never sanction these injustices nor accept them as permanent. But we strive only by peaceful means to achieve justice. It would not be in the general interest, nor in the interest of the peoples directly con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cerned, for events to shape up into war. We shall continue to employ all the resources of the United Nations and all diplomatic means and moral pressures to alleviate the injustices and oppressions suffered by these peoples and to make their plight known to world opinion. We have faith in their ultimate freedom and independence. When the Russian leaders decide to serve the interests of Russia, and cease to be the agents of International Communism, they will act in the knowledge that Russia's long-term interests require the reunification of Germany in freedom and the liberation of the satellites. Only thus can Russia achieve its proper desire to be surrounded by friendly peoples. The martyrs of Hungary have not died in vain if they have advanced the coming of that day.

Even such a brief survey of the forces working for change cannot but leave us with a sense of their immensity and the relative paucity of political means for keeping them within peaceful channels. Peace and justice are surely in jeopardy.

Within a stable individual society there are institutions to effectuate and legalize change—usually parliamentary bodies which make and re-make laws so that political, economic and social changes occur peacefully and with legitimacy. In the international field, concepts of sovereignty which have become obsolete lead nations to feel that they can put what they deem to be their own national rights and interests above the need of the whole society of nations—the need for peaceful settlements. It will probably be a long time before there is any universal mandatory process for effectuating international change. But there can and should be a far greater willingness than there now is to subordinate national interests to the interest of the world community, to use existing agencies such as the Court of International Justice and to develop and accept a body of written or unwritten international law.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Two significant facts stand out respecting United States foreign policy. The first is that our policies have developed as a reflection of deeply ingrained national characteristics. The second is that our policies have been influenced and modified by changing world conditions in the effort to apply our basic concepts to actual conditions and to the challenges they have presented.

These two features of our policy are by no means incompatible. To hold to national judgments of right and wrong does not mean

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that we are so closely wedded to doctrinaire concepts that we cannot adjust our policies to the demands of the hour. To think of our policies as shifting and changing in order to cope with varying situations need not be to infer that no central and governing core of principle gives them continuity. In this article we have dwelt mainly on the manner in which policy has adapted itself to new and challenging problems; but the manner and conduct have been guided throughout by certain principles.

These principles were unforgettably formulated by George Washington in his Farewell Address. He there points out that "of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports." And he went on to emphasize the primary importance of a general diffusion of knowledge. "In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened."

Because of our religious beliefs we attach exceptional importance to freedom. We believe in the sanctity of the human personality, in the inalienable rights with which men are endowed by their Creator and in their right to have governments of their own choosing. But we also believe that individuals as well as governments are subject to moral law. We recognize that liberty, whether it be individual or national, can be dangerous license unless it is exercised under the disciplines of moral law and with adequate knowledge and education to assure that moral judgments in fact take all relevant factors into account.

We are as a nation unsympathetic to systems and governments that deny human freedom and seek to mold all men to a preconceived pattern and to use them as tools to aggrandize the state. We are also unsympathetic to assertions of sovereignty which do not accept the concept of social interdependence. As Americans we have built our nation on the federal principle, drawing together what were sovereign states into a coöperative community. We thus naturally invoke the idea of coöperation between nations in the pursuit of ends which correspond with the aspirations of all people.

Despite a certain superficial indifference to the niceties of law observance, Americans have developed a profound respect for law as the basis of social and civic life. We conceive of man-made law as an effort to apply the moral law to the conditions of time and place. Our Constitution is the oldest basic written law in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world today. This concept of law permeates our entire political system and gives it a stability and moderation rarely matched among contemporary governments. We yearn to see the behavior of nations in their relations with one another rest upon the foundation of agreed legal principles derived from moral concepts. We abhor arbitrary government which reflects only the caprice of a tyrant.

These concepts, taken together, constitute our American way of life. They represent, for us, the idea and reality of freedom under law—of which the most authoritative is moral law. It is inevitable that they should influence our foreign policy. For, under a representative form of government, foreign policy is valid only as an expression and a projection of national character and national convictions. Whoever would understand our policy should try to comprehend us as a nation.

The constancy of our national character is what, even in such a swiftly changing era, gives stability and continuity to our foreign policy. It is well that this is so, for it enables those who understand the United States to comprehend also the mainsprings of its action and thus estimate, in their own interest, what the response of the United States to any situation is likely to be.

The fact has an important bearing on our alliances. As leader of a great coalition, we can never hope to please all countries. But we can win respect if it is felt that we are acting in true character.

It is important also in relation to those who are hostile to us. Potential enemies will be less inclined to gamble on our behavior —with all the risks of miscalculation—if they can count with a reasonable degree of certainty upon our national conduct.

So toward all, whether friendly or not, we should act as a people proud of our heritage, assured in our convictions and confident in our destiny. We have no desire to impose upon others the pattern of our thought and our institutions. Yet we may take pride in the fact that our principles are drawn from the great thinkers of the eighteenth century "age of enlightenment" who impressed their ideas deeply upon modern Western culture as a whole. These principles are not narrowly parochial but universal in their application. In America they were the inspiration of the greatest democratic experiment in history. In so far as our national behavior reflects these principles, it is certain to meet, in the long run, with understanding and respect.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A DEMOCRAT LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY

By John F. Kennedy

THE past months have set before our policy-makers a map whose essential features are not unfamiliar to those who have studied or been a part of the events of the past decade, but it is also crowded with new silhouettes. There are new projections, contours and dimensions. International events in recent months have accelerated in pace and have been in a flux not yet comprehended by the leadership of our nation or taken account of in adjustments in the machinery of our foreign policy. To an observer in the opposition party there appear two central weaknesses in our current foreign policy: first, a failure to appreciate how the forces of nationalism are rewriting the geopolitical map of the world—especially in North Africa, southeastern Europe and the Middle East; and second, a lack of decision and conviction in our leadership, which has recoiled from clearly informing both the people and Congress, which seeks too often to substitute slogans for solutions, which at times has even taken pride in the timidity of its ideas.

II

International events today are subject to a double pull—a search for political *identity* by the new states and the search for *unity* among the established states of the world. As Europe draws in upon itself toward a Common Market and greater political integration, Africa, its former colonial estate, is breaking apart into new and emergent states. Through the world today there runs both a tide toward and away from sovereignty. Many Americans view these tendencies with equal favor, reading into the one our own Declaration of Independence and Revolution, into the other the work of our Constitutional builders of a federal state. In fact, of course, we dangerously misread the movements of our time if we set them only in the prisms of our own historic experience. It is easy by a false parallelism to mistake nationalism itself for national salvation, to mistake the assertion of broad unity for its healthy substance.

Modern nationalism, too, has a twin heritage. In one of its aspects it reflects a positive search for political freedom and self-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development, in another it is the residue of disintegration and the destruction of the old moorings. The cardinal result of the First World War was the political collapse of the old continental Europe; the most apparent outcome of the Second World War was the erosion of Europe overseas. It is a temptation to write the history of the last 40 years in terms of the symmetric rise of two giant states, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. But it is quite as important to see this period in terms of the decline of other states and the substitution for them of new combinations and clusters of power. In this perspective we see that the United States and the Soviet Union are not only magnets which attract power; they are also, by their overarching influence, repellent forces. This has become especially clear in the events of the last year.

Whereas the coming of the nuclear age reinforced the bipolar structure of world power, its secondary effects now stimulate a dispersion of strength and influence. Great Britain has felt the need to chart an independent course in nuclear development; France is preparing to cut a separate path; China, Germany and India and several smaller nations may soon possess nuclear tools of destruction. In the period of NATO build-up the Western nations had a rough strategic agreement; today even the essential purposes of NATO have come into dispute, and on disarmament even close allies have shown a diversity of aims.

A generation ago the British Commonwealth was a bedrock fact of world politics. Today the Commonwealth has not simply widened in conception with the inclusion of new nations such as India, Pakistan and Ceylon; even among the core members the events of last fall produced a cleavage, when Canada seized the initiative in applying a brake against the British and French adventure in Egypt. India, which itself represents a pole within the Commonwealth, is the leading claimant for the rôle of a "broker" middle state in the larger bipolar struggle; she is also a centerpiece in a "middle zone" of uncommitted nations extending from Casablanca to Djakarta. These nations have gained an effective voice in the United Nations, especially in the General Assembly whose prestige we ourselves helped to enhance by Secretary Acheson's "Uniting for Peace Resolution" of 1950. Today the Arab states alone have as many Assembly seats as all the countries of Western Europe, and the steady increase in the number of U.N. members and the expanded authority of the General Assembly have more and more diluted the commanding positions of the "big" states

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that have permanent seats in the Security Council. Indeed, to set the constellation of power in the U.N. today against the pattern envisaged at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco a little more than a decade ago is to appreciate the scope and rapidity of the change which has taken place. In diplomacy as in military command there is a temptation to fight today's battles with the pattern books and position papers of yesterday's successes.

The task is to strike a realistic balance between the legitimate appeals to national self-determination which pulsate through the uncommitted world and the gravitational pulls toward unity which grow from the technological and economic interdependence of modern states. This is a very difficult exercise in political ballistics. Different parts of the world are at divergent points along the trajectory of political independence. Both democratic self-government and large supra-national mergers have preconditions —a capacity to govern and a communality of interest which cannot be created only out of military fear or idealistic impulse. Americans have always displayed a faith in self-enforcing moral principles and have hankered for apocalyptic solutions and fixed patterns; they must learn that most current issues in international politics do not encourage such unrealistic hopes. Many of the old conceptions of war and peace, friend and foe, victory and defeat, must be reshaped in the light of new realities.

III

We usually attribute to the enemy camp a rigidity of outlook and method; and certainly Russian thinking is hard in texture, its message unrelenting, its outward cast unchanging. We deceive ourselves, however, if we believe that on this account we are the more manœuvrable and flexible in our actions. At times in recent years it has been hard to distinguish Secretary Dulles' emphatic reaffirmations of the imminent collapse of Soviet totalitarianism from the wooden Marxist-Stalinist view of the essential fragility of the capitalist order. While retaining faith in our forms of government and economy, we should not underestimate the Russian capacity for feint and adjustment. While the United States was going through the giddy months after the empty triumphs of Geneva, the Russian leaders, noting the climate of Bandung and the restlessness of the "middle belt," set in motion new forces of ruble diplomacy, economic penetration and political manœuvre. Our only response to these series of actions was to continue to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rely unsuccessfully on the paper defenses of the Baghdad Pact, which rested on the false assumption that there was an identity of interest among all the states of the Middle East. This period ended with Mr. Dulles' unhappy efforts to call the Russian bluff over the Aswan Dam.

In other ways, too, we have underestimated as a nation the capacity of the Russians to compete with us militarily and economically. After the war we greatly misjudged their ability to build the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb; we underestimated their technological manpower in numbers and quality; we had an easy confidence that we could outdo them in producing planes, missiles and heavy weapons; and we miscalculated the rate of basic economic growth and its rate of acceleration in the U.S.S.R. and China.

While underestimating the potentialities of Russian developments we held exaggerated hopes as to how Western influences could flow into cracks occurring in the Soviet and satellite structure. Hardly had we announced the intention to "liberate" the satellite states of Europe before the Berlin riots occurred. After we found ourselves unable to turn this uprising to more than slight propaganda advantage, we tended to switch to the view that the states of East Europe were closed cells. The Administration saw little hope that new generations could wrench themselves free from the Soviet spell; yet it was precisely university youth and labor unionists, both peculiarly exposed to Soviet indoctrination, who led the rebellions against domination from Moscow. Once again the United States was able to offer little assistance during the ordeal. It has been slow to exploit the possibilities opened up by the gradual detachment of Poland from Russian rule; it was hesitant on granting economic aid and cut the amount to but a fraction of need.

It is in this sort of situation that American thinking, conditioned to the notion of two world camps, most needs reorientation—to accept partial gains in order to undercut slowly the foundations of the Soviet order. For it is most unlikely that any Iron Curtain country will defect simply from East to West. The movement will be gradual, along a spectrum. It would be a kindly recognition of the changing conditions behind the curtain if the Battle Act, Surplus Disposal Act and Mutual Security Act were amended so that economic and financial assistance might be given to countries existing in a kind of Communist limbo. These legisla-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive Acts were drawn for different conditions, in days when there was only one "flower" in the Communist garden—Stalin.

The fragmentation of authority within the Soviet orbit has been one of the main gains of the post-Stalinist era. The totalitarian succession has not passed easily from Stalin to Khrushchev. There are other Communists—Mao, Tito, Gomulka—who claim to speak with Communism's authentic voice. Nationalism is a force cutting into the Soviet world as well as the Western. What will be the full effect of the growth of these centripetal currents remains to be seen, but Mao is surely right in the belief that Moscow's once total monopoly of the gardener's craft has gone.

IV

What Walter Millis has called "the hypertrophy of war" has helped to create the loose-jointed nature of current world politics. The need to face the prospect of having to wage a limited war while holding the levers of unlimited destruction, the need to discriminate between pressures and the appropriate responses in different parts of the world, the need to keep strategy flexible without letting it become formless—these are challenges which Americans with their inclination to problem-solving and passkey formulas are not well equipped to meet. As the threat of total war has seemed to decline and as the danger we faced in 1947–48 has become less clear, the more traditional forms of diplomacy have resumed their old importance and we have again become concerned with the interstitial problems of the world community. The new situation has also brought about the reëmergence of small and middle states as important international factors and has set up a more complicated and fluid balance of power. Various states gain strength because they provide concessions for military bases or contain special resources; others such as Germany and Sweden have an industrial vigor which gives them levers of influence, not only because they can contribute to one or another power bloc but also because they can be leading exporters of both goods and expertise to the underdeveloped nations.

In Europe itself there is alike a new crystallization and a new diffusion of power. The unnecessarily forced pace of German rearmament and the cross-pressures of French politics and commitments aborted the hopes for establishing the European Defense Community. Painful as the French parliament's burial of this scheme was for much European and American opinion, the defeat

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for American diplomacy may have been salutary in that it destroyed false images. The countries of Europe are now more aware of the practical obstacles to integration, better appreciate the price of unity, more fully understand that concrete if gradual achievements are better than indulgence in great dreams that do not come true. The United States, too, is more aware that the drive for European integration does not represent any European fancy for imitating or being absorbed into American patterns, but in part, at least, a way to win detachment from the United States. Such revolutionary developments as the Common Market and Euratom offer two possibilities—either that the ending of old rifts will release new energies, or that the continental states will become locked in a closed system. It is time for the United States as well as Great Britain to realize that activation of the European Common Market and its companion agreements may well set in motion forces running counter to our present pattern of alliances and relationships with Europe.

Clearly one of the great successes of postwar policy has been the economic revival of Germany in a political framework with a democratic cast considerably stronger and therefore more hopeful than that of the twenties. However, partly out of appreciation and admiration for this outstanding reinvigoration of German politics, American policy has let itself be lashed too tightly to a single German government and party. Whatever elections show, the age of Adenauer is over. The biggest question in any government must now be the identity of Adenauer's eventual successor. The present Administration, like its Democratic predecessor, has riveted its policy and favor exclusively on one leader and party and made pariahs of the opposition, who will inevitably be a part of some future German government. The fidelity to the West of the Socialist opposition is unquestionable, and yet sometimes our statements and actions seem almost to equate them with the puppet régime in East Germany. In all Europe a new generation is coming to power, and it is dangerous to become alienated from them. The giants of the postwar period—Churchill, Adenauer, DeGasperi—have left their imprint. But in the last two years the French Socialist and Radical parties, British Labor, the Italian Christian Democrats, have all been experiencing the transfer of power to new leaders for whom many of the old distinctions between "Left" and "Right" have lost validity. The United States is ill-advised to chase the shadows of the past and ignore the polit-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ical leadership and thinking of the generation which is now coming of age.

V

Our response to the Soviet challenge in Asia and the Middle East has been exaggeratedly military. However, in Asia our policy has been probably too rigid, in the Middle East too soft. In Asia we have shifted from a hyperbolic image of a free China to the brittle conception of a shiftless totalitarian China. Objectives have become so distorted that our State Department first adamantly opposed even the dispatch to China of newsmen whose reports might allow us to test the validity of our policy; and then set extraordinary conditions with regard to an agreement for their admission. Information and independent judgment about China are so hard to secure that it is very difficult to make an estimate of developments there. There have been—and still are—compelling reasons for the non-recognition of China; but we must be very careful not to strait-jacket our policy as a result of ignorance and fail to detect a change in the objective situation when it comes. If a low ceiling is placed on criticism, policy tends to rigidity and vested interests harden to the point where established viewpoints cannot be modified.

At the moment there is a "deëmphasis" in our Far Eastern concerns, but the presence of important new problems is only thinly concealed. Not only is there the need to reëxamine our military and political position in Korea, but the place of Japan in the Far East deserves special attention. Though many observers have assumed that the military build-up of Japan is of supreme importance, the first need is in fact to find the roads by which Japan may stage an enduring economic revival. Dependent on trade for survival, Japan must find new markets in Asia, and particularly in China. Whether or not Western countries relax their own trade barriers, the issue has important political consequences for Japan.

In the Middle East, since the war, there has been no clear overall conception of American policy. We were right to support the establishment of the state of Israel, whose democratic stamina and military effectiveness have withstood the hard tests of outside challenge and aggression. But in dealing with the other nations of the area we have wavered. In Iran we built up Mossadegh and then scaled him down. In Egypt we encouraged the forma-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of a revolutionary régime and belatedly restrained its excesses. We helped to make the Aswan Dam an imposing symbol of Western economic leadership and then foreclosed it. Periodically after the war we tinkered with notions of a Middle Eastern defense pact, but never were able to decide who would be defended and against whom. Toward both the Arabs and Israelis we have had an on-and-off policy. Some economic aid was provided for the Arab states, but almost half of the funds appropriated between 1951–1956 were unexpended because of the seeming scarcity of suitable projects.

In this period Middle Eastern political development has generally speaking been in mid-passage between feudal colonialism and semi-feudal independence. British economic interest and political guidance were considered predominant there and we preferred to leave the area under the umbrella of British influence and protection. Events, however, conspired to bring the influence of the United States into play. Our services were often more remedial than preventive. More than in any other area of the world, our policy in the Middle East has been a creature of crisis, jagged in its ups and downs and ambiguous in its direction. The Persian oil crisis, the Israeli war for independence, the British evacuation from the Suez area—these and other events marked a recession of British influence from the Middle East and a sudden pressure for American intervention. On each occasion the United States helped with the immediate problem but without being able to do much toward healing the underlying organic maladies. In the end, it took the British and French invasion of Suez to jolt the United States into recognizing the need for a broader-gauge and more sustained policy. There had been no lack of pointers toward what that policy might include—a multilateral regional development fund, the Jordan River scheme, a food pool making imaginative use of our agricultural surpluses, a program for Arab refugees. What was missing was active political leadership to break the paralysis of purpose.

Occurrences in the Middle East and Asia now cast their shadow over Africa. Here again a sudden inflammation of tension is to be noted, a drive to cut the cords of colonial rule and at the same time to meet the need for economic development and growth. All over the continent several revolutions are occurring at once and many ideas and influences are in collision. The rapidity of the changes makes the formulation of policy both difficult and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more necessary. Here more than almost anywhere else the modern era of communications, with its rapid cross-fertilization of ideas and the reaction of social pressures, makes attempts to segment and isolate individual political conflicts entirely futile. Americans are perhaps too inclined to take at face value cheap caricatures of British and French colonial rule in Africa. The past achievements and current progress of those nations, however, especially in Central Africa, do not make new adjustments unnecessary. When Morocco and Tunisia are free states, Algeria cannot be kept an armed camp.

There are important and subtle political and cultural differences, of course, between different parts of Africa, but the complexity of problems thereby created does not absolve the United States of the duty of interesting itself in them. The temptation is to accept the idea that since our coalition allies have a primary interest there, the United States, like it or not, had best take an enforced diplomatic holiday. In an impasse such as that created by the Algerian rebellion we are told that an American declaration of interest would be illegitimate, a rash provocation of a major ally and a gross departure from accepted standards of international conduct—this in spite of the fact that the influences of the crisis spill over into the rest of free Africa, eat into the fabric of NATO and contaminate our relationships in the United Nations.

We face here one of the harshest perplexities of our policy. The resolution of it would greatly enhance the whole position of the West in Asia and Africa. There obviously is danger in making international policy on the basis of popularity polls; some of the liberal critics of American policy toward neutrals fail to see the risks of setting policy courses by volatile barometric readings. The United States should maintain a priority among its interests and not exchange an ally for a relationship based on a fleeting friendship or a quixotic flirtation. This does not argue, however, for letting slip a main chance to win the world of uncommitted nations. A pose of benign "neutrality" or "non-intervention" will not help us to advance the cause of our NATO allies or the Western position in general. Washing one's hands of responsibility, like plans for "sanitary war" and "clean bombs," induces an illusion of antisepsis and tidy order, but it is only an illusion. The consequences of abstention can be quite as positive as those of direct action. Our policies in Indochina and North Africa since the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second World War indicate that the forces of nationalism cannot be reversed in an effort to cushion their results for an ally.

From now on, our policy in Africa must not be hinged only on metropolitan Europe. In charting it, we must not seek to use it only as a tool of anti-Communism. Neither should we seek to displace European rule where it is making visible and sustained progress in establishing the bases for political independence. And we must show special care not to give grounds for an accusation that we helped to create a free Africa merely as a new arena for economic exploitation. There is no question, for example, that the countries of North Africa should enjoy a special interdependent economic relationship with France. Independence does not require a total severance of old relations, as the newest British dominions well illustrate; what it does require is the substance and not the mere shadow of self-government.

VI

In the years immediately ahead we face a challenge in how to help the new and underdeveloped nations bear their economic burdens. Again we must strike a balance between what Denis Brogan has labelled "the illusion of American omnipotence" and a somber contemplation of the impossibility of absolute solutions.

It is sobering to realize that population curves turn steeply upwards in underdeveloped lands, that as a result the economic backwardness of much of the world is increasing, and that the process of social disintegration intensifies with the rising curve of expectations among many peoples. Old liberal bromides have no appeal to nations which seek a quick transition to industrialization and who admire the disciplined attack which Communism seems to make upon the problems of economic modernization and redistribution. The more immediately persuasive experiences of China and Russia probably approximate what lies ahead for states such as Indonesia or Egypt, suffering from deteriorating economic standards and steeply rising populations.

The United States is economically capable of increasing aid for development purposes, but it cannot scatter its assistance on each parched patch of misery and need. The first step would seem to be to make a small number of investments through aid and loans, selected with an eye to their likelihood for success. There is no need for us to be neutral as to the objectives which it should serve. Successful foreign aid must be selective; otherwise a large amount

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of aid goes into projects designed to enhance the prestige of the receiving government and into military panoply which may only perpetuate feudalism. The general approach furnished in the Millikan-Rostow proposals (though too much patterned on the Indian economy and perhaps too sanguine about the possibility of freeing economic assistance from political objectives) furnishes some useful guideposts, particularly in stressing the need for more durable aid commitments and for finding methods which minimize political blackmail and indiscriminate handouts. In this regard the Senate has made beginnings this year in providing a long-term basis for assistance, which has the advantages not only of permitting better planning and a more rational evaluation of the political and psychological effects of aid, but also will tend to avoid the disadvantages of making annual aid appropriations which cannot be spent effectively.

In future years, other nations can probably make larger contributions in skills and money to world-wide economic development. Germany already is a sizable foreign investor and lender, and other nations will grow in such capacity. The development of atomic power has given Great Britain the prospect of becoming a prime exporter of atomic reactors. Chances for developing oil await the French in the Sahara if they can establish a political settlement in North Africa. With opportunities like these opening up, a wider system of multi-national aid, pioneered in Asia by the Colombo Plan, can become a reality.

VII

The new dynamics in foreign relations make it all the more important to consider afresh the methods by which foreign policy is formulated and applied. In this realm there is a special danger that a received body of doctrine will continue to be accepted when it no longer retains its original meaning and validity. The phrase "bipartisanship" in particular is abused and stretched beyond logical limits. It reflects the fact that most of the great departures in American policy since the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 have had substantial support from the opposition party. It recognizes that the opposition party of today may become the governing party tomorrow and that the broad stream of national purpose should not be thrust out of its main channel for fleeting partisan advantage which will later demand payment not only in trouble for the party but damage to the country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bipartisanship also designates the method which enables the Government to enlist the active coöperation of the leadership of both parties and of distinguished individuals in them. Under Mr. Truman a large number of Republicans—Paul Hoffman, John Foster Dulles, John J. McCloy, John Sherman Cooper, Robert Lovett and many others—were given important foreign policy responsibilities. In Congress, too, there was shared responsibility and leadership. Yet Mr. Vandenberg himself was the first to suggest that bipartisanship was not a blanket under which to smother dissent and genuine difference. China was never "bipartisan," nor was Point Four, nor were some extensions of the aid program. European assistance and United Nations policy generally were. Today, however, there is a prevailing view in Washington that to criticize the Administration on any foreign policy count exposes at worst a moral flaw, at best political irresponsibility. The Secretary of State and the President both have fobbed off responsible critics of specific phases of our policy as being captious or ignorant. Few Democrats have served in responsible administrative posts despite the fact that the party controls Congress.

Bipartisanship cannot be permitted to be an excuse for burying dissent. Especially at a time as fluid as the present it must not become a restraining wall against the flow of fresh ideas and the expression of honest doubts. Doubtless a Congressional opposition such as the Democratic majority forms today is not wholly consistent within itself and does not provide a completely adequate set of alternatives. Thus it regrettably has suffered severe fissions in the current year in the support which it has given to the traditional policy of strong mutual security measures. Significant Democratic groups have supported excessive cuts in foreign aid, have backed restrictive trade policies and, after five years of fighting for stronger national defense policies for both ground and air, have assented to excessive reductions in our defense appropriation. Some of this backsliding has come from weariness and discontent with the results achieved by similar measures in the past, some is consequent on important changes in the American economy, some is due to political reasons—"the duty of the opposition party is to oppose." Whatever the reason for the aberrations, they do furnish ground for concern as to whether our position as a responsible Democratic opposition in the field of foreign policy may not become blurred.

Against this, however, the Democrats can place a record which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

refutes the conception that foreign policy is too sensitive and that its many gears are too finely meshed to make constructive initiative or criticism in Congress possible. Our current and increasingly successful policy in Indochina (never a strong feature of the State Department under either Republican or Democratic control) has its origins within Congress. The Middle Eastern Resolution was not only refined and clarified in Congressional review and debate; its meaning was for the first time made clear to its authors, who had argued that prompt and automatic passage of the original text was essential if it was to have any effective impact. A workable concept of long-range economic development grew out of the study organized by the Senate into the foreign assistance program.

There are other illustrations. But the central point is that Congress not only can enrich the content of our policy but also make more certain that responsibility in the Executive is placed where it belongs—in the White House and State Department. President Eisenhower has been in the habit of holding a light rein on the conduct of policy and of parcelling responsibility out to many officials. Because of the President's confidence in the integrity of his associates, because of the elaborate mosaic of command and review within the Executive, and because he has the assured affection of the American people, the President in some instances has tended to mistake form for performance.

The National Security Council and its companion bodies have improved the continuity and coördination of policy-making, but at a price. The massive paper work and the clearance procedure, the compulsion to achieve agreement among departments and agencies, often produce policy statements which are only a mongrelization of clashing views. Sparks of dissent and a clear confrontation of alternatives may sometimes be more useful as guides to action than an amalgam on paper of conflicting judgments. We like to believe that the National Security Council previews all likely crises and has on file studies that set forth the right responses. In reality, the anthology of decisions which the N.S.C. compiles has only contingent reliability. Despite its elegant lacework of committees and boards of review, such major crises as Dien Bien Phu and Suez do not appear to have been forecast very accurately and seem to have surprised and divided leaders of government. It is also evident that on major questions such as H-bomb testing, disarmament and even the allocation of func-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions to the military services for varying types of warfare the N.S.C. has failed to write the score for a united chorus of Administration officials. Indeed, there have been times in recent months when the conflict of wills and policies has been almost as apparent as in the days of F.D.R.—without the drive and direction which then came from the White House itself.

We would lose much if we scrapped the major administrative changes which have been made both under the National Security Act and by executive reorganizations.[1] But a capacity for leadership and a clear articulation of policy at the pinnacle remain an essential dynamic of our system of government. The administrative structure, however constructed or refurbished, supplies only an environment for the making of decisions. It cannot itself produce a wise decision. There is a dangerous tendency today both within our Government and in the United Nations to take too mechanistic a view of the tasks to be accomplished. Sometimes a ferment of ideas is to be preferred above fabricated harmony. It would be unfortunate if our central policy-making bodies became mere vendors of compromise.

To criticize the style of operation of this Administration raises dilemmas which are a continuing feature of our foreign policy. The technological and scientific evaluations which have become so important an ingredient of major decisions mean that the inherent difficulties of the decisions themselves have never been greater. Matters such as our draft and conscription policy, our weapons system, disarmament, East-West trade, all require a knowledge in depth of scientific gains made and scientific potentialities ahead which few informed persons in any branch of government can fully grasp. Even the President himself is torn in many directions, just as the scientists are sharply divided on many of the effects of their researches and discoveries. Yet decisions must be made today and cannot await the compilation of clinical records, based on experience, regarding all the social, political and cultural by-products of our aid and the infusion of new techniques. If Don Quixote is a poor inspiration for the makers of our foreign policy, so, too, is Hamlet.

Now that the smoke surrounding "l'affaire Gluck" has cleared, it would seem appropriate for the State Department and the Congress to consider effective steps for improving our representa-

[1] These developments have been elaborated and defended in these pages by Robert Cutler in "The Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1956, p. 441–458.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional responsibilities abroad. Can the United States have a really first-class career service if the most prominent posts are reserved for the politically faithful and the economically successful? And can we have an effective foreign policy if our agents are selected for qualities other than experience, judgment and responsibility? There is a definite rôle for non-career men in Foreign Service; certainly the successes of Chester Bowles and John Sherman Cooper in India and the services of David Bruce and Clare Boothe Luce in Europe indicate that on many occasions ambassadors with special skills of personality or experience or with close ties with the President may play very useful rôles, sometimes influencing events in a way that a career man might not. But it should become a maxim that no Foreign Service post should be beyond the reach of any man, career or non-career, because of inadequate allowances, and that ambassadorships should not be among the loaves and fishes customarily handed out to the party stalwarts.

Finally we return always to the growing inter-connectedness of policy. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this is Germany. Again and again we have seen that the discussion of any plan for German reunification involves not only the terms of such a merger, but that the achievement of it would immediately call into question the structure and strategic basis of NATO, the status of the satellite states of Europe and German rearmament. During recent months there have been influential voices arguing that the occasion was ripe for an omnibus settlement of all these points on the basis of a reunified but militarily neutral Germany. It is unlikely that the Russians are in fact willing now to make such a settlement, but it is most difficult to think what should be our attitude toward such a scheme when there is so little agreement within our Government on each of the constituent features of such a plan and its probable results.

We have been fortunate as a nation that our successes in foreign policy have been shared and are not exclusively to the credit of any one party. Likewise our failures and flaws have been shared and are not to be attributed solely to a party or adminstration. In the tests which lie ahead the problems once again are national ones and the necessary adaptations to new circumstances as they arise will not come easily for a person of any tight party persuasion. The veil of illusions hangs over each of us to some degree. The fundamental task for both parties and for all branches of Government is to understand the forces which move the future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Extended autopsies of past failures tend only to add one more layer of unreality to the basis on which we must build—the belief that China was lost because of the action of a few diplomats, for instance, rather than because of underlying revolutionary forces; or the misunderstanding of the rise of Asian or African nationalism as either a Communist or a United States conspiracy; or the idea that there are not social forces running through all the world which have a validity apart from the bipolar struggle.

Recent years have witnessed still another wholly unforeseen phenomenon in parts of India, Indonesia and other sections of Southeast Asia and Latin America—the success of Communists and their associates at the polls and through other ordinary political processes. Western policies have long been predicated upon the assumption that Communist gains would be manifested through either external military threat or intervention, or internal supervision or violence. Consequently, reassessment is urgently required for those American aid programs which have reflected an ill-conceived and ill-concealed disdain for the "neutralists" and "socialists" who—in a nation such as India—represent the free world's strongest bulwarks to the seductive appeal of Peking and Moscow.

The agenda of tasks is large. Our chief concern should be major items. We must see that our actions stimulate the healthy development of the new states even if they are neutral; that we do not encourage the prolongation of Western colonialism where it is stagnant; that the position we take against Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe is not weakened by Western "imperialism" in Africa or Asia. This is not a sentimental attitude, but one which tries to take measure of the inevitable and come to terms with it. It is futile to think that we can purge our foreign policy of all ambiguities—perfectionism is an empty standard for policy when effectiveness must depend not on abstract principles alone but also on estimates of power and national interest. But with respect to some of the major challenges in the world at the present moment there is an opportunity for the idealistic initiative of our people and the self-interest of the nation to intersect. I am certain that a sufficient clarity of will and purpose within the Administration can gain the support of both parties and of the broad public to meet these challenges in unity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRITAIN AND AMERICA AT LOGGERHEADS

By Aneurin Bevan

IT is sometimes said that America and Britain would understand each other better if it were not assumed that they speak the same language. As a conversational gimmick this may pass, but, of course, it is not the truth of the matter. A common language, and for so long a common history, have established between the two countries an underlying unity. Much of the literature, the poetry and the music of both countries is a shared experience. For the most part we take this for granted. It is implicit in our relationship. But it must not be ignored in any assessment of the present situation, for it makes its own continuing impact upon reality. Indeed, it is mainly responsible for the fact that though many factors tend to prize us apart, there is a surprising amount of good will for America and Americans in Great Britain.

It would be probably true to say that there is more good will for Americans than for America. The concept "America" connotes in British minds, these days, events not always conducive to cordial feelings. During the war, a friend of mine who was an officer in the United States Navy had just taken delivery of a new car. He was driving this with great pride through the streets of London when a taxi grazed his beautifully polished wing. My friend stepped out of his car, went up to the taxi-driver and poured out a flow of expletives of a beautifully variegated type until he was eventually out of breath. The taxi-driver retorted in one simple sentence, "Pearl Harbor to you." It was my American friend who told me of the incident. He recalled it with great glee. He considered that in his exchange with the taxi-man he had displayed more vigor, but the taxi-man the greater virtuosity.

This incident conveys far more than could be done in many long dissertations. American participation in the war was accepted by the British people thankfully, but not necessarily gratefully. It was felt that America did what she did because no alternative course was left open to her. Looked at from this angle. the British attitude is not surprising; Americans should not feel hurt when they find that the British people are not conscious of gratitude to them for entering the war, although highly appreciative of their war effort.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When the war ended, Anglo-American relations were at their best. In ruling Conservative circles they continued at this level for some years, but among the masses of the people, then devoted to the cause of Labor, criticism of American policy began to be heard with increasing frequency. The abrupt ending of Lend-Lease by the Truman Administration was felt to be a bitter blow intended to injure the British Labor Government by hurting the British people. During the war, a division of labor had been worked out between the two countries by which we went on building ships and bombers while America concentrated mainly on supply planes and merchant ships. The supply planes and the ships could be quickly converted to peacetime uses; but not the tanks or the bombers or the battleships. Britain's export trade, so vital to her economy, had been virtually extinguished for six and a half years and had to be painfully rebuilt; whilst America, with a relatively tiny export trade, had been able to maintain most of it in the expanding Americas. At the same time, Britain had suffered grievous material damage by air raids and from guided missiles. One-third of her homes had either been damaged or destroyed outright. I myself was keenly conscious of the magnitude of the task this involved, because for six years I was the Minister responsible for housing as well as health.

The economies of both countries were closely interlocked while they were being built into the war effort. The consequence of this projected itself far into the peacetime years. Disentanglement was a difficult and painful process for Britain, but of no significant consequence to the United States. The abrupt ending of Lend-Lease was, in these circumstances, a sharp, indeed almost a mortal blow, to British prospects of recovery. I understand that Mr. Truman now believes that this action was a mistake. I recall it now, not for the purpose of recrimination, but in order that American readers may understand one, at least, of the reasons for British coldness towards America. This coldness was, of course, partly dispersed by the imaginative generosity of Marshall aid. Nevertheless, it is necessary to appreciate that charity, however lavish, is no substitute for justice.

In 1947, when the dangerous run-down of Britain's financial reserves compelled her to raise a loan in Canada and the United States, it was felt that this had been caused at least as much by American financial policies as by Britain's management of her own finances. Currency convertibility was soon discovered to be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a foolish arrangement when the commerce of the world, and especially that of Britain, had not yet recovered. What was meat for the American economy in these circumstances was poison for the British. In her desperation, Britain was driven to cancel an arrangement which ought never to have been made.

At this point it may be well to make an observation which is not usually emphasized sufficiently. The American and British economic systems are not complementary to each other. Britain and the United States are not the natural markets for each other's goods. They are both highly industrialized countries. The goods they produce in the main compete with each other. The natural markets for the exports from Britain are to be found, in most cases, in the underdeveloped countries. Most of these, at least in the years immediately following the war, were either in the throes of political convulsions or, like China, Russia and her Eastern satellites, had come completely under Communist control. Even Russia remains a comparatively underdeveloped country, in spite of her astonishing industrial progress within recent years.

All this adds up to a significant conclusion for which inadequate allowance often is made in attempts to analyze the complex relationship between Britain and America. Britain has been in close political alliance with the United States, to which her economy is not similarly married, and she has been estranged diplomatically and militarily from those areas of the world most suited to her economic destinies. Thus we have economic interest pointing one way and diplomatic involvements in another. If all ideological considerations were dismissed, British diplomacy should follow her material needs. But, of course, they cannot be dismissed. The fact that her ideological affiliations and her economic interests tend to tug Britain in opposite directions is a fact that should be recognized and for which allowance must be made if we are to act intelligently. It is not often in the history of nations that long-term economic trends and needs fail to find corresponding expression in diplomatic policy. That this has not been the case with British policy in recent years is a remarkable tribute to the strength of the Anglo-American alliance. If the Kremlin had not been so obtuse and maladroit, it could have made much more of this. On the other hand, if Washington and the American people understood it more fully, and realized its implications, certain American policies might have been modified.

Britain's trade and commerce were caught at the end of the war,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and have been held since, in an unnatural clamp. Her financial and economic recovery has been partly frustrated. The outlets for her exports have either been silted up or blocked, distorted and diverted in a way which has impaired her vigor and enterprise. In spite of the economic enfeeblement resulting from all this, she accepted, largely under United States pressure, a crippling burden of arms. It is true that the United States, from time to time, came to her assistance in various ways, but as I once remarked to Mr. Lewis Douglas when he was Ambassador in London, "the British were getting tired of American dollars being pushed into pockets from which the bottoms had been cut by American policies." The foreign exchange crises which have occurred so frequently in Britain since the end of the war are but the symptoms and expressions of these underlying economic distortions.

I am not contending that the economy of Britain should be interlocked with that of the Soviet world. That might well prove disastrous. It would have made her far too dependent on Communist foreign policy, which is always prepared to apply economic sanctions, as happened in 1948 in the case of Jugoslavia. But it is a far cry from that position to cutting off Britain's expansion almost completely from those parts of the world economically most suitable to her trade.

A particular illustration of this is the policy of the United States towards China. To the British it just does not make sense. It is causing bad blood in British business circles as well as among those whom Americans would describe as radicals. It is easy for the British to understand and sympathize with the emotional overtones involved. American soldiers were killed by the Chinese in Korea. It is therefore understandable that American opinion cannot easily be brought to the resumption of normal trade relations with China. But when we set against that the American policy towards Germany, it becomes difficult for us to understand this one-sided emotionalism. America insists on helping Western Germany, arming her and bringing her into the Western Alliance. For the moment, I am not entering into an argument about the merits of this policy, but it rather assumes that the British are not entitled to have emotions. If it was only yesterday that Chinese were killing G.I.s, it was only the day before yesterday that Germans were killing British Tommies as well as American G.I.s. Taking all this into account, I am afraid the American argument

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in this respect does not carry much weight with British opinion.

It would be unwise to exaggerate the possibilities of direct British trade with China. There is not much that China could send to Britain in exchange for industrial products. China's greatest need is for extended credits, and these Britain in any case could not provide. But the same is not true of Japan. Before the war, Japan did a thriving trade with China. Both economies grew up together. They became interlocked and a mutual division of labor developed in the interests of both countries. Cut off from the Chinese market, Japanese exports are driven elsewhere, frequently into the British Commonwealth and dependencies, to the injury of Lancashire textiles and other British exporting industries.

Leaving, for a moment, the economic consequences of this American policy, it is difficult to understand what are the American objectives in thus insisting on the maintenance of Chinese isolation. Is its purpose to starve the Chinese revolution? If it is, then it is practically certain to prove ineffectual. On the contrary, all experience shows that by such ways revolutionary governments are consolidated, and not only consolidated but made more oppressive in their methods. The enemy of revolutionary extremism in modern society is industrial expansion. With the development of the techniques of modern industry, society undergoes profound changes. The social structure becomes more complicated as wider sections of the population learn new cultural and technical skills. Methods of direct tyrannical oppression which are effective in a simple homogeneous community prove less and less effective as the social and economic structure grows more complex. It is a law of social evolution that when people come to occupy positions of authority and initiative in industry and commerce, and in all the arts and sciences ancillary to them, they come more and more to resent limitations on personal freedom. The crude, monolithic political apparatus of Communism is shown to be more and more at variance with the underlying facts of a developing community. This is the chief explanation of the series of palace revolutions now taking place in the Soviet Union.

If all this be true, does it not make nonsense of the American policy of economically isolating, as far as possible, the Communist world? It may be a long-term answer, but surely it is the fact, nevertheless, that the way to rid the Communist nations of those features which are most repugnant to the Western mind is to facilitate, not to thwart, their economic diversification. Nor can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it be said that economic isolationism is even a short-term answer. (I am not, of course, arguing for the sale of arms or of goods directly for arms production.)

As I have already declared, this economic isolationism which scarcely touches the buoyant American economy damages and hinders in a thousand ways the totally different economic needs of Great Britain. In the past few months, the embargo on trade with China and Russia has been relaxed, but the business world of Britain is conscious that this was accomplished despite prolonged and stubborn resistance from the United States. Gossip was bitterly busy about the number of American officials in Hong Kong whose job it was, apparently, to keep a watch on the extent to which Britain was keeping faith with the embargo.

Because of these considerations, the criticism of American foreign policy, which was confined in the main to the working masses in the immediate postwar years, spread to Conservative circles, until it has now become pervasive. With the coming of the Suez crisis, the emphasis shifted until it is now more marked in Conservative than in Labor areas of political opinion. Indeed, informed circles of Labor actually grew more friendly to the United States in the second half of 1956, for Labor's Suez policy more closely resembled that of the White House than of our own Conservative Government.

Apart from its manifest insanity, the Anglo-French adventure in Egypt provided evidence of the extent to which America and Britain had drifted apart. History shows few similar examples of a nation embarking on such a wild and dangerous undertaking whilst keeping her closest ally in ignorance of her intentions. That the British Government behaved in this way dramatically exposed the gulf that separated Washington from London. Ironically enough, the line taken by President Eisenhower drew him closer to Labor and further away from his political counterparts in Britain.

Conservative speakers made no attempt to hide their bitter resentment against the United States. Those who, like myself, had been for years highly critical of certain aspects of American foreign politics were left far behind in vituperation. Conservative critics of the President's attitude felt no contrition at the way in which they kept him in the dark. When the affair was over, and Egyptian soil was free of the invaders, they pointed in cynical triumph to the Eisenhower Middle East Doctrine that immedi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ately followed as evidence of American perfidy. They believed the Lion had been driven back to its lair only in order that the American Eagle could dominate the same territory. This point of view persists, and is reinforced by the suspicion, amounting almost to a certainty, that arms supplied by America to Saudi Arabia were recently employed against British interests in Oman.

It is openly stated in Britain that the United States is assisting in the liquidation of the British Empire so that she can be the residuary legatee. It is felt that this is particularly true of the Middle East, where British and American oil interests are in persistent collision; nor will these convictions be dispelled until there is Anglo-American agreement about the Middle East. It is not enough that America feels she is constrained to do what she is doing as the champion of the free world in the struggle against Communism. British Conservatives are not consoled if, whenever a blow is struck at Communism, they are made to bleed.

These evidences of strained relations between Britain and America have given rise to the suggestion that some attempt should be made to reach an agreement whereby each is assigned its own special area of influence, without interference from the other. It is hard to see both where and how this can be done. It is a conception belonging to old-fashioned diplomacy and is out of place in a rapidly contracting world. Furthermore, it implies that if either gets into trouble when following its own interests, it can rely on help from the other. Is this really practicable? Could it be reconciled with the obligations of both to the United Nations? It had been assumed until recently that the Middle East was a special responsibility of Britain's. But when she pursued a policy there which offended at one and the same time against American views and against the Charter of the United Nations, she found herself at loggerheads with America. When, at one time, it seemed that America wanted to extend the Korean War, she found herself at variance with Britain. Spheres of influence are not, in the final analysis, consistent with the concept of a United Nations clothed with increasing authority. It is in the United Nations and its Charter that the chief hope of peace lies.

Here we reach the real problem of Anglo-American relations. These cannot be put on a more satisfactory footing until agreement is arrived at on our relations with the Communist world. Failure to do this bedevils our position both in Europe and in the Middle East. In both these parts of the world, it is essential to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

realize that reaching an accommodation with the Communist countries is not the same thing as accommodating Communism. The distinction is a real one. In fact, it can be argued that a refusal to attempt an understanding with the Communist nations may itself lead to the spread of Communism. Conditions of economic and political disturbance facilitate the spread of Communism or its offshoots. If the frontiers of Communism are to be frozen where they now are, it can be accomplished only by pacifying and stabilizing conditions in adjacent territory. If, on the contrary, these are constantly bubbling with discontent, Communism seeps across by a thousand different channels. Military containment is not the answer, for it invites unsettlement in the most sensitively dangerous areas—the frontiers themselves. Syria is a case in point, and so, of course, is Eastern Germany. Russia reacted with brutal sharpness to the dangers of a weakening of her military frontiers in Hungary.

If, in the countries contiguous to the outposts of Communism, Britain and the United States are in conflict with each other, a situation is created that Soviet Russia can, and does, exploit. Nor, to be realistic, can she be blamed for this if the dominating motif of the Western Powers is the eventual destruction of Communism. On the other hand, if the principal aim is mutual tolerance until time and social changes do their work, a different and more hopeful pattern begins to emerge.

It is sometimes argued that such a course is useless because Communism is bent on the destruction of the institutions of the free world, and that therefore its dynamism must be met by a superior dynamism on our part. But what kind of dynamism? Military, or social and political? If it is the former, then the world will go up in flames and that will be that. But, if the dynamism is to be socio-political, then the circumstances must be assembled in which it can do its work, and this can be accomplished only by reaching an understanding with the Communist nations.

It may be said that there is no sign of the Communist world wanting such an understanding. That may be so. But what of ourselves? Do we want it? If the answer is yes, then let us set about trying to get it. Until we do, Anglo-American relations will continue to be snarled. In the shadow of impending catastrophe, in an atmosphere where military threats and counter-threats dominate, is it asking too much of mankind to expect even minor social and economic adjustments to be hopefully attempted?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON CERTAIN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS

By Josip Broz-Tito

WHEN I was asked to express my views on developments in the sphere of present-day international relations, I was sure that I was not expected to write something in which I did not believe merely for the sake of giving pleasure to anyone. I must say what I really have in mind and what I think the American public might usefully be acquainted with. Naturally I can make no pretense at giving an exhaustive analysis of current international problems or of providing a blueprint for their solution. I think I can, however, lay some claim to not having been mistaken as regards the causes of many of today's difficulties and of the adverse trends which it now is essential to do away with. At the same time new mistakes must be avoided and thus even more dangerous consequences prevented from arising. The main point I wish to emphasize is that it would be unforgivable if responsible statesmen neglected to learn from past experience and failed to take bold steps to establish the kind of international relations which mankind requires at the present stage of history—relations based on comprehensive coöperation and a determination to settle all outstanding problems by peaceful means.

The atmosphere in the world today is disquieting. Never before, perhaps, has there been so much talk of war or peace. At the same time, means of destruction unparalleled in military history, such as atomic and hydrogen weapons and other modern instruments of war, are being feverishly created. It is indeed hard to comprehend that there are people in the world today—people, moreover, in positions of the greatest responsibility—who not only hold the view that international differences can be settled by force, *i.e.* through war, but are actually making preparations to this end, while at the same time failing to consider the consequences that would be bound to ensue. Even if they are inclined to forget the millions of lives lost and the tremendous devastation and misery wrought by World War I, they should at least remember the terrible consequences of World War II. The world has not recovered from those unprecedented human and material losses, and will not for a long time to come.

Nor is it hard to visualize the effects of a third world war where

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the contestants used the means of destruction now available and being menacingly flaunted. Could the initiator of a war—the aggressor—be at all sure that he would be spared devastation from atomic and hydrogen weapons? Certainly not. To start such a war would indeed be a hazardous venture, because I am convinced that the people of no country would willingly permit themselves to be destroyed through such irresponsibility on the part of their leaders but would do everything necessary to halt them on that desperate course. For it should be borne in mind that even if certain statesmen have forgotten the lessons of World War II, the people certainly have not; it is they who bore the brunt of war and suffered from its consequences; it is peace that they therefore desire above all. It may also be useful to recall the significant and instructive fact that the outcome of both world wars was considerably different from what was desired by those who prepared and started them.

If recent history has a lesson to offer, therefore, it is simply that war no longer pays. Achievements in the field of science have reached a stage where they can bring either happiness or destruction to mankind. The statesmen of the world bear the responsibility before the nations and before history to elect the first of the two alternatives. And here it is necessary to have the courage to face realities and see where the causes of existing international tensions lie. They are not the result of some elementary force, but have arisen from the errors of men, and of precisely those men whose duty it was to assure peace and security to suffering mankind after the victory over the reactionary aggressor Powers.

The origin of the tensions plaguing the world today may be traced back to the time of Tehran, Yalta and the other international conferences and to the mistaken views of the protagonists at those conferences on certain international problems such as the division of the world into spheres of influence. For them, the world consisted of three Great Powers; all the other nations were looked upon as wards and their aspirations and interests were ignored.

It was precisely through this division of the world into spheres of influence that the strivings of both large and small nations towards genuine independence were to be thwarted, both in principle and in practice. Today certain countries in the West frequently invoke the principle of independence for propaganda purposes, while their actual practice runs in quite the opposite

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

direction. This, however, does not prevent them from accusing others of violating the principle of independence. Until the principle of independence is adopted in practice by all states, and particularly by the Great Powers, this issue will be a constant element of conflict.

Furthermore, some of the principal Western Powers were highly dissatisfied with the outcome and the results of the war. In other words, they were and still are dissatisfied because events took a different turn from the one they had expected when they were deciding the fate of other nations, in the absence of these and without their consent. They have watched with particular displeasure as the new power of the people emerged from the ruins of the Fascist and reactionary régimes. This power may have certain temporary weaknesses, but it is developing towards the achievement of socialism and socialist democracy. In them the people perceive the possibility of realizing their aspirations for a better life and a peaceful development.

The causes of existing tensions are also to be sought in the erroneous foreign policy of Stalin and in the rigidity of Molotov, whose offensive and aggressive attitudes in postwar international affairs aroused a growing measure of suspicion and apprehension regarding the intentions of the Soviet Union. Stalin was wont to indulge in all sorts of threats and in violence, and this had anything but the desired effect on the countries concerned. Let me recall only how he applied every conceivable kind of pressure against Jugoslavia, ranging from an unprecedented propaganda campaign and an economic blockade to a cold war which showed increasing signs of developing into an armed conflict on the frontiers of our country. He did this to an ally and a socialist country. How he felt about other countries, small or large, I do not wish to recount here. Indeed it would take too much space to cite all the negative features of Stalin's policies, which brought the Soviet Union into a state of isolation and led to the loss of the tremendous prestige which it had won through the sacrifice of millions of its sons in World War II.

It is understandable that these policies of Stalin should have provoked growing mistrust and met with a mounting resistance and that his threats should have led to a series of measures, some of them of a military character, on the part of the Western Powers. It is difficult, however, to understand that even now, four years after Stalin's death, this mistrust not only persists but actually

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is increasing in certain circles in the West, regardless of the efforts which are being made by the present-day Soviet leaders to correct Stalin's mistakes. Why is every move on the part of the Soviet leaders looked upon even now with suspicion? Has not the time come for the steps which the Soviet Government is taking towards an alleviation of international tension to be viewed with more realism and with greater confidence? The other side should now show its willingness to settle some of the problems which still constitute a constant threat to peace and international coöperation, such as the question of disarmament and of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests.

It will be objected, I know, that the views I have just expressed are one-sided. I am, however, profoundly convinced of their truth. If prior to Stalin's death it was his policy which constituted the main element of cold war, fear and uncertainty, the responsibility for a continuation of such a state of affairs has been shifting during the last few years more and more to those in the West who persist in the view that the different outstanding questions should be tackled from positions of strength. I shall not be revealing any secret when I say here that persistence in establishing military bases in Europe, the Middle East and Asia involves a constant danger to peace, because it leads to legitimate apprehension and mistrust on the other side, *i.e.* among the Soviet leaders. The Soviet leaders look upon this, rightly in my opinion, as a policy of encirclement, a threat of war and an aggressive attempt to isolate the Soviet Union.

Such, then, are the roots of the distrust which now prevails in the Soviet Union with regard to Western intentions, much the same as Stalin's aggressive policies had led to suspicion in the West and to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. If the setting up of NATO did have some justification at the time, there can be no justification today for the continuing existence, development and extension of the Alliance, which undoubtedly contributes to the widening rift and the growing lack of confidence between East and West. I shall, at this point, probably be asked: what about the Warsaw Pact? One should take into account the time when this pact came into being and the reasons for it. I am opposed to the division of the world into military blocs, and to blocs in general. I nevertheless must point out that the Warsaw Pact appeared subsequent to, and as a result of, the creation of NATO and for the purpose of counterbalancing it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I am deeply convinced that the Warsaw Pact would cease to exist as soon as NATO had disappeared.

The question arises as to what should come in lieu of these pacts, which in my view are not what Western circles claim them to be but instruments and elements of international tension which increase the danger of war. The answer is simple: they should be replaced by a collective security agreement, which would provide peace and stability and aid powerfully in establishing confidence amongst states and nations and also in helping toward the settlement of other outstanding problems outside Europe.

II. CAN A PEACEFUL WAY BE FOUND?

A problem that looms large in Europe is the problem of the unification of Germany. But it is a problem which is the concern of the German people; they alone have the right to solve it and they have the right to solve it as they think best. What are required here are time and patience. Any interference from outside can only make unification on a practicable basis more difficult. One should be realistic and take into account the fact that, whether we like it or not, there are today two Germanys with different social systems. This is a result of the historical conditions prevailing in the war and postwar periods; in other words, the existing situation in Germany is a consequence of the negotiations conducted during the war and afterwards at conferences where the fate of the world was shaped in a somewhat unfelicitous manner.

Are we now, because of this, to fall into even graver errors and plunge the world into renewed chaos and a new catastrophe? That would be a most disastrous mistake. What we should do is to assist the German people to find a way out of this situation and to achieve unity within a peace-loving and democratic Germany. The possibility should be created for the peoples of East and West Germany to come closer together. I am certain that they have so many things in common that they will one day find ways of living together regardless of their different social systems. That would be the best solution. It would also offer the best assurance against the emergence in Germany of forces which might one day again pose a threat to the world. This has happened twice within a short space of time, and is naturally the source of the greatest apprehension for the nations that have been the most direct sufferers.

The changes which have occurred in a number of countries of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the war, and which resulted in the replacement of the previous Fascist or capitalist forms of social organization by socialist forms of organization, cannot be reversed by anyone; and it would of course be a mistake even to consider any such possibility. A new social system has struck deep roots in practically all these countries. A social process creating a system of tremendous vitality is now making headway regardless of temporary weaknesses of either a subjective or objective nature. Interference from outside can only fetter and retard the development of the democratic forms of the system without in any way changing the system itself. I therefore consider that propaganda conducted from abroad, and with foreign aid, by persons who have fled their own countries can only feed international tension. There is no prospect of restoring the former system: it is merely an attempt to turn the clock back, and it will not work.

What then? Is there to be war in order to bring discarded forms back into being? The answer of the people, clearly and naturally, can only be no. To engage in an armaments race in order to be able to negotiate from positions of force for the restoration of old and obsolete forms or organization is both senseless and useless. I am convinced that not one of the countries involved would permit this to happen; they would resist any such attempt. It seems to me, therefore, that all such harmful propaganda against the countries of socialism, as well as against my own country, should cease —in the interest of decreasing international tension, in the interest of promoting peace and international coöperation, in the interest of establishing sincere confidence between states and nations. Responsible statesmen the world around should, I feel, approach all these questions with a greater measure of realism. They should take things as they are, seeking to establish such relations among nations as would permit people to live without fear for their future.

What then remains, if we reject war as a method of settling international differences? The only alternative is, of course, coexistence among states and nations irrespective of their different social systems. There are two main and distinctive systems in the world today, the socialist and the capitalist. Within each there exist certain nuances. Should the countries with different social systems decide to settle by war which of the two systems is to triumph, in other words, attempt to impose their system on others

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by force? That would be absurd and would bring a new catastrophe to the whole of mankind. The internal social system of any country is a matter for the people of that country to decide; they have the right to shape their own destiny and no one is entitled to interfere in this from outside. At the present stage of human history, problems between countries cannot be solved through war, and this method should therefore be discarded. The only alternative is peaceful and active coexistence among states and nations.

When I speak of active coexistence I do not mean that states with different social systems should merely vegetate alongside one another, but that they should actively coöperate on all questions of mutual interest and settle differences regarding them by peaceful means. Rather than interfere in each other's internal affairs, states should engage in an exchange of the positive and useful results they have obtained through their labor, through raising the standard of living of each and through promoting progress in general. This approach is not utopian. It merely reflects a universal need, if the world is to be spared further shocks, if we are to establish international relations that will permit the world to cease living in fear.

III. THE MIDDLE EAST, A DANGEROUS HOTBED OF CONFLICT.

Only recently an event occurred in the Middle East—an aggression against an independent country—which might have had incalculable consequences had it not been for the determined efforts of the United Nations to put an end to it. In these United Nations efforts, the Soviet Union and the United States played a decisive rôle. How did these events in the Middle East come about? As a result of the attitude of the leading statesmen of certain countries who apparently felt that nothing in the world had changed. Their views were heavily tainted with old-style colonialism. They ignored world public opinion. They considered that the world would, from fear of a broader conflagration, close its eyes to this local war. Fortunately, however, events took quite a different course. The world's reaction through the United Nations was swift and resolute. We are left with a realization, however, of how much the line of thinking of statesmen who hope to obtain a favorable (from their point of view) solution of problems like that of the Suez Canal by aggressive means is fraught with danger to peace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Have the necessary lessons been learned from an event which might well have led to a new world conflagration? I think not. Current developments in the Middle East indicate as much. The situation there is still extremely troubled. There is a renewed danger of conflict owing to a mistaken policy of interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries. The young and still insufficiently developed Arab countries are being divided by the application of a doctrine which can hardly be considered beneficial for them. It is claimed that what is being done is in the interests of peace and stability in that part of the world. I shall be only too happy if events prove me wrong. But would it not have been better if a different approach had been adopted, not one based on an alleged need of "filling a vacuum"—a "vacuum" which had come into being as the positive result of the removal of colonial influence and exploitation by certain colonial Powers?

The explanation that it was essential to fill the "vacuum" because of the alleged danger of Communist infiltration does not hold water. The countries involved are mainly young countries with strong national feelings, striving towards independence, seeking to achieve democracy by doing away with the remnants of feudalism and with feudalism in general. Is it not a mistake to oppose these strivings and to denounce them as the fruit of Communist influence and of Communism in general? Why should the people of these countries be denied rights which other nations have long enjoyed, above all the right to decide their own fate? Why should there be interference in their internal affairs? It is my considered opinion that such a policy in the Middle East has yielded no good results. It would have been better if after the Suez crisis an effort had been made gradually to remove past errors and existing antagonisms and to assist these nations materially to emerge from their backwardness. Assistance of this kind, with no strings attached, would be far more conducive to the establishment of conditions of peace and stability in that part of the world.

In general, I consider that the present policies of the colonial Powers towards the peoples of Africa and Asia are mistaken and are pregnant with a latent danger of armed conflicts. The bloody Algerian tragedy is an example of the resistance of the colonial Powers to the liberation strivings of the enslaved colonial peoples. These problems must remain one of the main concerns of the United Nations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Speaking of the United Nations, I must point out that I consider incorrect any kind of discriminatory policy towards certain states still outside the organization. I have China in mind in the first place, a country with one-fourth of the world's population. I do not think anybody now really believes that such a state of affairs can persist. It seems strange indeed that a settlement of the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations is still being delayed; as is the question of the admission of certain other countries to the organization.

IV. OUR RELATIONS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES AND WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

The question is frequently asked in the West: Where does Jugoslavia now stand, and where will she stand in the future? Various conjectures are indulged in. This speculation stems from the fact that Jugoslavia is a socialist country and is building socialism; hence it is supposed that her goal is the same as that of the Soviet Union and of the other Eastern European countries. This is how Western thinking runs. Yes, it is quite true that our goal is the same, although we differ with regard to certain questions of internal development, *i.e.* with regard to our respective methods of building socialism. We also differ at certain points in our interpretation of the science of Marxism-Leninism, in assessing the correctness of our respective roads to socialism. All these are not such weighty matters that they should lead to tension in our mutual relations. The future will provide the best answer, I think, as to who was more nearly correct and who was less so. The one who is proved less correct will be the one to suffer and will have only himself to blame.

The Belgrade and Moscow Declarations of June 1955 and July 1956 contain the principles upon which the relations and the cooperation between the Soviet Union and Jugoslavia should be based. Considerable progress has been achieved, I feel, in improving our relations. This gives us assurance that the principles set forth in the Declarations will be put even more speedily into effect in our mutual relations in the future.

Any move on our part to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the other people's democracies usually gives rise to misgivings and to all kinds of speculation in the West. Some even seek to derive tangible benefits from this fact, alleging that "Jugoslavia is lost to the West." I fail to see why such conjectures should

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arise. We have never given anybody reason to hope that we would join the Western bloc, or any other bloc for that matter. To do so would be contrary to the principles on which our foreign policy rests. Our foreign policy is based on the clearly expressed principle of coexistence, on peaceful and equal coöperation with all countries, small or large. If one takes the trouble to examine the line to which our foreign policy has adhered hitherto it will be realized that it is only natural for us to seek to have as good relations as possible with the Soviet Union and with the other people's democracies, and not only with the Western countries.

Our good relations with the West stem from the times when our country had been brought into a dangerous state of isolation and was subjected to pressure from all the states which followed Stalin's policy. While we had not been solely to blame for our unsatisfactory relations with the Western Powers in the early postwar years, we have nevertheless learned the lesson from that period. We have learned that it is not advisable to conduct a too one-sided policy in a world where a growing number of elements of common interest are at work—particularly elements making for economic integration and linking the world more and more into a whole. The process continues notwithstanding the powerful resistance offered by certain subjective factors. It is interesting, though hardly comforting, to note that people have the most difficulty in perceiving the importance of the very social laws of which they are themselves creating the elements and in the development of which they are themselves participating.

There is nothing out of the way in the fact that, in establishing good relations with the U.S.S.R. and the other Eastern European countries, we have not the slightest intention of impairing our relations with the Western countries. The reason is that we consider that our coöperation with the West on questions of common interest is extremely advantageous for our country and that in addition it contributes both to the easing of international tensions and to the strengthening of peace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MAO AND MOSCOW

By G. F. Hudson

WHEN the popular discontent in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe came to a head last October in the uprising in Hungary and Gomulka's coup d'état in Poland, the whole Communist world was involved. It was not a matter which could be of concern only to the Soviet Union and the European Communist countries, leaving unaffected the great Asian adherent to the Marxist-Leninist faith, the Chinese People's Republic. Despite their geographical remoteness from the scenes of conflict, the Chinese Communists were, in fact, greatly alarmed at the course of events, and their concern showed itself in two ways: in a diplomatic policy of intervention and mediation between the Soviet Union and the European satellites; and in domestic policies designed to apply what were considered to be the lessons of the outbreaks in Europe.

Communist China's position in relation to the Soviet Union differed greatly from that of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. The primary factor in the contrast was one of sheer size; whatever the truth about the census claims of the People's Republic, the Chinese are certainly the most numerous nation in the world and at least potentially a great Power, in quite a different category of bigness from Poland, Czechoslovakia or Rumania. This from the beginning caused the Russians to be more careful and respectful in their dealings with the Chinese Communists than they were with the parties of the smaller European countries. Further, there was a great difference in the degree of indebtedness to the Soviet Union. In capturing power the Chinese Communists owed less to Soviet military occupation and political support than any European Party except the Jugoslav. The Chinese Communists might not have won the civil war against the Kuomintang but for the aid which they received from the Russian occupation authorities in Manchuria; however, that aid was confined to one region of China, and the new rulers could plausibly claim to have made their revolution by their own efforts. Thus, on grounds both of China's size and importance and of the Chinese Communists' own revolutionary achievement, Mao Tse-tung's government always took an attitude of independence and equality in its dealings with Moscow, and Stalin, in contrast to his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treatment of the new party-states in Eastern Europe, took the greatest care not to offend or humiliate the Chinese. During Stalin's lifetime there was, in fact, no dispute between Moscow and Peking which reached the dimensions of a publicly acknowledged conflict.

Those Western observers who pointed out that Communist China could not be listed as a satellite of the Soviet Union were quite justified. But they were wrong when they drew the conclusion that China might be expected to "go Titoist." The rupture between Stalin and Tito occurred because Stalin tried to interfere in the affairs of Jugoslavia in a way he never tried to interfere in the affairs of China—partly perhaps because Stalin learned something from the Jugoslav experience. Since Mao never had to put up with the kind of treatment Tito was expected to endure, he felt no practical need to become a Titoist. On the other hand, since Mao was asserting for China a position of partnership with, rather than subordination to, the Soviet Union, it might have been expected that he would show some sympathy for Tito's claim to the same status. In fact, throughout the whole course of the quarrel he committed China to Stalin's side in condemning Tito as a traitor to the Communist cause. This attitude cannot be attributed simply to Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union for economic and military aid or even to the unanimity of the support given by other Communist Parties to the Soviet position. By the strict interpretation of Marxist-Leninist principles to which Mao has always held, Tito was in the wrong. Although Mao may have had his own views about Stalin's handling of Tito in the first place, the latter's action in publicly taking a neutral stand in international relations and accepting economic and military assistance from the United States was unpardonable. Then, as now, Mao insisted that there must be solidarity of the "socialist camp" in the face of imperialism; neutralism may be a virtue in a non-Communist state, but it is impermissible for a government professing to base itself on Marxist-Leninist ideology.

In spite of his disapproval of Titoism, Mao remained potentially sympathetic to any movement in a Communist country aimed at attaining greater equality in relations with Moscow, so long as it did not endanger the domestic supremacy of the Communist Party or make compromises with the international enemy. His attitude during the crisis of last autumn was quite consistent with this general outlook. In Poland, Gomulka came to power as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spokesman of a national demand for independence from Russian control and exploitation, but with a firm intention of maintaining the rule of the Communist Party and of keeping Poland within the military alliance system of the Warsaw Pact, which affords Poland its only international guarantee against German territorial revisionism. Gomulkism thus remained within the limits of Marxist-Leninist legitimacy and was worthy of Peking's support; it did not surrender Communist supremacy and, unlike Titoism, it did not involve international neutralism.

In Hungary, on the other hand, the rebels demanded both free elections with rights of opposition and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact; the Nagy government, powerless to cope with the national uprising, capitulated to both demands. This put Nagy outside the pale, as far as Peking was concerned. If the Soviet troops had not intervened, Hungary would have become another Austria, and Communist rule would have been at an end there. Logically, Mao gave his approval to the Soviet intervention. The official statement on events in Europe published in China at the end of December referred to "the righteous action of the Soviet Union in giving assistance to the socialist forces in Hungary" against a counter-revolution.

The Party leadership in Peking considered the situation so serious that Prime Minister Chou En-lai was directed to interrupt his good-will tour of Asia and go to Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest to use his good offices in resolving the crisis. In Moscow, according to reports which cannot be confirmed but are believed to be well founded, Khrushchev's "Stalinist" critics were demanding the use of force to crush Gomulka, but Chou strengthened Khrushchev's hand by warning that China would not support the Soviet Union in such a policy. In Warsaw, on the other hand, Chou tried to get Gomulka's consent to a joint statement which would acknowledge Soviet leadership of the "socialist camp" and condemn the Hungarian revolt. Whatever Gomulka's own inclinations may have been, public feeling in Poland was too inflamed for him to make these concessions, but at least China's emissary made clear to the Polish leaders what the Chinese attitude was in these matters. The Polish public was aware of the part played by Chou in restraining Russia, but does not seem to have realized the extent of Chinese reservations on behalf of Russia, so that news reporting from Poland tended to represent the Chinese policy as more pro-Polish than it actually was. What did

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emerge, however, from the exchange of views was an increased intimacy in Chinese-Polish relations and the definite establishment of China as an interested party in East European affairs.

In Budapest, Chou En-lai confined himself to efforts to build up the prestige of the Kadar government by showing that China as well as Russia stood behind it. It was noted that he did not try to make contacts with any Hungarians other than members of the government.

Thus the Chinese policy in relation to the October upheavals in Europe, as shown in practice by Chou's diplomacy and in theory by the ideological declaration issued at the end of December, was a two-edged one; it included support for the type of "national" Communism represented by Gomulka, but it was also directed against "revisionist" tendencies, which might impair either the principle of permanent Communist Party supremacy in each country or the stability of the system of military alliances of which the Soviet Union was necessarily the pivot. The principles of Marxism-Leninism, according to the declaration, must be applied with reference to the "special national features" of each country, and "great-nation chauvinism" must be avoided in relations between Communist states. But the smaller nations also had their responsibilities; all nations must subordinate their particular interests to the international movement in order to present a united front against imperialism. The Soviet road of revolutionary capture of power and dictatorship of the proletariat was the road that every country must take in order to gain victory, and the Communist Party must always take the lead in exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat, which Lenin had repeatedly declared to be "the most essential part of Marxism."

Mao and the Chinese Party did not presume to interfere directly in the internal affairs of the Soviet Communist Party, but in so far as the latter was divided between contending factions the Chinese undoubtedly played a part in the outcome of the factional struggle. At the end of 1956 Khrushchev was in a weak position politically in the Soviet "collective leadership" because of the events in Poland and Hungary, which had been the sequel of his policies of de-Stalinization for the satellites and rapprochement with Tito. There had always been opposition to these policies from the group led by Molotov and Kaganovitch which held that any relaxation of control must endanger the whole system. It was argued that there would have been no major break in Eastern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe if so many political concessions had not been made to the forces of discontent; the Polish and Hungarian upheavals had not, after all, occurred while Bierut and Rakosi had been in charge but after Gomulka had been released from prison and rehabilitated and after the Hungarian Party had spectacularly repudiated its own past by the state funeral given to the reburied Rajk. The "I told you so" reproaches directed at Khrushchev might well have led to his downfall; he was saved mainly by his firm hold on the Party machine through his position as First Secretary, but partly also by the friendly attitude of Peking towards the new Poland, which implied that it was no longer possible to return to a policy of forcibly dragooning the European satellites without incurring a grave dissension with China.

Chinese moral support was also given to Khrushchev in his struggle for power in Moscow on quite other grounds. Khrushchev was opposed, not only by the "Left" opposition of the Molotov-Kaganovitch group standing for the maintenance of firm control by repressive methods both in the Soviet Union and the satellites, but also by Malenkov's "Right" faction, which called for an increased reliance on market relations in the economy, more economic incentives and a substantial transfer of industrial capacity to the production of consumer goods. The situation was in some ways similar—though the issues at stake were different—to that which had prevailed in the Soviet Party after Lenin's death, when Stalin's faction had had to contend both with the Left Opposition of Trotsky and Zinoviev and with the Bukharinite Right. In the recent purge Khrushchev has followed Stalin's example of making an amalgam of oppositional trends which were of opposite significance, and the policies represented by Malenkov have been lumped together with those of the "Stalinist Old Guard." But in relation to Malenkovism, it was Khrushchev who, as the unrepentant champion of heavy industry, was the Stalinist. On this issue his stand corresponded to the self-interest of Communist China, whose crash program of industrialization depended on the maximum flow of capital goods from the Soviet Union and the more industrially advanced of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Changes of economic policy providing for concentration on the production of consumer goods might ease the economic and social strains of the Soviet Union, but they must mean a reduction of the Soviet capacity to provide for the urgent needs of China's industrial expansion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On this question also, therefore, as on the issue of relaxation of control over the satellites, the Chinese were on Khrushchev's side. It may seem, however, that there was some discrepancy between the two positions, because relaxation of control in Eastern Europe meant in most cases an abandonment of the extreme priorities for heavy industry which Soviet domination had imposed. However, it could be argued that the decline in the output of capital goods which might result from this would be less serious than the losses which would be incurred as the result of armed intervention to preserve—or rather restore—the old system in the satellites.

II

What, then, of China's own road to socialism? How far did the Chinese assertion of political independence from Moscow and disposition to support similar claims in Eastern Europe imply a theory and practice of Communism really divergent from the Soviet model? As we have seen, the Chinese manifesto of December 29 balanced its support for national roads to socialism with a reassertion of the "universal truth" of Marxism-Leninism and an insistence that the national roads must conform to this. Conditions in China nevertheless differed in important ways from those in the Soviet Union and also from those in Eastern Europe.

The most important differences were those of time since the achievement of the Revolution. Communism has been established in Moscow since 1917; in all the European countries where it is now established it was at least politically predominant by the end of 1945. But the principal cities of China fell into Communist hands only in 1949. The Chinese is thus the youngest of the Communist régimes, and its subjects have the most recent memories of the pre-Communist era. In Russia today only those over 60 years of age had reached adulthood when the Bolsheviks came to power, and those who had achieved any distinction in their careers before the Revolution are a disappearing handful. In China, on the other hand, the new system has not yet had time—outside the remote rural areas where it had long held sway—to rear a new generation in its own ways. In the economic and cultural spheres it still has to operate mainly with people whose minds were formed in a non-Communist environment. This is, of course, a situation which the Communists have had to face also in Eastern Europe, but the circumstances of the capture of power

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in China made the Party there much more dependent at the outset on the conciliation of potentially hostile social elements. In the East European countries, except Jugoslavia, Communist domination was secured by the overwhelming might of the Russian Army and no effective resistance to it was possible; in Jugoslavia the Communists had gained supremacy through their rôle in the national resistance to foreign invasion and Tito's power was firmly established before the war ended.

In China there was a Russian occupation only in Manchuria and the Communist part in the national resistance had been only a subsidiary one; after Japan's surrender, four years of civil strife were needed to achieve the victory of the Revolution. In this struggle the Communists owed much of their success to their skill and lack of scruple in concealing their real aims and making all kinds of promises to all kinds of people. While the urban workers were encouraged to look forward to a socialist utopia, the peasants were promised shares of landlords' estates for their private ownership, the "national bourgeoisie"—capitalists not belonging to the privileged group of "bureaucratic capitalists" connected with the Kuomintang Party—were promised a private sector of industry for an indefinite period, the intelligentsia were promised political liberty and an end of currency inflation, and even generals and officials of the Kuomintang régime were promised forgiveness of sins and jobs for the future if they passed over to the Communist side. Thus the Communists came to power in China on the basis of a broad united front, with very many Chinese as well as foreigners believing that they were not "real" Communists, but simply patriots, democrats and "agrarian reformers."

The wide social appeal was reflected politically in a coalition which linked with the Communists a number of minor parties classified as "democratic" or "progressive." These parties retained their own separate memberships and organizations, but formally pledged themselves to follow the "leadership" of the Communists, whose claim to supremacy was strongly based on their direct control of the troops and security forces of the People's Liberation Army. The leaders of the conciliatory parties put their signatures to all the policy declarations issued by the Communists and they received a number of high administrative offices, including some of the economic ministries of the central government. In accordance with the Marxist-Leninist theory that all parties must represent classes, the non-Communist parties of the coalition

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were supposed to represent the national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia; the Communists reserved to themselves the exclusive right to represent the workers and peasants. The arrangement at the outset suited both sides. The Communists were able to utilize the services of many individuals of high administrative or technical qualifications from outside their own ranks, and also to spread their propaganda through subservient agencies in quarters alien to them, without having to admit unreliable and opportunist elements to membership in their own Party. For the members of the auxiliary parties the bargain provided careers under the new régime in spite of embarrassing past associations as well as the hope of exerting a limited influence on policy.

The most important of the auxiliary parties was the Democratic League, itself a federation of smaller groups, which had appeared to some foreign observers in earlier days as a liberal "third force" between the Kuomintang and the Communists; it had obtained a large following among the professional and business classes, but had been ineffective in the struggle for mastery in China because of its lack of a party army to support its politics. It had finally moved into alliance with the Communists, and two of its vice-chairmen, Chang Po-chun and Lo Lung-chi, became Ministers of Food and of the Timber Industry respectively in the Central People's Government. Another important group of fellow-travellers formed the so-called Revolutionary Kuomintang; they were former generals and officials who had for one reason or another been at odds with Chiang Kai-shek, including Li Chi-shen, who had been Chiang's principal military rival in South China, Tsai Ting-kai, who had commanded the Chinese troops fighting the Japanese in Shanghai in 1932, and Lung Yun, who had been for many years the virtually independent "warlord" of Yunnan.

As long as these parties existed, they provided the basis for an alternative government if ever the power of the Communists should be weakened. Down to 1956, however, the Communists had things all their own way. They were successful in establishing a unified administration for the whole of China, in curbing the venality of officials and in halting currency inflation. The Korean War, in which the Soviet alliance had effectively deterred the United States and its allies from any action against the territory of China, had strengthened rather than weakened the Communist position by enabling the new rulers to exploit national patriotic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sentiments and claim the glory of fighting a coalition of great Western Powers on equal terms. The victories of the Viet Minh, won with Chinese aid, had further enhanced Communist prestige, while on the home front the ruthless slaughter of known or suspected Kuomintang supporters as counter-revolutionaries had at once eliminated active opponents and intimidated the rest of the population. At the same time the grandiloquently advertised plans for vast industrial construction aroused the enthusiasm of the younger generation and the reluctant admiration of many older people who, although far removed from the Communists in their outlook, remembered the international impotence and humiliation of the China in which they had grown up.

With these assets of force and popularity the new régime was able within seven years to effect the transition to a socialist economy by nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture. Trying to profit from the lessons of Soviet experience, Mao made a great effort to minimize the resistance to the expropriations; persuasion was used as far as possible; special credit facilities were provided to make collectivization more palatable and the peasants were promised that they would have the right to leave the collective farms if they wished; capitalists were given ten-year fixed-interest bonds in compensation for their properties.

The socialization, nevertheless, came much sooner than people had been led to expect, and it inevitably alienated large sections of the population to whom the "agrarian reformer" line had been successfully sold during the forties. The discontent thus produced could be ignored as long as the strength of the régime was unimpaired. But from the spring of 1956 it began to get into difficulties.

The first setback was the repudiation of Stalin in Russia. The exposure of the follies and horrors of Stalin's rule did not directly reflect discredit on the Chinese Communists, but did so indirectly because of the way in which Stalin's Russia had been built up as the paragon of revolutionary wisdom and virtue and the example for China to follow. As elsewhere, the Chinese leaders were confronted with the awkward dilemma of having to admit either that they had known what went on under Stalin and had deliberately concealed it or that they had not known and had thus themselves been dupes of the Soviet panegyrics.

Also, in China perhaps more than anywhere else, Communism lost face on moral grounds, for in the Orient it had made a special

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bid to establish itself as a rule of superior ethical virtue, a creed of men selflessly dedicated to historical progress and the welfare of the people. In so far as Khrushchev's disclosures reached quarters in China outside the higher Communist leadership—which they did mainly through radio broadcasts from abroad—the effect was to cause bewilderment and dismay among Communists and a reduction of respect for the Party among people outside it.

In the period following this blow to the faith, things began to go wrong with the economic plans. The troubles were of a kind familiar from the experience of all Communist countries. Bottlenecks and shortages developed in almost every branch of production; projects were held up for lack of materials and priorities were continually being changed as one shortage after another made itself felt; masses of peasants were brought into the towns to add to the industrial labor force and were then sent back to the country as there were neither jobs nor houses for them. The difficulties have now been admitted and the plans drastically cut back, but the failures have been accumulating for over a year and already last autumn the blundering in the economic field was plain for all to see.

Then came the news of the Hungarian uprising. It became widely known that the Hungarian workers had been in the forefront of the insurrection and that the Communist régime would have been overthrown but for the Soviet military intervention. Even though the Hungarians were defeated, the prestige of Communism as upholder of the people's cause everywhere was severely shaken and the myth of the irreversibility of its conquests was shattered.

The events in Hungary caused alarm in Peking not only for their international implications, but also lest the example be followed in China. As Mao said later in his speech of February 27 of this year: "Certain people in our country were delighted when the Hungarian events took place. They hoped that something similar would happen in China, that thousands upon thousands of people would demonstrate in the streets against the People's Government." There was not in fact any uprising in China, but the Communist leadership had been thoroughly scared and set itself to learn the lessons of the Hungarian catastrophe. The results of its study were contained in Mao's speech "On the correct handling of contradictions among the people," delivered on February 27 to an enlarged session of the Supreme State Conference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

According to Mao the Hungarian rising was caused by improperly handled contradictions among the people which were exploited by counter-revolutionaries. The Hungarian Communist Party had failed to win a sufficient basis of support among the workers, peasants and intelligentsia; on the other hand it had been negligent in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. It had been tough where it ought to have been lenient and lenient where it ought to have been tough. As applied to China this two-edged interpretation has led on the one hand to a campaign for correcting the "three evils" of sectarianism, subjectivism and bureaucratism in the Party's relations with the people and on the other to an even stronger campaign against "rightists," particularly in the ranks of the auxiliary parties of the government coalition.

Mao divides society under the Communist rule into two parts: the great majority who form "the people" and the small minority who are the "enemy." Contradictions may exist among the people, both between various classes and—an innovation which has not been well received in Moscow—between the government and the governed, but, if properly handled, these are "non-antagonistic" and can be resolved by democratic persuasion. Contradictions with the enemy, on the other hand, *are* antagonistic, and can be resolved only through the use of force. The enemy can be defined theoretically in class terms as consisting of landlords, bureaucratic capitalists and foreign imperialists, or more practically as comprising all elements in active opposition to the Communist Party.

There are, however, according to Mao, categories of people on the borderline who can belong to the people or to the enemy. It has been, he maintains, the policy of the Communists "in the concrete conditions existing in China" to "treat the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as a contradiction among the people." But, he adds, "if it is not properly handled, if we do not follow a policy of unity, criticizing and educating the national bourgeoisie, or if the national bourgeoisie does not accept this policy, then the contradictions between the working class and the national bourgeoisie can turn into an antagonistic contradiction as between ourselves and the enemy." In other words the Party cadres ought to be more patient and conciliatory in dealing with the bourgeoisie—many of whom are now managers or technicians in state enterprises—but if the bourgeoisie do not respond to this kind treatment, they can always be reclassified as enemies and treated as such.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similarly, with regard to the intelligentsia, Mao recognizes that "many of our comrades are not good at getting along with intellectuals" and that "administrative measures" to ensure conformity of thought do not convert intellectuals, but only alienate them. Hence he is all for "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend," for allowing people with erroneous ideas to express themselves and then persuading them with "scientific analysis and fully convincing arguments." He shows appreciation of the principle that "crude, coercive methods" should not be used in ideological struggle, and some of his utterances taken out of context may appear to show that he is advocating freedom of speech as it is understood in the West. But he also threatens the penalties of the law against those who "take advantage of our policies and distort them, deliberately put forward unreasonable demands in order to stir up the masses, or deliberately spread rumors to create trouble and disrupt social order." Very little thinking about public affairs is possible without giving cause for offense in one of these ways, and since it is for police and judges strictly controlled by the Communist Party to decide whether anyone is trying to "create trouble" or not, Mao's formula provides the Party with an effective curb on the freedom of discussion which he proposes to permit.

Since February the principle of "democracy for the people, dictatorship for the enemy" (with the Communist Party reserving the right to classify or reclassify anyone in these categories at its own discretion) has been applied in practice. There has been a certain amount of "de-Stalinization"—or perhaps it should be called "de-Maoization," since the evils of sectarianism, subjectivism and bureaucratism, for which the Party cadres have recently been reproached, had previously flourished under Mao's own leadership. The cadres are exhorted to be more considerate, conciliatory, patient and attentive in their dealings with all categories of the people over whom they exercise power. But since June the self-criticism of over-authoritarian Communists has dwindled away in the midst of the furious struggle against the rightists. The campaign has been designed to destroy the non-Communist auxiliary parties which might be dangerous to Communist supremacy in a crisis. The method used has been to compel their leaders to denounce one another or make abject recantations of views which under the "hundred flowers" policy they were encouraged to express; the compulsion has been in the form of threats that they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will be designated as counter-revolutionaries if they do not do as they are told. As the principal Chinese Communist newspaper put it: "We can afford to be lenient with them if they mend their ways; only if they are obstinate will it be necessary to punish them." Thus, in accordance with his view of the way to avoid upheavals of the Hungarian variety, Mao has balanced his concessions with more thorough measures for crushing serious political opposition or insubordination.

The Russian Communists liquidated allied parties in the first year of the Revolution. In so far as Mao accomplishes this in China—it does not matter if empty shells of these parties remain —he will have brought his country nearer to the Soviet ideal of pure single-party rule. In another regard, the Soviet Union has recently also moved nearer to the practice of Peking. There has never been any doubt of the personal supremacy of Mao Tse-tung in the Chinese Communist régime, and the Soviet glorification of "collective leadership" since the death of Stalin has been somewhat embarrassing for a government in which it obviously did not exist. But now that Khrushchev has made a clean sweep of his rivals and abruptly put an end to collective leadership in Moscow, he and Mao will be able to meet on equal terms as fully autocratic leaders of totalitarian party-states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CARROT AND STICK IN RURAL CHINA

By Wolf Ladejinsky

EVER since the Communists became masters of China, they have sought to create the impression of a giant in full control of a well-planned and efficient economic and political machine, marching from success to success. Mao Tse-tung's pronouncements of February and March of this year are perhaps the frankest testimony we have had indicating that the picture has been overdrawn. We may not know all the motives for Mao's rejection of that sacred premise of Communist theology—the absence of conflicting interests between the Communist State and the people it rules—but certainly one of them is the seriousness of China's economic problems and the troublesome political issues to which they have given rise.

This is especially evident from the failure of the Communists to attain complete mastery of rural China. Within a period of eight years the Communists both accumulated and dissipated most, if not all, of their political capital in the countryside. The slogan of "land to the landless," so deftly used in the Communist drive for power, is a painful memory for the millions who accepted it at face value. Not only have the landlords lost their property through the land distribution program, but those who received the land and those who had long worked their own land were subsequently deprived of it by forced collectivization. Partly because of the demands of an ambitious industrialization program, and partly because of doctrinaire assumptions, the "pragmatic" Chinese Communists have proved to be as oblivious to peasant welfare as have the Russian Communists. They are harvesting a crop of discontented peasants with interests and objectives quite at variance with those of the State. Yet the future of China and the success of the Communists are inextricably tied to the course of events in the village.

II

For many years past, it has been widely recognized that institutional and technical agrarian reform in China was long overdue. Before the war, China (including Manchuria) had about 250 million acres of cultivated land and a population of 450–500 million, of which 70 percent was rural. With the rapid population

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

growth in the past century, the average size of a farm holding had been reduced to between three and four acres, one of the smallest in the world.

The Chinese is a master farmer despite his seemingly primitive methods of cultivation. His intensive, garden-type farming yields a high output per unit of land, but the output per man is very low. Aside from the problem of many people on little land, he has to contend with a number of other disabilities: land fragmentation; floods and droughts; lack of capital for developing agricultural resources; shortage of draft animals, farm implements and fertilizers; lack of credit and exorbitant interest rates; poor transportation facilities; and a high illiteracy rate. The sum total effect is that, in the main, the Chinese farmer has known little but poverty. Unrest and discontent were its natural corollaries.

Moreover, a large number of peasants did not own any of the land they cultivated while a good many owned so little that they, too, had to rent land, paying half or more of the crop to the landlord for the privilege of working it. The Communists claimed that 10 percent of the households owned 68 percent of the land, while the remaining 90 percent owned 32 percent of the land. The comparable anti-Communist figures were 54 and 46 percent. Regardless of the statistical differences and the occasional attempts to prove that China had no landlord class, hunger for land and the land tenure conditions to which it gave rise have long affected China adversely.

The Chinese Communists recognized in the rural situation, and particularly in the inequalities of land ownership, the most dramatic and politically exploitable issue. They monopolized the slogan of "land to the landless," and in the minds of the peasantry they succeeded in identifying themselves as the authentic "agrarian reformers." In China, as in Russia, the Communists successfully translated into political language the peasant's longing for the landlord's acres.

The Communist program of agrarian reform in China was more than two decades in the making, punctuated by twists and turns, always conditioned by one consideration only: the ultimate seizure of political power. Almost from the very beginning of the Party's existence, land confiscation and redistribution became its main objective; the occasional watering down of the original plans was never more than a tactic to secure the political support of particular elements of rural society.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Agrarian Reform Law was promulgated by the new Communist Government in June 1950. It emphasized land confiscation and private ownership by the cultivators. However, at that stage, the Communists made an effort to reduce the number of people subject to the confiscatory provisions. Even the "land owned by rich peasants and cultivated by them or by hired labor" was exempt from confiscation. The brunt of the reform was to be shouldered by the landlords, comprising 4 percent of the rural population. Clearly, the new régime sought to make as few enemies as possible.

Development of the national economy, not the welfare of the peasants, was apparently uppermost in the minds of the Communist leaders. The first article states that the purpose of the reform is that "the system of peasant land ownership shall be carried into effect in order to set free the rural production forces, develop agricultural production, and thus pave the way for New China's industrialization." "The basic aim of agrarian reform," a Communist leader stated, "is not purely one of relieving poor peasants. The basic reason and aim of agrarian reform stems from the demands of production."

The ideological motives of the agrarian reform, though not spelled out in the Law, were surely as important as the economic ones. Land confiscation and distribution without at the same time "liquidating" the landlords would have been a betrayal of the Communist revolution. Furthermore, the physical annihilation of the landlords was useful to the Communists in that the peasants were made to share the guilt with them. This "partnership in crime" served to tie the peasantry more strongly to the Communist kite. There was, above all, the practical advantage of destroying the only alternative source of authority in the countryside. When the drive for collectivization began three years later, the village was without effective opposition.

The program of confiscation and distribution, as well as all other subsequent phases (including collectivization), was carried out under the strictest Party control. From the initial survey of land and population to the determination of class categories, from the "accusation meetings" for aggravating class antagonisms to the final distribution of land, hundreds of thousands of trained Communist "cadres" were in complete control. The Agrarian Reform Committees and the "people's tribunals" were carefully organized and supervised by the Communists.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Within a period of not quite three years, the land redistribution had been completed. The Communists confiscated and distributed 118 million acres of land or approximately 43 percent of the entire cultivated acreage of the country. In addition, houses belonging to landlords, about 30,000,000 draft animals, upwards of 40,000,000 agricultural implements, and about 5,000,000 tons of foodstuffs were confiscated and redistributed. Physical annihilation of the landlords was the leitmotiv of the redistribution process. Since in the Communist parlance "bandits" and landlords are often synonymous, one may interpret as one will the "liquidation" of 2,000,000 "bandits," a figure vouched for by a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or the "liquidation" of 800,000 persons mentioned by Mao Tse-tung.

For the peasants, the agrarian reform in its early stages must have been an exhilarating experience. Almost every peasant in China became a small owner-operator. This involved a complete reshuffle of the village social structure, destroying many old relationships and distinctions of status and opportunity, and clearing the way for Communist goals which were only dimly perceived by the peasantry. According to the Communist sources, the landlord group which once owned 50 percent of the cultivated land by this time owned only 3 percent. Although the reform was to have affected the rich peasants relatively little, the area under their control declined from 18 percent to less than 8 percent. On the other hand, the Communists maintained that the poor peasant and the hired hands, or 70 percent of all the households, now owned 63 percent of the land as against 17 percent before the reform; unquestionably, the reform had a great levelling effect. It also had a number of other consequences, some of them affecting agricultural production adversely.

The opposition of the landlords had all the familiar earmarks of that displayed by the Russian kulaks during the early days of collectivization: they starved or slaughtered their animals, destroyed farm tools, set fire to or flooded the crops in the fields, demolished irrigation facilities and put farm buildings to the torch.

Small-scale ownership of land presupposed individual management, with little or no outside interference. The reform marked the beginning of the end of this type of individualism. Government cadres having firmly established themselves in the villages, private owners had to heed the directives of the Ministry of Agri-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

culture about plowing, planting, sowing, weeding, harvesting and so on. The confiscation of the landlords' property was a boon to the peasant, but the measures which accompanied the reform did not create a psychological climate in which output was likely to increase.

Nevertheless, in 1952, the year this phase of the reform was completed, agricultural production seemingly equalled or exceeded the record crop of 1936. In 1949, when the Communists attained power, agricultural production in China had reached a very low ebb, and, given a measure of peace and security, production was bound to increase. The excellent weather conditions in 1951–52 played a decisive rôle, while improved techniques introduced by the Communists were not without their positive effects. Of over-riding importance was the incentive generated by the land redistribution. The peasants received what they wanted most. To them, as to the Russian peasants in 1918, possession of a piece of land more than balanced the heavier tax burden, compulsory grain deliveries and the restrictions imposed upon them by the Communists. It did not occur to them, any more than it did to the Russian peasants, that the "gift" of the land was only a step in the régime's ultimate plan for collectivization.

III

A dozen years intervened in Russia between the land redistribution and the onset of collectivization; in China the interval lasted barely three years. The idea of herding 100 million farm households into collective farms is probably as old as the first Soviet collective farms, but for reasons of political expediency this was to have been approached in stages.

The notion of a gradual, step-by-step transition in attaining complete control over the peasantry conformed to Lenin's thesis that the peasant class was fundamentally anti-socialist but must nevertheless be made to serve the interests of the new social order. To have jumped into collectivization on the morning after securing political power would have antagonized the land-hungry and the small farmers—the great majority of the Chinese people—before the newly-won power had been consolidated. The promise of "land to the landless," however temporary, had to be kept.

In early 1953, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, while deliberating on the question of agrarian coöperation, still found it necessary to record that "the individual economic system

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the peasants will necessarily continue to exist and expand for a long time to come." But it was not to be so. Arguments in favor of collectivization became more persistent. The Chinese Communists used the old Soviet argument that "the nation could not stand with one foot on socialistic industry and the other on peasant economy." Or, in the words of Mao Tse-tung, "if positions in the countryside are not held by socialism, capitalism will assuredly occupy them." Improved techniques on the millions of one- or two-acre farms seemed out of the question, yet the huge industrialization program required larger farm output, especially of grain. And, of course, centralized economic and political control of the peasants was essential if collections were to be adequate. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to insure such control over the vast ocean of individual peasant holdings; it would be much easier if these were organized into a mere million coöperatives, which could later be consolidated into a few hundred thousand collective farms. The only question was what form the coöperatives should take and with what speed they could be introduced into the countryside.

"The Model Regulations for Agricultural Producer Coöperatives," adopted on November 9, 1955, tells much about their form, at least in theory. A producer coöperative is an economic organization of peasants, created for the common utilization of all means of production. ". . . Step by step [a coöperative] turns these means of production into community property." The land belongs to the coöperative, but the members retain ownership of the land. This time, however, the Communists were frank enough to admit that ownership will continue only "for a certain period." The peasants were to receive a special dividend for the land contributed to the coöperative, but with a severe limitation: "The income of an agricultural producer coöperative is derived from the labor, not from the land ownership, of its members."

The principle of voluntarism was stressed: "Agricultural cooperatives should never resort to methods of coercion but should use the method of persuasion. . . ." The aim is to ". . . overcome the backwardness of small peasant economy, to develop a socialist industrialization."

The members of the coöperatives were permitted to retain for individual use "small plots of garden land . . . poultry, livestock, small tools . . .," but under no condition might the size of the retained land exceed 5 percent of the land owned by an individual.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As professed Marxists, the Chinese Communists had no compunction about laying to rest the concept "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." Instead, the coöperatives must remunerate their members on the principle of "pay according to labor, and more pay for more labor," and this in turn must be based upon a system of "norms" or piecework.

The "Regulations" are pages long, made up of 82 articles, but references to the welfare of the peasants are scanty and indirect. Vastly more specific are the obligations of the peasants to the State. In the words of the "Regulations":

> Agricultural producer coöperatives must exemplarily fulfill their duties to the State, pay agricultural tax according to the quantity, quality, and time prescribed by the State, deliver and sell agricultural products according to the unified purchase plans of the State, and sell agricultural products according to the advance purchase contracts signed with the State purchasing agencies.

Numerous other provisions are all designed to stress the duties of the peasants vis-à-vis the coöperative and that of the coöperative vis-à-vis the Communist Party. As to incentives and peasant well-being, the peasants were told that they were to find them in greater output.

While the Government was formulating these policies, the actual development of the coöperatives proceeded at a relatively slow pace. By the end of 1954, they numbered 115,000, comprising about 2 percent of all the farm households. At this time the issue between the expansionists and the "conservatives," who were for consolidation of the coöperatives already in existence, had not been joined. The turning point was the middle of 1955.

The sudden drive to increase the number of coöperatives was prepared by several factors: the poor crop of 1954, grave concern about the grain deliveries, the pessimism that prevailed about the future of China's agriculture in general, and Mao Tse-tung's assertion that the yields in the coöperatives were from 10 to 30 percent higher than those on the private farms. In a speech in July 1955, Mao reminded the Communists that a socialist revolution could not be won by "sitting fast," and the "influence of forces tending to develop spontaneously toward capitalism has been daily developing in rural areas." He castigated the "rightists" who "like a woman with bound feet" have approached the problem waveringly. Mao insisted that China's industrialization demanded farm collectivization, and he held up the Soviet experi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence as proof of the correctness of that policy. "The movement," Mao warned, "must be directed with a free hand [and] there must be no fearing of the dragon in front and the tiger at the back."

Coming from on high, the call to action brought instantaneous response from the local Communist workers, who proceeded with fine disregard for the principle of voluntarism to exceed Mao Tse-tung's goal. The aim was to organize 50 percent of the peasants in coöperatives by the end of 1958 and this was accomplished before the end of 1956. Early this year, more than 90 percent of the Chinese farmers had been "persuaded" to throw in their lot with the producer coöperatives, and over half a million of them came into being. More than that, in the very midst of "the surging tide of agricultural coöperation," the emphasis was placed on the organization of the "truly" socialist type of coöperatives, the collectives. By mid-1957, long before Mao's target date, China's agriculture had been collectivized.

It is perhaps too early to assess, however summarily, the significance of this revolution and of the relative ease with which the Communists effected it. Yet, a tentative appraisal of some of the immediate consequences and problems may be ventured.

IV

The land the peasants had received from the Communists was taken away from them. All the land (with the exception of garden plots) and the principal means of production became the property of the collective. This time the principal victims were the small landholders. The collective is no respecter of classes; with the loss of the land all distinctions disappeared, and all members of the collectives became, in effect, farmhands on the land they owned only recently.

The collectives are erasing the village as an entity. Whereas the producers' coöperatives were small and were built around a village and often comprised no more than 20 to 30 households, the collectives are made up of a number of villages, totalling from 500 to 1,000 households each. The million or more coöperatives are likely to be reduced to 200,000 or 300,000 collectives. This is indeed a great gain for the Communists, for their major goal of political and economic control over the peasantry becomes more easily attainable.

The ineffective resistance of the peasants to collective farming

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is at first glance incomprehensible. For the student of the early period of Soviet collectivization, when the Russian village literally exploded in the face of the Communists, the Chinese counterpart appears to have been a tame affair.

The key to the mystery of the world's most individualistic peasantry submitting to a system so alien lies in the land redistribution program. The backbone of effective resistance was broken when the Communists inaugurated the practice of dividing and eliminating their class enemies one by one. They have destroyed the landlord class, and they have played a cat-and-mouse game with the rich peasants, to a point where, as one Communist leader put it, "they have been rigidly, finally and entirely isolated." In sum, they destroyed the two groups most likely to offer effective resistance, while courting the poor peasants and small landholder. By the time the collectivization of the village became a reality, the opposition that could have come from the small farmers, who accounted for about 20 percent of the rural population, was neutralized by the 70 percent of poor peasants for whom the collectives were not altogether an unmitigated evil —or so they may have thought at the beginning.

The Government's exercise of unlimited economic controls also served to dull the peasants' resistance. With the liquidation of the "exploiters," the tie of the peasant with the world beyond his village was inescapably through the Government. The peasant became completely dependent upon the Government for his sales, purchases, credit and a host of items grouped under "technical improvements." In theory, a peasant could resist the State's embrace, but in practice the cards were stacked against him. The choice was made for him, and in the time-honored Chinese tradition, he proved to be the bamboo bending with the wind rather than the tree breaking against the irresistible force.

However, the Communists have won only half the battle. There still remains the more critical task of making the collectives work.

The collectives created many problems, baffling to the Government and bewildering to the peasants. For peasants used to working in family groups, a collective farm is a new and confusing experience. Individualism, constrained in the complex organization of a collective with its myriad regulations, can be a troublesome affair, creating infinite possibilities for dispute and setting up emotional stresses that may well produce more bad blood than grain. The sudden change from the fruitful anarchy of in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dividualism to formal collectivism resulted in a lack of a sense of personal responsibility toward the collective and its property, and lack of incentive in maintaining the quantity and quality of the work.

The Communists soon realized that it is easier to organize collectives than to turn them into efficient producers. The 1956 agricultural season was a disturbing one. An unrevealed number of farmers actually deserted the collectives. Grain production and collection quotas appeared impossible to fulfill. It may or may not be true, as the Government claims, that output was larger than the preceding year, but the production target and, more importantly, the collection-purchase quotas were not fulfilled. These, including the grain tax, were officially put at three million tons less than in the previous season, and in the face of mounting requirements, State sales of grain within the country are now actually exceeding purchases, a good deal of them going to grain-short rural areas. Grain rations had to be tightened and exports of grain, edible oils and cotton have been ruled out for 1957. Mao Tse-tung's promise in early 1956 that collectivization would increase the income of 90 percent of the farmers was a rash one.

While staunchly defending the collectives as the only rational production system, the Communists admitted that the organization of the collectives was accompanied by a good deal of "dizziness with success." In the zeal to "fulfill and overfulfill," every conceivable mistake was committed.

According to Vice-Premier Teng Tzu-hui's speech of June 19, 1956, "in quite a number of places" coöperatives went in for "unthinking extravagance and waste;" "failed to work from actual needs and possibilities;" imposed "very rigid restrictions" on how the peasants should use free time, causing them to neglect subsidiary occupations, which normally accounted for nearly one-third of their income; and some coöperatives "failed to apply strictly the principle of voluntarism and mutual benefit," while still others "fixed rather low prices" for items purchased from the peasants. In setting production targets in some areas, soil, weather and technical means were "never seriously" considered; there was "undue emphasis on quantity and speed," while "much of the personnel lacked a practical sense of a realistic approach and of handling things according to local conditions." To this should be added the mistake of "planning behind closed doors," and, above all, the cardinal sin that "though knowing full well that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the plans cannot be fulfilled [the local authorities] insist on treating a dead horse as if it were a live one."

Whatever the character of the admissions, it became obvious to the Communists that the mystique of rural collectivism will not bear fruit unless the peasant loyalties and incentives generated by individualistic, small-scale farms are transferred to the collectives. Anticipating Mao's new doctrine of "a hundred flowers," a Communist leader, Mr. Wu Shuo, wrote a searching article in January of this year entitled "An Inquiry into the Grain Situation during the Transition Period." "Farm coöperation itself," he asserted, "does not constitute a means of increasing production." He compounded this heresy by one even more startling: ". . . the incentive for production comes from the idea of working for one's own benefit. . . ." Hence the conclusion: ". . . it is of absolute necessity, though it is a difficult task, for us to enable the peasants to understand the fact that to work for the group which includes oneself is to one's own benefit." To this end, and with their customary energy, the Communists set about shoring up the collectives by emphasizing the carrot rather than the stick.

According to the new line, the income of a member of the collective farm must be treated as a major policy question rather than subsidiary to production. Reserve funds were to be reduced to 5 percent in order to augment the income of the farmers. Production, compulsory sales and taxation targets must be determined realistically. State prices for compulsory sales of farm products were to be raised, and the existing system of "advance purchase contracts," designed to help the peasants between harvests, must be expanded and more liberally financed. "Free markets" were to be organized for the sale of surplus products not subject to state purchase and, although concentrating on the main crops, subsidiary occupations should be encouraged "without any restrictions." Managers were told that production costs must be kept to 15–20 percent of the annual income and adminstrative expenses to 2 percent. Sixty to 70 percent of the income was to be divided among the peasants. Since the size of the collectives had proved unwieldy, they should be reduced to approximately 300 households each. Attempts of local authorities "to reach heaven in one jump" must come to an end.

Finally, the collectives were granted more state assistance bearing directly on greater output. In 1956, the Government

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allocated U.S. $943,000,000 for capital investment in agriculture, or 48 percent more than in 1955. This is exclusive of farm credit loans advanced mainly for developmental purposes, and a large item in themselves. If the data are correct, 1956 will show a marked increase over the previous years. Between 1950 and 1955, long- and short-term loans ranged from U.S. $80 million to a high of U.S. $504 million; in 1956, the target is U.S. $1.2 billion.

All these measures relate, of course, to the appeasement of the peasant so that agricultural production may be raised. All ideological contentions about the socialist character of the collectives aside, a continuous rise in agricultural production is *the* critical issue facing the régime in the years immediately ahead. Accepting Wu Shuo's official claim that the 1955 grain output was 184 million tons, or 54 percent higher than in 1949, and 22 percent above the 1936 prewar peak, the average per capita is only 600 pounds, or less than half that of Russia. His own rather rueful comment was: "How inadequate China's food supply is!" The same writer noted with distress that the rate of increase slowed down to less than 4 percent per year after 1953 as against an annual increase of 14 percent for the three years prior to that date. Several considerations make this decline particularly alarming for the Communists. The population is expanding at the rate of 15,000,000 per year; demand for foodstuffs in urban areas and in areas where farmers concentrate on industrial crops is increasing sharply; collectives tend to equalize the consumption of their members at higher levels; and finally, there is the ever-pressing need to export agricultural products in order to pay for imports required to sustain the industrialization program.

The Communists know this, and they are beginning to experience the consequences of the wide gap between needs and fulfillment. As of mid-1957, the enthusiasm and confidence of the "surging tide" of collectivization has given way to deep concern and uncertainty about agricultural production and the failure of the collectives to increase it.

In giving attention to the contradictions in a Communist society, Mao Tse-tung barely hinted at the sullen attitude of the peasantry. However, it takes little perspicacity to see that, in Mao's "double aspect of all occurrences," the peasants are the masses pitted against their rulers, the Communists. But will the oblique acknowledgment of this conflict of interests bring a resolution that satisfies the peasants? Hardly so, if Mao means what

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he says: "The contradictions between the masses and the rulers, like other contradictions among the people, are non-antagonistic contradictions that arise on the basis of the *unity of primary interests.*" (Italics added.)

This fiction of common interests between the collectivized peasantry and the State is likely to persist. The only alternative is freedom with its hundred schools of thought contending. As Mao knows from his brief experiment of last spring, this would give rise to a flood of criticism which, if unchecked, could weaken the régime and doom the collectives. For this reason, the rulers of Communist China, like those of Russia, will continue to treat the non-Communist countryside as if it were an occupied satellite, carrying on in the familiar pattern "of lurches, checks, and plunges, of sharp frictions, suffering, unrest, and repression."

There is a widespread notion that the tactics of the Chinese Communists are as pragmatic as the Marxist dogma is inflexible, and that this pragmatism may be as helpful to them as it is dangerous to the non-Communists. The collectivization movement does not support this theory. True enough, prior to the final triumph of the Communists, the agrarian reform did not start with outright confiscation and distribution of land; there were the in-between stages. And yet, in 1955 and early 1956, the Communists threw flexibility to the wind, to the point of endangering the collectives they were so anxious to create, and thereby weakening the outwardly monolithic power of the régime.

It is not implied that the collectives are in imminent danger of dissolution; if the Soviet experience means anything, the Chinese dictatorship should be able to maintain the collectivization system for years to come, but it is doubtful whether it will find an answer to the only questions that matter: how to insure the loyalty of the peasants, and how to raise agricultural production with a peasantry lacking the incentive to produce. If the Communists have spoken any truth at all, it is their admission that a continuous rise in agricultural production is the sine qua non of all their efforts.

Devices for appeasing the peasant, even if implemented, are unlikely to reconcile them. The Communists know what is wrong with the system but are not prepared to deal with it at the expense of Communist economic and political dogma. This would mean significant changes in the collective system itself. But there is no indication that the régime is ready to compromise either its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rural revenues or its absolute control over the collectives. The greater flow of investments into agriculture may indeed lead to a rise in productivity in the coming years, but the farmers are much more concerned with an immediate betterment in their conditions than with uncertain rewards at the end of another and perhaps yet another five-year plan. The Communists have not yet invented a substitute for the peasant and his customary willingness to give generously of his labor. If the Chinese Communists are pragmatic, the compromises in late 1956 and early 1957 may have to be supplemented with something more tangible, something that would recognize the fact that the peasants do not like collective farming. If the element of peasant self-interest is thus revived, a rise in agricultural production will be a "natural result."

While temporay relief may be dictated by reasons of State, it is unlikely that the Communists will relax their hold on the collectives in any fundamental way. The risks are much too great so long as the dogma persists that only Communist-controlled, collectivized agriculture can insure the progress of industrial development, and that only the collectives can rid the peasants of traditions inimical to a socialist state. This dogma can survive only through continuous recourse to force. On the collectivized fields of Soviet Russia the Communists have practised this for 27 years, and the struggle is still on. The Chinese Communists have only begun the battle for the mastery of the countryside, and the prospects are that this trial of strength will be long and exhausting. If the Communists succeed not merely in subduing the peasants but also in gaining their support, it will take a good deal of carrot and very little stick. Failing that, the peasant restlessness which once helped to put the Communists into power may well become a festering sore on the face of their régime.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE AMBASSADORIAL ISSUE: PROFESSIONALS OR AMATEURS?

By Clare Boothe Luce

A PUBLIC controversy has arisen concerning the conduct of our foreign affairs, namely whether amateurs or professionals should be appointed to head our embassies abroad. If we are to examine the issue seriously, we must agree not to prejudge it by using the terms "professional" or "amateur" in any deprecatory or pejorative sense, such as equating them with "cookie-pushing" and "pin-striped pants" on the one hand or "bungling" and "political payoffs" on the other. Amateurs are frequently called upon to wear pin-striped pants and professionals have been known to bungle; and in the intramural politics of the State Department, no less than "on the Hill," there have also been "political payoffs." If the issue is valid, we must discuss the merits of the amateur ambassador as opposed to the merits of the professional.

Certainly it will readily be agreed that a man who has made the practice of diplomacy his life work, his only career, can be called a "professional." We can also agree that the term "amateur" may then be used to designate a man who has come into diplomacy from any other walk of life, and who does not intend to pursue it as his profession or career. We may further agree that an "amateur," that is to say a non-career man, who has worked closely with professionals over a period of years—who has, for example, served in the State Department, the non-career missions attached to our embassies, or other branches of government where he has acquired a wide and practical knowledge of foreign affairs—might fairly be classed as a semi-professional, or in the language in which the professionals themselves classify him, as a "foreign expert." Defined in these terms, the issue of "amateur versus professional" is a relatively new one, for the reason that a realistic choice between the professional and the amateur ambassador has existed only in recent times.

Envoys of the United States of ambassadorial rank were not sent abroad until the year 1893. At that time America began to be recognized, and recognized itself, as a world Power. The Foreign Service, as an organized, united, systematically staffed profession, providing the framework of a corps of highly trained career diplo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mats, first came into being with the Rogers Act of 1924. Submerged and disrupted by World War II, it was reformed as an élite corps again by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, when the rank of "career minister" was created. The rank of "career ambassador" was established only in 1955, and both ranks require Presidential appointment and confirmation by the Senate.[1]

The Foreign Service today claims to have available from the ranks of its "hard core" regular officers enough career men to fill the top jobs in all our embassies abroad. It is this fact which seems to give the issue validity today.

Plainly, when the ambassadorial question is raised solely in terms of a categorical choice between "amateur" and "professional," the issue seems to settle itself: the skilled practitioner of the art of diplomacy is clearly to be preferred to the novice; the diplomatic "generalist," or "trained political specialist with a knowledge of everything," to the untrained neophyte. When we further consider that the very survival of our nation, in this age of the hydrogen bomb and atomic weapons, depends on the success of our multitudinous, world-wide diplomatic undertakings, can any other answer be reasonable or prudent? Is it not, therefore, desirable—indeed vital—that our professionals, who are now fortunately available, should be put in charge of all our embassies, especially in sensitive areas where the lack of diplomatic skill, not to mention a "blooper," might endanger the success of our policies, perhaps the security of the United States itself?

With these definitions, and with these dangers well in mind, let us leave the field of argument to survey the field of facts.

How many professional U.S. ambassadors are there in our missions abroad today, and how many non-professionals? In what important posts, and in what sensitive areas of the world, are they stationed?

The first pertinent fact is that today two-thirds of all our ambassadors abroad are professionals. As of this writing, 54 of 76 United States diplomatic missions spread about the world are headed by career men.

[1] The Foreign Service has been engaged in a 30-year struggle for the achievement of two objectives: the maintenance of the Foreign Service Officer corps as an élite body of diplomatists, with an identity separate from other branches of the State Department and other U.S. agencies overseas; and second, the acceptance of the principle that the chief coördinator, at a country level, of all U. S. representational activities overseas should be an officer of this corps. The vast multiplication of American agencies overseas has made coördination necessary, and today this function rests squarely with the ambassador. Apart from his position of seniority, as the President's personal representative, he has a special coördinating charter in the form of Executive Order 10575 of November 6, 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second pertinent fact is that they are in command of almost all of those areas considered by the State Department to be sensitive or crucial: the revolutionary areas and the areas which threaten us with aggression or are themselves imminently threatened by the Soviet Union or other Powers. Mr. Llewellyn Thompson, the Ambassador in Moscow, the most important post in the world today from the point of view of our over-all foreign policy objectives, is a career man. (He is also considered by his own colleagues as eminently qualified for this crucial job.) Every one of our ambassadors to the Iron Curtain countries is a "pro." In the 33 top posts in Africa, the Near, Middle and Far East, and the Pacific, the professionals outnumber the amateurs by 28 to 5. They hold such sensitive posts as Tunisia and Morocco, Israel and Egypt, Korea, Formosa, the Philippines and Japan. Career men are also today in strategically important Pacific posts, Australia and New Zealand. Of the 21 countries in the American hemisphere, the "pros" occupy 14 posts, including Canada, and in South America the two most important posts, Argentina and Brazil. In Europe, career ambassadors serve in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Iceland and Luxembourg.[2]

Let us now consider the whereabouts of the remaining 22 diplomats, whom we have agreed to classify either as amateurs, or foreign affairs experts—in either case, as non-career men.[3] Five of them are posted in the smaller countries of Latin America, an area whose importance, while certainly great to the United States, is not commonly considered by the State Department itself to be a crucial or sensitive one. One is in Mexico, another in Santo Domingo, another in Cuba. Two, as we have noted, are in Africa (Libya and Liberia). In Asia, one is in Pakistan, one in Ceylon,[4] and the third represents us in India (and Nepal). The remaining nine are posted in European countries. Of all these 22 posts which are today occupied by amateurs, only six are classified, in the

[2] *Career man Missions:* Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Jugoslavia, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of S. Africa, U.S.S.R., Viet Nam. Two embassies, Uruguay and Sweden, are now occupied by former Foreign Service officers. Switching these two back to the ranks of the amateurs would leave the score still two-thirds professional.

[3] *Non-career man Missions:* Belgium, Ceylon, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Honduras, India (also Nepal), Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Spain, Switzerland, Venezuela.

[4] Mr. Maxwell Gluck whose appointment gave fresh impetus to the amateur-versus-professional controversy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

language of the Foreign Service itself, as major diplomatic posts. They are London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, New Delhi and Madrid.

In view of the importance of the posts they hold, it is now not beside the point to ask who these non-professionals are.

Mr. Ellsworth Bunker (sugar and banking), now in India, has served under a previous administration as Ambassador to Argentina and Italy, and between ambassadorial assignments has worked in and for the State Department.

Mr. David Bruce, who is in Bonn, was a vice-consul in the Foreign Service for two years, Chief of the O.S.S. for the European Theater, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Chief E.C.A. Administrator to France, Ambassador to France, Under-Secretary of State—all under Democratic Presidents. Under Mr. Eisenhower, he has been special observer to E.D.C., and U.S. representative to the European High Authority for Coal and Steel.

Thus, while our ambassadors to India and Germany are not professionals, it would seem that they could qualify as "foreign affairs experts."

Let us then take Mr. John Davis Lodge, in Madrid. A former member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, ex-Governor of Connecticut, brother of the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Henry Cabot Lodge, grandson of the late Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, whose name has figured so large in the history of diplomacy, he has already served four years in Spain. He speaks French, Italian and Spanish fluently. Can he also not lay a reasonable claim to the title of "foreign expert"?

Mr. James D. Zellerbach (chairman of Crown Zellerbach Paper Corporation), who is in Italy, served under President Truman and Secretary Acheson as our economic chief of mission for the Marshall Plan in Italy, and later as a Delegate to the U.N. Consequently it can be assumed that he is familiar enough, not only with Italian problems and world problems, but with the ways of an embassy, to lay some claim to being a "foreign expert."

Mr. John Hay Whitney assumed his duties at the Court of St. James's just 60 years after his grandfather, John Hay, went to the same post. He has been a special adviser on public affairs to the State Department, a member of the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, and served on the Wriston Committee which reorganized the Foreign Service in 1954.

Mr. Amory Houghton, Ambassador to France (Chairman of the Board, Corning Glass Works), was an official of O.P.M.,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

W.B.P. and the U.S. Mission for Economic Affairs under Philip Reed in London during World War II. His father, Alanson Houghton, was Ambassador to Germany and to England.

It is questionable whether either Mr. Whitney or Mr. Houghton can be called "foreign experts." But here honest reporting requires us to note that their appointments were well received by the Congress, the press and the public. Mr. Houghton suffered some brief criticism from certain sections of the press on the score that he could not speak the language of the country to which he had been posted. The criticism did not last long, possibly because this is a handicap that many career men also suffer, especially in the sensitive and crucial Iron Curtain areas and the Near, Middle and Far East.

Here it may not be beside the point to comment briefly on the question of the part "speaking a foreign language" plays in the qualifications for an ambassador. The lingua franca of diplomacy throughout the Middle Ages and well into the seventeenth century was Latin. French became the accepted language of organized diplomacy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. French power under Louis XIV and XV was great on the continent of Europe, and Cardinal Richelieu had set the mold of diplomacy for an era that ended with the Napoleonic expansions and conquests. Consequently, expediency and prudence dictated to the other chanceries of Europe that all their professional diplomats would be well advised to learn to speak French like Frenchmen. Moreover, until the middle of the eighteenth century, most Englishmen, as well as Europeans, of the cultured and ruling classes were bilingual in French. But most importantly, a lingua franca is a diplomatic necessity. Accordingly French, a language of precision and courtesy, offered the necessary neutral ground of a "dominant language" in which the diplomats of all other nations could converse with one another. Today, the use of French as the language of diplomacy is a dying tradition.

As the result of the long ascendancy of the English-speaking nations, English has already become the lingua franca in vast areas of the world. It is the favored "second language" in the chanceries of most great capitals, especially in the Orient. It is the "common tongue" in India, and among many Middle East rulers.

The practical use of a second language to an ambassador is limited by the fact that no wise diplomat (of any country) will try himself to conduct any delicate diplomatic negotiation in a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tongue in which he is not bilingual. A reasonable knowledge of the language of the country to which he is posted is unquestionably an asset to an ambassador in his diplomatic and social contacts. In democratic countries, it is especially helpful with the people of that country, who are always flattered by the diplomat's attempts, however awkward, to use it. But a diplomat who is not completely fluent, indeed bilingual, will transact, at the peril of his nation, the real business of his nation in a language which is foreign to him. Mr. Houghton is said to be learning French, as a courtesy to the French. But it is to be hoped that he will not try to conduct any business in it more important than ordering a meal at the Ritz or delivering a friendly little speech.

In conclusion, one has only to reflect that if a top diplomat's knowledge of another diplomat's language were *essential* to the successful conduct of our foreign affairs, no conferences or meetings between prime ministers of various countries would be possible, certainly no "summit meetings." And the United Nations would be forced to close its doors. What *is* essential is that every American Embassy should have in residence an American officer cleared for security who is bilingual, in order to translate accurately any important negotiations between his ambassador or minister and the officials of the country. It is *this* deficiency of professionals who are linguistic experts in our embassies and not the ambassador's *personal* inability to speak the local tongue which has often created embarrassments, difficulties, even dangers for us in the conduct of our diplomacy. It is the task of the State Department to supply these bilingual experts wherever they are needed, just as it is the responsibility of the Congress to appropriate the sums needed for their training.

II

Certainly this review of the facts concerning the numbers, and whereabouts, of our amateur versus our professional ambassadors should remove any sense of public alarm or urgency which may today surround the issue. Two-thirds of our ambassadors are already professionals, and many of the remaining amateurs can be classified as semi-professionals and foreign experts.

These facts, however, do not invalidate the real issue—namely, *in principle* should United States Missions abroad be headed by professionals or amateurs? Is there any room for amateurs, even for those who have, in the course of time, become "experts" in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American diplomacy? We cannot answer this question without widening the focus of our argument, by asking what room the American system, and the American Constitution itself, make for the "amateur diplomat."

The room that the Constitution itself provides is the President's room in the White House, and the Secretary's room in the Department of State.[5] The Constitution designates the President as our no. 1 American diplomat. Throughout our history all our top diplomats have embarked on their great appointed task of formulating and carrying out our foreign policy as "amateurs." The Constitution also permits our no. 1 diplomat, the President, personally to pick our no. 2 diplomat, that is his Secretary of State, from any walk of American life he chooses. The President is similarly empowered to appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, all our diplomats to foreign countries who are then sent abroad as the President's *personal* envoys.

Any comprehensive list of the Presidentially appointed amateurs who have been sent throughout our history to negotiate for the United States abroad, and who have done so with distinction, would be far too long to include here. One can only mention the names of a few amateur envoys of the past: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Gouverneur Morris, John Jay, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Albert Gallatin, Washington Irving, John Hay, James Russell Lowell, Joseph Choate, Jacob Gould Schurman, Myron T. Herrick, Richard Washburn Child, Lewis W. Douglas, Admiral William Harrison Standley and General George Marshall—all names first associated in the public mind with achievements outside the field of diplomacy.

Nor can we limit the room made by the Constitution for non-professional diplomacy to the President, the Secretary of State or the President's personal envoys. Every United States Senator and Congressman functions at one time or other—and these days with increasing frequency—in the field of foreign affairs. Legislators who set about, by voice or vote, to support, amend, cripple or destroy the foreign policy of any given administration are profoundly affecting the conduct of our relations with foreign countries. They are, in the true sense of the word, foreign policy-makers. One has only to consider the impact abroad of certain resolutions (*i.e.* Suez, Formosa), immigration and tariff bills, and the vast complex of foreign affairs legislation and appropriations,

[5] The statutory basis for this responsibility lies in the Act of Congress, July 27, 1789.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to realize that in the final analysis our amateurs in the Congress have more influence on the foreign affairs of the United States, and wield more "diplomatic" power, than all the practitioners of "organized diplomacy" put together. In our constitutional democracy, the members of the Congress, amateurs all, are empowered to play a decisive part in the nation's diplomacy. As a result of the increased speed of communications, and the necessities of American foreign policy, many of them have now become familiar figures in our embassies and in foreign chanceries.

Senator Fulbright, author of the Fulbright Exchange Program, which is considered by all American professionals as one of the State Department's most successful undertakings, is frequently hailed as a "real diplomat" as well as statesman on his frequent trips abroad to investigate the workings of the program. I recall a speech made to him in my presence by an Italian official. "Few American Ambassadors," he said, "have ever done more to cement good relations between the United States and other nations than the Senator from Arkansas." Senator Mansfield, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is another amateur laboring in the substantive field of foreign affairs whose appearance in any American Embassy around the world is hailed by the "pros" as a professional opportunity to listen as well as to talk. Not infrequently, Senators and Representatives "junketing abroad" are "briefed" by our Embassy before they call on local leaders in order that they may "drive home" some point the Embassy itself has not succeeded in putting across; and some of them have succeeded admirably in their diplomatic rôles.

We must also take into account the amateur diplomacy practised by the million or more Americans who visit, live or work in foreign lands: the American businessmen, creating better and more abundant commercial relations; the scholars, artists, lecturers, students, creating wider and deeper cultural relations; the agricultural experts, scientists, engineers and technicians, spreading American "know-how;" the news bureau men, constantly reporting to the home front on conditions abroad; the medical and religious missionaries, creating good health and good will among men; the hordes of American tourists who leave behind them a realistic impression of the American character; the organized groups of American labor men, spreading knowledge about the uses and practices of free trade unionism to the working men of other lands; the editors' groups, learning about foreign atti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tudes, explaining America's as they go; the members of our armed services, bringing the actual sense of America's solidarity with the countries where they are posted. All of these are "amateurs" (and I have listed only the most notable groupings) who are consciously or unconsciously assuming some of the tasks of modern diplomacy.[6]

More than 30,000 civilians are working for the United States Government abroad. Less than one percent of them are officers of the Foreign Service corps. Even at the level of organized diplomacy, the amateurs vastly outnumber the professionals. About 20,000 of these men and women, who do not consider diplomacy their life work, are nevertheless engaged overseas in the conscious and full-time pursuit of our diplomatic objectives. These amateurs in organized diplomacy are to be found in great numbers in the missions outside the regular Foreign Service establishment, and among the attachés of other government departments—Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and so on. Thousands of them, for example, are in the I.C.A. (economic), the C.I.A. (intelligence), and the U.S.I.S. (information). It will not do to dismiss all the members of these missions from the argument as being "specialists" and "technicians." Their presence in organized diplomacy is germane to the professional-versus-amateur argument, since no American Embassy today could carry out its complex and voluminous instructions, negotiations, programs or even representational functions without their know-how and assistance.

But that is not all: even in the Service itself amateurs are now plentifully present. As a result of the "Wristonization" program of 1954, there has been a great influx of non-professionals into the ranks of the Service in all classes.

It seems that, under the American system, at least in the cold war world, there is not only some room for amateurs in diplomacy, there is very great room indeed. Initially provided by the Constitution, and sustained by the American tradition, amateur diplomacy is the American method, not only in the actual machinery, but in the theory which puts the machinery into motion. Indeed, it is impossible to see how our democracy could conduct its foreign policy without the organized and unorganized assistance of amateurs.

[6] One fact is certain, regardless of how favorable or unfavorable the impression of America that is left behind by these amateurs; they do leave a favorable dollar balance in all the countries they travel through. These dollars, estimated in billions, achieve one very definite objective of U. S. foreign policy: they raise living standards in foreign countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

The mid-20th century American ambassador has to enact many rôles on a very broad stage and in relation to a cast of great number and variety, whereas, until shortly before World War II, the ambassador's contacts were largely confined to a relatively small circle composed of high officials of the host government and his opposites of the diplomatic corps.

In today's vastly enlarged diplomatic field, the ambassador must be a man with many and diversified interests and with the mental capacity to absorb the substance of various branches of knowledge. No longer can the diplomat confine his attention to politics and policies—important though they are. As executor of his country's comprehensive foreign policy, the American ambassador may be concerned with any or all aspects of human activity. His interests and his responsibilities range through politics, economics, commerce, industry, agriculture, finance, labor, standards of living, transport and communications, social welfare, education, science, art, religion—in fact all aspects of life in the country of his assignment. Not one can be neglected by today's ambassador, whose mission is to carry out a foreign policy based on the interdependence of nations and dedicated to removing the causes of war from the world.[7]

Where does the conclusion that amateur diplomacy is the American method leave the ambassadorial question? Closed? Not at all. It simply puts it into its proper perspective. It consequently permits us to raise the ambassadorial issue in realistic terms; namely, who should represent America abroad: the professional, the amateur, or the *best qualified man who can be found?* Obviously, the latter. And just as obviously, the reasonable presumption must be that the professional is most likely to be that man.

Certainly, *all other qualifications being equal,* in simple justice, the career man should be given preference over an amateur when an ambassadorial assignment is being made. He has spent his life in the Service, always a life of discipline and hard work, often of sacrifice and danger. If he has risen on merit close to the top of his profession he is entitled to reap its proper rewards, the prestige, the position, the power and the pay of an ambassador. Similarly, all posts, in all areas, should be as open to him as they are to an amateur.

It is natural and proper enough that the Foreign Service resents that this is not the case today. Of our 76 ambassadorial posts, career men today occupy *all* of the "hardship posts," while the non-career diplomats hold many of the easy, and *all* of the "plush," ones. That is to say, wherever you find a post where living and

[7] "The American Ambassador Today." Department of State Publication No. 6420.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

working conditions are inadequate and uncomfortable, where disease is rife or danger imminent, where strange customs and alien ways are practised, where it is too hot or too cold, too damp or too dry for the average American, there you will find not the amateur but the career man.

Life for an ambassador in a satellite country, and in many of the countries of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, can be worse than hard: it can be grim, ugly and depressing. Medical, hospital, educational and recreational facilities for American children range from poor to nonexistent. Social life is dreary beyond belief; American diplomats and their families in some parts of these areas can seldom enjoy, in their leisure hours, the normal pleasures of an American—restaurants, movies, sports or even visits to or from friends. Worst of all, vast distances, as well as dangers, give them the feeling of isolation from their fellow countrymen, and from America itself.

To be sure, in point of expenditure of energy, effort and work, the European posts are no easier than they are, say, behind the Iron Curtain. Indeed, in the big European posts an ambassador's day is one of endless effort, sometimes to the point of exhaustion.[8] But the honor, in the eyes of his countrymen, is greater. And life can be pleasant, stimulating, rewarding in Europe, especially for an ambassador's family. Where ambassadorships are concerned, we must admit that the professional often gets the skimmed milk of diplomacy, and behind the Iron Curtain the sour mash, while the non-career ambassador gets the cream.

All this strikes the men of the Foreign Service, and not without reason, as unjust. And the sense of injustice is in no way alleviated when they are told, true though it generally is, that they "couldn't afford the big European posts anyway." Rome, London, Paris, for example, are posts around which a dollar curtain has long been drawn. They can be assumed for any reasonable length of time only by men with private fortunes.[9]

It seems to every career officer, as it must seem to any thought-

[8] A detailed description of the rigors of a modern ambassador's day will be found on page 7900 *ff.* of the *Congressional Record* of May 23, 1956.

[9] To this point I can speak from experience. In Rome I spent, over and beyond my salary and representational allowance, some $30,000 a year. This expenditure was on efforts, entertainments, etc., that were closely connected with my ambassadorial functions. The financial drain of a "big post" on the minister counselor is relatively as great. Within recent weeks, the minister counselors in the American Embassies in London and France have asked to be transferred to other countries because their salaries would not cover the expenditures the duties of the posts required.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ful citizen, that whatever other factors should be, or are, taken into account by the President in the choice of an American ambassador for any given post, money should not be one of them. When the mere possession of private wealth becomes a major qualification for an American diplomat, the Foreign Service has the right to feel "sore," and the American people ought to feel ashamed. The post of ambassador should not be an honor that can be put on an auction block. Nevertheless, the President today faces the necessity of picking only very rich men for certain posts. The way to remedy this situation is for the Congress to appropriate adequate funds to the posts themselves, for their representational maintenance.

IV

We have agreed that wherever an amateur is not *better qualified* than a professional for a top diplomatic job, the job should go to the professional. We have also agreed that the mere possession of money should in no way constitute a qualification. Obviously, neither should it constitute a disqualification.

We come now to the basic question: Are there any criteria equally acceptable to professional and amateur which we can use in determining the "better qualified man"?

What criteria does the Foreign Service itself set in rating its officers for promotion? A large part of the answer can be found in studying the Foreign Service "efficiency report." This is a form which is periodically filled out on a Foreign Service Officer by his immediate superior.[10] The accumulated efficiency reports made on an officer as he comes through the ranks from the lowest class, 8, to class 1 (at which point he becomes eligible for promotion to minister or chief of mission) are the basis on which the Selection Board which sits annually in Washington considers him for promotion. On this form there are listed eight "qualities:" character, ability, conduct, quality of work, industry, experience, dependability and general usefulness.

Thirty additional "factors" are also listed: general knowledge of the Foreign Service; understanding of political and economic factors; of information programs and techniques (in the country in which he serves); knowledge of administrative practices and consular duties; effectiveness in applying laws and regulations

[10] It is reviewed by *his* superior, and can also be reviewed by the ambassador, at his discretion, where the ambassador himself is not already the rating or reviewing officer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

correctly; thoroughness and accuracy of work and observation; effectiveness of written and of oral expression; negotiating ability; judgment; skill in dealing with the public; effectiveness as a supervisor; managerial effectiveness; ability in the field of intelligence; ability to get along with others; tactfulness; initiative; resourcefulness; decisiveness; forcefulness; adaptability; coöperativeness; patience; cost consciousness; security consciousness; good manners and politeness; and sense of humor.

The Foreign Service superior rates his subordinate officer on a basis of one to six on each of these 38 "qualities" and "factors."[11] These are further analyzed by the rating officer in brief comments appended to the report. A perfect score would be 228 points, assuming of course that all the factors listed were relevant to his particular embassy task.

In actual practice, if an officer consistently maintains a score of five on each relevant point, he is well headed for continual promotion—always assuming that he doesn't hit a snag in the form of a superior who takes a personal dislike to him. (The professional deformation of the career officer, "not getting his neck out," is often acquired after he reads his first efficiency report.) On the other hand, the career officer who is able or lucky enough to make the right friends in the Department can always survive a poor efficiency report made out by a prejudiced rating officer. The Foreign Service is, after all, a human institution. Making the right friends, influencing the right people and "playing politics" are not confined to the non-career world.

This efficiency report is relevant to our inquiry because it offers interesting proof that the main qualifications for a good ambassador are the same as they are for a good anything: they are human qualities.

We have only to review the above list of the human qualities desirable in a professional to see that these same qualities are equally valued in the non-professional. They are possessed in a greater or lesser degree by any man who has risen to eminence in public life, or who has made a notable success in any enterprise or profession which calls for continuous teamwork, and wide and fruitful contacts with his fellow citizens.

Nevertheless, there can be little question that the non-career man would get a pretty low mark on "general knowledge of the

[11] His degree of fluency in foreign languages is taken into account as an asset, but is not rated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

service," "consular duties" and "administrative practices" and "effectiveness in applying laws and regulations correctly." It is not enough to say that he would soon learn them (as he probably would), or that his minister counselor and his staff of professionals are there to see that his personal deficiency in these technical respects should not embarrass him. We have agreed that in justice to the professional, the non-career man must be *the better man,* he must offer other virtues or qualifications which will clearly outweigh his professional deficiencies.

What qualifications over and beyond those required of the professional can the amateur ambassador bring to his job?

Now a curious fact emerges from a study of the efficiency report: the great intangible assets that throughout the long history of foreign affairs in all countries have rendered envoys most effective in the art of diplomacy are not listed here. They are: prestige and esteem in the eyes of the diplomat's own countrymen, a proven interest in public affairs, a knowledge of political and economic realities at home and abroad and friendly contacts with leaders on the domestic scene.[12]

When a man has acquired great prestige at home through his own successful and popularly esteemed efforts as scholar, banker, industrialist, statesman, publicist, businessman, public servant or humanitarian; when he has, over the years, demonstrated a lively and constructive interest in public affairs; when he has wide and varied contacts with other leaders on the American scene, and if in addition he enjoys the prestige that flows from a mutually valued personal friendship with the President or Secretary of State, such a man can certainly be called "a man of proven distinction," a Somebody with a capital S.

The prestige of a Somebody will give him the power to influence public opinion at home, to approach "key figures" without diffidence and make suggestions to them without impertinence. He will be a man who can "get things done" and "put things across" at home. And he will always get a warm welcome from the diplomats of the country to which he goes, who will view his appointment both as an honor to them and an opportunity to transact

[12] In the words of a recent article by Walter Lippmann, "An appointment outside the career service . . . has to be justified by the special quality and the proved distinction of the candidate . . . [he should be] a man of demonstrable ability in public life." Harold Nicolson, in "The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method," writes that "the Greek cities were constantly sending and receiving ambassadors of a temporary, or *ad hoc* character." These ambassadors "were chosen for their known respectability, and reputed wisdom."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mutual business fruitfully and rapidly. And when such an ambassador arrives to take up his post, there is general rejoicing on the part of the professionals on his staff. After all that has been said, this is not as strange as it seems: the Foreign Service is a service dedicated, above all else, to the furthering of our country's objectives abroad.

V

As the constitutional right to appoint envoys rests squarely with the President, so, also, the prime responsibility for finding "the better qualified man" lies with him.

We have seen that two-thirds of President Eisenhower's appointments have been career men, and that his assignments of amateurs to certain major posts from which Foreign Service officers have been excluded (because of the personal cost to the envoy of their representational maintenance) have been commonly considered good ones.

Nevertheless, a few appointments to lesser posts have evoked heated charges of "political payoffs."[13] This charge is not a new one in American history. It has been made not only against certain of President Eisenhower's choices, but in the past, against some of Mr. Truman's, Mr. Roosevelt's, and against many previous presidential appointments. What is a "political payoff," and how can the appointment of "political payoffs" be prevented?

Certainly there is a large measure of public agreement on what constitutes a "political payoff." In American political practice, the personal political convictions of an appointee; the size of his private fortune; the campaign contributions he has made in the past to the party of his choice; the private services he has rendered the party; his personal relation to key figures in government (such as his blood relationship, friendship or business association with them)—all are considered to be circumstances which *as such* neither qualify nor unqualify him as a candidate for any high office. But when these same circumstances are presented as being *qualities* or *virtues* of the candidate's person; especially when they seem to be his *only* qualifications for the job to which he aspires, it can be assumed—and the assumption is generally a valid one—that the appointee is a "political payoff."

[13] The term "political appointment" has no meaning in the ambassadorial context, except the derogatory one the speaker may intend to give it, since *all* appointments made by our top politician, the President, including those of career envoys, are by definition political appointments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In view of the President's constitutional right to appoint whom he pleases, his appointments cannot be prevented. But, fortunately, the Constitution itself provides a recourse against the assumption of office by such men: the Senate has the power to *disqualify* them. It has the right to refuse to confirm their appointments.

In passing, let me say that although it is conceivable that legislation could be drawn to prevent their designation, in the first instance, by the President, it would be very difficult indeed to draw such legislation in view of the many reasons listed above why they are, in political practice, "paid off." Often the least of these is "the size of the campaign contribution." A "crony" of somebody high in government always has an inside track over the campaign contributor. Moreover, if the Senate fulfills its duty—which is to refuse confirmation of unfitted candidates—such legislation is obviously unnecessary.

Not only in recent years, but also in the past, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has failed in this, and even while "leaking" opinions from its secret hearings about the unfitness of some ambassadorial candidate, has proceeded forthwith to confirm him. It is this fact which makes subsequent charges of "political payoffs" both specious and hypocritical.

Such failures on the part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tend to prove that too many of the Senate's members—Opposition no less Administration—still regard ambassadorships as a part of the political spoils system; and that the chief motive underlying their charges of "payoff" is the desire to embarrass the President and the party in power in order to score a party advantage in future campaigns. This suspicion is especially justified when—as is the case today—the Opposition controls the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and with it the power to refuse confirmation to an Administration candidate.

The Senate would do well to remind itself that the public today ardently believes that whatever room there may be for amateurs in modern American diplomacy, there is no room for the kind of amateur who was once graphically described by a Congressional friend of mine as "an unknown public nonentity." When the Senate confirms a man who, in the considered judgements of a substantial number of the Committee, is not qualified to represent America abroad, it is doing an unpatriotic act. An ambassador's prestige, when he arrives in a foreign country, is America's pres-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tige. And obviously, when members of the Senate Committee set about to damage the reputation of a qualified man in order to secure some slight party advantage, the action is unpatriotic.

The responsibility for preserving and increasing American prestige abroad, as it is reflected in the calibre of our "Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary," is the dual responsibility of the President and the Senate. As concerns the rôle of the President in this connection, I might quote the words of Mr. James Reston in *The New York Times* of August 7. "The issue is not," he wrote, "whether the Eisenhower Administration is being more political in its ambassadorial appointments than the Democrats, or whether these jobs should be given to the top-career men in the Foreign Service, but whether the appointments have met the President's principle of appointing the best man available, regardless of party, wealth or foreign service record."

As concerns the Senate, I might quote Senator Hubert Humphrey, who led an important and illuminating debate on this subject in the Upper House on August 15: "Let us have a little more public discussion of nominations when they come to the committee. I think all of us have been slightly derelict."

In conclusion, let us remind ourselves again that, while there admittedly have been some lapses on this score, on the whole both the President and the Senate have recognized their responsibility. On the record, as we have shown, they have not done too badly by American diplomacy. Under the "amateur" guidance of 34 Presidents and their Secretaries of State and ambassadors, and in spite of the "unwarranted diplomatic interventions" of 85 Congresses, the "uninformed" advice of an uncontrolled press, and the pressures of hundreds of millions of "undisciplined Americans" on our foreign affairs, the United States has nevertheless reached the peak of world leadership.

It is the wisdom of the Foreign Service itself to understand that whatever else diplomacy is, or is not, it is a pragmatic art. "By their fruits ye shall know them." In its 181 years of diplomatic life, America has not yet made "the irrevocable diplomatic error."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA

By L.

IT might be supposed that as a result of so many years of Stalinist conditioning the new Soviet man would be a new creature, as different from his Western counterpart as the Soviet system differs from Western forms of government. But this has not, in fact, turned out to be so. In so far as recent conversations of mine with students, clerks in shops, taxi-drivers and stray acquaintances of all sorts can convey a just impression, the result is a kind of arrested infantile development, not a different kind of maturity.

In the Soviet Union today one finds the conditions that are often found to prevail in organizations in which degrees and types of responsibility are very sharply defined—strictly disciplined schools, armies or other rigid hierarchies in which the differences between the governors and the governed are extremely precise. Indeed, the chasm between the governors and the governed is the deepest single division noticeable in Soviet society; and when one speaks to Soviet citizens it soon becomes quite clear to which of the two groups they belong. Honest public discussion, either of the ends for the sake of which the new society supposedly exists, or of the more important means supposedly adopted for the forwarding of those ends, is equally discouraged on both sides of this great dividing line. The work of the ant-hill must be done, and anything that wastes time or creates doubts cannot be permitted. But the consequences in one case are somewhat different from those in the other.

Let me begin with the governed. Those who have no ambition themselves to become governors, and have more or less accepted their position in the lower ranks of the Soviet hierarchy, do not seem to be deeply troubled about public issues. They know they cannot affect those issues in any case, and discussion of them is, moreover, liable to be dangerous. Hence when they touch upon them at all they speak with the gaiety, curiosity and irresponsibility of schoolboys discussing serious public issues outside their ken, more or less for fun, not expecting to be taken too seriously, and with a pleasing sense of saying something daring, near the edge of forbidden territory. Such people cultivate the private virtues, and retain those characteristics that were so often noted as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

typically Russian by foreigners before. They tend to be amiable, spontaneous, inquisitive, childlike, fond of pleasure, highly responsive to new impressions, not at all blasé, and, having been kept from contact with the outside world for so long, essentially Victorian and prudishly conventional in their outlook and tastes. They are not as terrified as they were in Stalin's day, when no one knew what might not happen to him, and no effective appeal to any institutions of justice was possible. The tyrant is dead, and a set of rules and regulations rule in his place.

The rules are exceedingly harsh, but they are explicit, and you know that if you transgress them you will be punished, but that if you are innocent—if you live a very careful and circumspect life, take no risks, see no foreigners, express no dangerous thoughts—you can reasonably count on being safe and, if arrested, on a reasonable chance of clearing up the misunderstanding and regaining freedom. The justice of the rules themselves is not, one finds, much discussed. The question is not asked whether they are good or bad. They appear to be taken for granted, like something from on high, on the whole disagreeable, and certainly not believed in with the kind of religious devotion expected of good Communists, but, since they are clearly not alterable by the governed, accepted by them almost like the laws of nature.

Taste remains simple, fresh and uncontaminated. Soviet citizens are brought up on a diet of classical literature—both Russian (which is almost unrestricted now) and foreign—mainly of authors held to be of "social significance:" Schiller, Dickens, Balzac, Stendhal, Flaubert, Zola, Jack London, plus "boy scout" novels celebrating the social virtues and showing how vice is always punished in the end. And since no trash or pornography or "problem" literature is allowed to distract them, the outlook of the pupils in this educational establishment remains eager and unsophisticated, the outlook of adolescents, sometimes very attractive and gifted ones. At the marvellous exhibition of French art in the Hermitage in Leningrad, Russian visitors (according to at least one foreigner who spoke to several among them) admired few pictures after the eighteen-fifties, found the Impressionists, particularly Monet and Renoir, difficult to like, and quite openly detested the paintings of Gauguin, Cézanne and Picasso of which there were many magnificent examples. There are, of course, Soviet citizens with more sophisticated tastes, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

few and far between, and they do not advertise their tastes too widely.

Students are encouraged to take interest in scientific and technological studies more than in the humane ones, and the closer to politics their fields of study are, the less well they are taught. The worst off are, therefore, the economists, modern historians, philosophers and students of law. A foreign student working in the Lenin Library in Moscow found that the majority of his neighbors were graduate students, preparing theses which consisted largely of copying passages from other theses that had already obtained doctorates and, in particular, embodying approved quotations from the classics—mainly the works of Lenin and Stalin (still Stalin in 1956)—which, since they stood the test of many examinations, represented the survival of the fittest. It was explained to this foreign student that without these no theses could hope to pass. Evidently both examinees and examiners were engaged in an unspoken understanding about the type of quotations required, a quota of these being a sine qua non for obtaining a degree. The number of students reading books was very small in comparison with those reading theses, plus certain selected copies of *Pravda* and other Communist publications containing quotable official statements of various kinds.

In philosophy the situation is particularly depressed. Philosophy—that is, dialectical materialism and its predecessors—is a compulsory subject in all university faculties, but it is difficult to get any teacher of the subject to discuss it with any semblance of interest. One of these, perhaps in an unguarded moment, went so far as to explain to a puzzled foreign amateur of the subject that under the Tsarist régime a clergyman was expected to visit every form in the school, say, once a week, and drone through his scripture lesson, while the boys were expected to sit quiet. They were scarcely ever asked to answer questions; and, provided they gave no trouble, did not interrupt or give vent to aggressively anti-religious or subversive thoughts, they were by tacit consent permitted to sleep through the hour—neither side expecting to take the other seriously. The official philosophers were the cynical clergy of today. Lecturers on dialectical materialism simply delivered their stock lectures, which had not altered during the last 20 years—ever since debates between philosophers had been forbidden even within the dialectical materialist fold. Since then the entire subject had turned into a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mechanical reiteration of texts, whose meaning had gradually evaporated because they were too sacred to be discussed, still less to be considered in the light of the possibility of applying them—except as a form of lip service—to other disciplines, say, economics or history. Both the practitioners of the official metaphysics and their audiences seem equally aware of its futility. So much could, indeed, be admitted with impunity, but only by persons of sufficient importance to get away with it: for example, by nuclear physicists whose salaries are now probably the highest of all, and who apparently are allowed to say, almost in public, that dialectical—and indeed all—philosophy seems to them meaningless gibberish upon which they cannot be expected to waste their time. Most of those who have spoken to teachers of philosophy in Moscow (and a good many Western visitors have done so by now) agree that they are one and all passionately interested to know what has been going on in the West, ask endless questions about "Neo-Positivism," Existentialism and so on, and listen like boys unexpectedly given legal access to forbidden fruit. When asked about progress in their own subject, the look of guilty eagerness tends to disappear, and they show conspicuous boredom. Reluctance to discuss what they know all too well is a dead and largely meaningless topic before foreigners who are not expected to realize this is almost universal. The students make it all too clear that their philosophical studies are a kind of farce, and known to be such, that they long to be allowed to interpret and discuss even such old-fashioned thinkers as Feuerbach or Comte, but that this is not likely to be found in order by those in authority. Clearly "the governed" do not seem to be taken in by what they are told. The philosophy students know that the philosophy dispensed to them is petrified nonsense. The professors of economics, for the most part, know that the terminology they are forced to use is, at best, obsolete.

At a wider level, it is difficult to find anyone with much belief in the information that comes from either their own newspapers or radio, or from abroad. They tend to think of it as largely propaganda, some of it Soviet, some of it anti-Soviet, and so to be equally discounted; and they avert their thoughts to other fields in which freer discussion is possible, mainly about issues of personal life, plays, novels, films, their personal tastes and ambitions and the like. On all these subjects they are fresh, amusing and informative. They suffer from no noticeable xenophobia. What-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever they might be told by the authorities, they hate no foreigners. They do not even hate the Germans, against whom there really was strong feeling of a personal kind in 1945–46, and certainly not the Americans, even though they fear that because of the quarrels of governments, the Americans may make war upon them; but even this is viewed more like the possibility of an earthquake or some other natural cataclysm than something to which blame attaches. Those who ask questions about current politics usually show little bias, only the curiosity of bright, elderly children. Thus the taxi-driver who asked his passenger if it was true that there were two million unemployed in England, and upon learning that this was not so, replied philosophically, "So they have lied about this too," said so without the slightest indignation, not even with noticeable irony, very much like someone stating a fairly obvious fact. It was the Government's business to dispense these lies, he seemed to say (like that of any Ministry of Propaganda in wartime), but intelligent persons did not need to believe them. The amount of deception or illusion about the external world in large Soviet cities is not as high as is sometimes supposed in the West—information is scanty, but extravagant inventions are seldom believed. It seems to me that if by some stroke of fate or history Communist control were lifted from Russia, what its people would need would be not reëducation—for their systems have not deeply absorbed the doctrines dispensed—but mere ordinary education. In this respect they resemble Italians undeluded by Fascism, rather than Germans genuinely penetrated by Nazism.

In fact, the relative absence of what might be called Communist *mystique* is perhaps the most striking fact about the ersatz intelligentsia of the Soviet Union. No doubt many convinced Marxists exist in Poland and Jugoslavia and elsewhere; but I cannot believe that there are many such in the Soviet Union—there it has become a form of accepted, and unresisted, but infinitely tedious, official patter. What writers and intellectuals desire—and those who have made their protests at recent meetings of writers' unions and the like are symptomatic of this—is not so much to be free to attack the prevailing orthodoxy, or even to discuss ideological issues, but simply to describe life as they see it without constant reference to ideology. Novelists are bored, or disgusted, with having to put wooden, idealized figures of Soviet heroes and villains into their stories and upon their stages; they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would passionately like to compose with greater—if still very naïve—realism, wider variety, more psychological freedom. They look back with nostalgia to what seems to them the golden age of the Leninist twenties, but not beyond, which is different from seething with political revolt. The writers—or, at any rate, some of them—wish to discuss or denounce bureaucracy, hypocrisy, lies, oppression, the triumphs of the bad over the good, in the moral terms to which even the régime ostensibly adheres. These moral feelings, common to all mankind, and not heterodox or openly anti-Marxist attitudes, are the form in which the Hungarian revolt seems to have been acclaimed or condemned, and in which the new novel (almost worthless as literature, but most important as a social symptom) that has stirred everyone so deeply—"Not by Bread Alone," by Dudintsev—is written and discussed.[1]

The governed—the subject population—are for the most part neither Communist believers nor impotent heretics. Some, perhaps the majority, are discontented; and discontent in totalitarian states is ipso facto political and subversive. But at present they accept or at any rate passively tolerate their Government—and think about other things. They are proud of Russian economic and military achievements. They have the charm of a sheltered, strictly brought up, mildly romantic and imaginative, somewhat boyish, deeply unpolitical group of simple and normal human beings who are members of some ruthlessly ruled corporation.

As for the governors, that is a different story. Individually ruthless and anxious to get on, they seem agreed that Communist language and a certain minimum of Communist doctrine are the only cement that can bind the constituent parts of the Soviet Union, and that to modify these too greatly would endanger the stability of the system and make their own position excessively precarious. Consequently they have managed to translate the thoughts in their heads into a reasonable imitation of Communist terminology, and seem to use it in their communication with each other as well as foreigners. When you ask them questions (and it is always clear whether or not one is talking to a member of the upper tiers of the hierarchy or someone who is aspiring to get

[1] Nor does the "oppositionist" literary almanac *Literaturnaya Moskva* do more than this: it is neither for "pure" art nor for some alternative political policy, however covertly. Its "suspect" articles cry out for human values.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there, if only from his looks and the tone of his voice and the clothes he wears and other less palpable things) they launch into something which at first seems a mere propagandist turn; then gradually one realizes that they believe in what they are saying in much the same way as a politician in any country can be said to believe in a performance which he knows that he manages well, which he has adjusted to his audience, upon which his success and career depend, which has patently become bound up with his whole mode of self-expression, possibly even to himself, and certainly to his friends and colleagues.

I do not believe that a double morality prevails in the Soviet Union: that the Party leaders or bureaucrats talk in the consecrated mumbo jumbo to their subjects, and then drop all pretense and talk cynical common sense to each other. Their language, concepts, outlook are an amalgam of both. On the other hand, again perhaps like that of the Russian bureaucrats of old, and of certain types of political manipulators and power-holders everywhere, their attitude toward their own official doctrine, but still more toward the beliefs of the outside world, is often skeptical and, indeed, cynical. Certain very simplified Marxist propositions they certainly do hold. I think they genuinely believe that the capitalist world is doomed to destruction by its own inner contradictions; that the proper method of assessing the power, the direction and the survival value of a society is by asking a certain type of "materialistic" economic or sociological questions (taught to them by Lenin), so that the answers to these questions play a decisive part in the conception and formulation of their own most crucial political and economic policies. They believe that the world is marching inexorably towards collectivism, that attempts to arrest or even modify this process are evidence of childishness or blindness, that their own system, if only it holds out long enough against capitalist fury, will triumph in the end, and that to change it now, or to retreat too far simply in order to make their subjects happier or better, might mean their own doom and destruction, and—who knows?—perhaps that of their subjects too. In other words, they think in terms of Marxist concepts and categories, but not in terms of the original Marxist purposes or values: freedom from exploitation, or coercion, or even the particular interests of groups or classes or nations, still less in terms of the ultimate ideals: individual freedom, the release of creative energy, universal contentment and the like. They are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

too tough and morally indifferent for that. They are not religious; but neither are they believers in some specifically proletarian morality or logic or historical pattern.

Their attitude towards intellectuals can be compared in some degree to that of political bosses everywhere: it is, of course, largely conditioned by the tone set by the leaders—the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The majority of these, in addition to their suspicion of those who are concerned with ideas in any form as a perpetual source of potential danger, feel personally uncomfortable with them, and dislike them for what can only be called social reasons. These are the kind of reasons for which trade unionists in all countries sometimes feel a combined attitude of superiority and inferiority to intellectuals—superiority because they think themselves more effective, experienced and with a deeper understanding of the world gained in a harder school, and inferior socially, intellectually and because they feel ill at ease with them. The group of roughnecks who preside over Russia's fortunes—and one glance at the Politbureau (now called the Presidium) makes it clear that they are men happier at street corner meetings or on the public platform than in the study—look upon intellectuals with the same uneasy feeling as they look on the better-dressed, better-bred members of the foreign colony—diplomats and journalists—whom they treat with exaggerated and artificial politeness, envy, contempt, dislike, intermittent affability and immense suspicion. At the same time they feel that great nations must have important professors, celebrated artists, cultural trappings of an adequate kind. Consequently they pay the topmost practitioners of these crafts high salaries, but cannot resist, from sheer resentment, an irresistible desire to bully and, from a deep, jealous sense of inferiority, the temptation to knock them about, kick them, humiliate them in public, remind them forcibly of the chains by which they are led whenever they show the least sign of independence or a wish to protect their own dignity.

Some intellectuals do, of course, themselves belong to the upper rungs of the hierarchy; but these are looked on by the bulk of other intellectuals either as semi-renegades and creatures of the Government, or else as blatant political operators or agitators, required to pose as men of learning or creative artists. The difference between genuine writers who can talk to other writers in normal human voices, and the literary bureaucrats—a difference,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

once again, between the governors and the governed—is the deepest single frontier in Soviet intellectual life. It was one of the former—the governors—who, talking not ostensibly about himself but about intellectuals in general, told a visiting American journalist not to think that Soviet intellectuals as a class were particularly keen about the granting of greater personal freedom to the workers and peasants in the Soviet Union. He said, in effect, that if they began giving liberties too fast, there might be too much unruliness—strikes, disorder—in the factories and the villages; and the intelligentsia, a most respected class in Soviet society, would not wish the order from which they very rightly get so much—above all, prestige and prosperity—to be jeopardized. "Surely you understand that?" he asked.

So far, then, have we travelled from the nineteenth century, when the whole of Russian literature was one vast, indignant indictment of Russian life; and from the agonies and enthusiasms and the bitter, often desperate, controversies and deadly duels of the twenties and early thirties. A few pre-Stalin men of letters survive, great names, but few and far between; they are half admired, half gaped at as semi-mythical figures from a fabulous but dead past. Bullying and half-cynical semi-Marxist philistines at the top; a thin line of genuinely civilized, perceptive, morally alive and often gifted, but deeply intimidated and politically passive, "specialists" in the middle; honest, impressionable, touchingly naïve, pure-hearted, intellectually starved, non-Marxist semi-literates, consumed with unquenchable curiosity, below. Such is Soviet culture, by and large, today.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

By Robert Marjolin

THE development of the European Economic Community will pose many and serious problems in the next 12 or 15 years—both within the market area and in its relations with the outside world. But before examining these we must first analyze a few of the essential provisions of the treaty, in order to define clearly its scope and to remove certain misconceptions which have already begun to creep into public discussions of it. For this purpose, the most important points which need to be brought out are the following:

1. The step-by-step process by which the customs union will be created cannot be revoked. A certain flexibility has been provided in the measures for eliminating duties and quotas, but under none of these measures can the transition period be extended beyond 15 years, even by unanimous agreement. A certain number of escape clauses have been provided, but their operation is subordinated to the same general principle. Moreover, they cannot be invoked except with the approval of the governing bodies of the Community.

2. The common external tariff for most items is henceforth fixed, and these rates will not exceed the arithmetical mean of duties collected by the member countries before the customs union was formed. Of course, the treaty includes a list of items for which tariffs have yet to be negotiated, but they are few in number and will not affect the over-all tariff level. The principle of the arithmetical mean has undergone some strain, but the exceptions which have permitted the lowering of tariffs are at least as important as those by which tariffs have been set above the mean. Of particular interest to outside countries are the tariff ceilings on many raw materials and semi-manufactured products which have been set at 3 percent and 10 percent respectively.

3. Agriculture is not excluded from the Common Market; customs duties and quotas will be progressively abolished for agricultural products just as they will be for industrial goods. A special escape clause has been provided which for a time permits a given country to restore import quotas if the price of a product falls below a certain level. This level is determined by the importing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country, but at the beginning of the third stage at the latest (eight to ten years after the treaty takes force), governments will be obliged to adhere to the majority decisions of the Community if it should judge the minimum price to be too high. The Community will also endeavor to coördinate governmental measures influencing each national market. Majority decisions can be taken in this matter.

4. The association of overseas countries and territories with the Common Market constitutes a virtual free trade zone, uniting these countries and territories to the Common Market itself. They retain the option of maintaining customs duties on goods coming from the six countries, whenever necessary to protect their developing industries. However, such tariffs must not discriminate in favor of the European country to which they are politically tied. It is evident that this provision was conceived solely in the interest of the underdeveloped countries associated with the Community. Although in several of its most important aspects the association has been worked out for a projected period of only five years, the member countries fully intend to bring about a complete and permanent association. This is shown by the fact that reduction of tariffs will in any event be pursued until they are totally eliminated, with the exception noted above.

5. The European Economic Community is more than a customs union; it is a real economic union, in which conditions of production and trade will be progressively equalized. Trade as well as agricultural policy will be gradually unified; by the end of the transition period at the latest, the Six will be as one in their relations with other countries. By majority decision of the Council of Ministers, the Community will be able to require member countries to modify their legislation or their administrative regulations when it appears that a disparity in the laws or regulations of the various countries destroys true competitive conditions. Not only will the movement of goods and services be facilitated, but also the movement of labor and capital—subject to certain rules. These are designed to channel workers toward available employment and to avoid purely speculative movements of capital. The gradual elimination of other restrictions will eventually make it possible for nationals of any member state to establish a domicile in any other member state.

The creation of a European Investment Bank and of a European Social Fund are further evidence of the intention of the six

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries to establish something considerably more than the classic customs union. They stopped short of the point at which a more fundamental fusion of economic policies and institutions would have required the creation of common political institutions, that is to say, of a new state. Each country retains its sovereignty in matters of currency, credit, budget and investments. But enough has been merged to oblige all members, even in those areas reserved to them, to consult one another and to follow policies which are at least parallel.

In the course of things, the creation of the European Economic Community will stimulate an effort to modernize and rationalize each industry, to seek agreement on areas of concentration and specialization within each country, and to establish international, business contacts with a view to making European-wide agreements of a similar nature. In fact, there are a number of indications that this is already happening.

Clearly, the Common Market treaty will profoundly modify the European economy in the next few years. It is not an exaggeration to speak of a metamorphosis when it is considered that in so brief a time the obstacles to the circulation of goods, services, persons and capital will be abolished and that the six countries will in effect constitute a single economic unit. A considerable effort of the imagination is necessary to conceive what Western Europe will be like in ten years or so. The transformation to come appears even more astounding if one considers the implications of the association of Africa with the Common Market.

II

What are the most serious problems which the establishment of the Common Market will create? It is not very likely that they will be exactly the ones we imagine today; economic circumstances change rapidly. An attempt to anticipate them is nevertheless useful in order to clarify ideas, provided that we constantly reëxamine the conclusions drawn. Let us first consider the difficulties which might arise within the Community.

The danger most feared by French industrialists is competition by Germany and, to a lesser extent, other countries. Similar fears naturally exist for the other members. It is on this problem that negotiators have worked the hardest, trying to ease the shock caused by the freeing of trade, to bring the over-all levels of economic activity in the various countries closer together, and to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provide escape clauses in cases of danger. Even without this effort, which can have appreciable results, it does not seem probable that there will be serious trouble on this score so long as general economic activity remains high and industry operates at full capacity. The experience of Benelux shows that two essentially competing economies, with quite unequal production costs, can be joined together without danger but with a considerable development of two-way trade.

The preceding remarks are completely valid for sizable concerns—those already engaged in mass production, having at their disposal a modern plant, enjoying relatively easy access to bank credit and capital markets, and having a highly qualified management with technical and financial experience in specialized operations. They may be less valid for family businesses of small and medium size which are not in such a favorable position. However, we must not confuse size and efficiency, nor underestimate the trend in all the countries of the Community towards modernization of these enterprises and their adjustment to international competition. The fact remains that France faces a real problem in this regard, since small and medium-sized enterprises occupy a relatively important place in her industrial economy.

To some extent, this problem is related to that of the underdeveloped regions of France and Italy. Won't the Common Market increase the attraction of centers which are already highly industrialized—the Rhine Valley in particular—at the expense of the less developed regions? And won't the result be an unbalanced growth, to the advantage of Germany and Benelux, and to the detriment of France and perhaps of Italy (although the latter has the advantage of relatively low production costs)? This question and that of the modernization of small and medium-sized firms have played an important part in the ratification debate in the French parliament.

The problem is real, but it seems certain that the circumstances which led to a concentration of industry in the northwestern part of the Community are already changing. It is essentially the location of coal deposits which is responsible for this concentration. The diversification of sources of energy has already altered this situation and will change it even more in the future. The United States has experienced this with the rapid industrialization of the South and West, made possible primarily by water power. Similarly, in France the industrialization in progress in the southeast

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is based on hydroelectric power, and soon there will be rapid growth in the southwest based on the natural gas of that region. The development of atomic energy, which Euratom is designed to accelerate, will further free industry from the need to be near coal deposits.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that in the future labor resources will be at least as important a factor in the location of industry as energy supply. This tendency will become increasingly marked as we see more clearly the disadvantages of excessive industrial concentration, such as are found in the Ruhr or around Paris: severe housing shortages, increasingly hopeless traffic problems and rising costs of all kinds.

It remains true, however, that the placement of industry within the Community cannot be left entirely to the chances of market forces. In France and especially in Italy it will be necessary to have a deliberate policy of encouraging decentralization and providing a variety of incentives to induce an important proportion of new and expanding concerns to locate in unindustrialized regions rich in labor force. Likewise, government intervention will frequently be necessary in order to help small and medium-sized businesses, wherever they may be situated, to modernize. These functions are precisely those which the Common Market treaty assigns to the European Investment Bank and to the European Social Fund. It will be noted, moreover, that nothing in the treaty limits the right of members to develop by their own efforts those areas and industries which may be initially handicapped. The only proviso is that their action must not create unreal market conditions affecting competition within the Common Market.

The multiple adjustments that will be necessary will be greatly aided by the vitality which the European economy has shown since the end of the war and more particularly since 1950 or 1951. Its rate of growth has been measurably higher than that of the American economy; this is true not only of Germany but also of the other countries of the Community, especially France. In a general expansion of this nature, the choice facing an enterprise is usually not between survival and disappearance but among various degrees of development.

The problem would become much more difficult if, before the Common Market became a going concern, Europe were to go through a prolonged period of economic depression. Although this possibility cannot be entirely excluded, the real danger in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe, as in the rest of the world, is a continuation and perhaps an acceleration of the present inflation; the inevitable periods of recession will probably be brief and will not affect the fundamental trend of our times toward an expansion as rapid as, or even more rapid than, the circumstances permit.

It is this tendency towards inflation which will probably be the source of the most serious difficulties for the Common Market. If prices rise more rapidly in some countries than in others, there will be difficulties in the balance of payments. France is already suffering from a considerable deficit, which must be eliminated before she can play her proper rôle in the Community. The prolonged imbalance of payments in favor of Germany is equally serious. Even if these imbalances are corrected, there is no guarantee that new ones will not appear to threaten the implementation of the Common Market. There is no remedy to this danger other than a close collaboration of the six governments in the field of financial and monetary policies and a certain moderation on the part of employers and labor unions in their price and wage policies.

At worst, the realization of the Common Market could be effectually blocked if one or more countries let themselves be involved in repeated inflationary movements. This possibility exists regardless of the strictness with which provisions of the treaty are applied. The danger would not be less if the application of its provisions were absolute and included no escape clause. The very existence of the Common Market will exert a constant pressure on the various participating parties to moderate their demands and on the governments to hold down their expenditures; it is impossible to say more today.

But the development of the Common Market will not depend entirely on the conduct of individual governments nor on the play of economic forces in each country. It will depend very much on the effectiveness of the governing bodies provided for in the treaty. No important decision can be taken without agreement between the European Commission, which decrees by simple majority, and the Council of Ministers, which follows various procedures depending on the nature of the problem and the stage in the transition. One can easily imagine circumstances in which these bodies would be incapable of reaching a decision. This would have particularly serious consequences in areas where the treaty is written only in very general terms and where the elaboration of precise regulations has been postponed until later:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

common agricultural policy, transportation policy, rules of competition, etc. A certain amount of understanding and good will will certainly be required. On one hand, the Council of Ministers must recognize the European Commission as a real partner and, on the other, the Commission must refrain from imposing its will on the member governments, especially when several legitimate solutions of the same problem are presented; the rôle of the Commission should be rather that of a catalyst, whereby its authority is used to bring the governments to make decisions which are consistent with the interests of the Community as a whole.

One further problem that may arise within the Market area stems from the fact that the Common Market will increase the attractiveness of great industrial concentration and the temptation to make agreements among industries. This problem is both economic and political. The provisions of the treaty concerning monopolies and cartels are very general; they will have to be considerably clarified by the governing bodies. Experience will show whether they should not also be reinforced some day by unanimous agreement of the six countries.

III

An enterprise of the magnitude of the Common Market will profoundly affect the relations of the member countries not only with one another but also with the rest of the world. It is natural that third countries should anxiously ask what may be the consequences for them of this new economic organization, possessing a population comparable to that of the United States and second only to it in buying power.

The first consequence of the Common Market, even before it goes into effect, will probably be the formation of a free trade area which will include as full or partial members the other countries of the O.E.E.C. This considerable extension of the geographic area within which goods will circulate freely will increase even more the impact of European economic integration on the rest of the world.

Negotiations on the free trade zone, which are now going on, owe their existence to the initiative of the six countries. The project would not yet have seen the light of day if these countries had not gone ahead with the Common Market treaty. This does not mean that England is not eager to participate in the freeing of European trade, or that her interest is simply a reaction to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decision of the six countries. An ever more important part of enlightened opinion in the United Kingdom is convinced that such an undertaking is good in itself and feels the historic necessity of an increasingly closer union of the European countries. But the determination of the six countries to create a Common Market and the fear of seeing British goods subject to discrimination on the Continent has crystallized her desire to coöperate and has given it the broad political support without which nothing could be done.

The fundamental problem raised by the projected free trade zone is to reconcile England's position as a member of this zone with her position at the center of the Commonwealth, which is so essential to her. It is her conflicting obligations that have created problems which the current negotiations are trying to resolve.

Some of these difficulties exist in the very nature of a free trade zone, which, unlike a customs union, does not imply a common commercial policy or a common tariff on goods entering the zone. Consequently, there arise a whole set of problems which do not exist for the Common Market—notably the problem of determining the origin of a product which may have been processed in several countries, and how can foreign products entering the zone through a country which levies either no tariffs or very low ones be prevented from spreading through the rest of the zone? It must be remembered that although history has seen the formation of several important customs unions, the idea of a free trade area—at least among countries with a comparable degree of economic development and with modern transportation facilities—has never been tested by experience.

Other difficulties arise from the limitations which the British Government wants to impose on the free trade zone, particularly the exclusion of agriculture. As we have seen, agriculture is an integral part of the Common Market, although it enjoys special dispensation. The Market has achieved a balance of obligations and rights which the six countries judge to be satisfactory and in which commerce in agricultural products occupies an important place. In the free trade zone it is unavoidable that agriculture be given a special position, which takes into account Britain's distinctive relationship with the Commonwealth, but most of the other European countries cannot accept the complete exclusion of agriculture.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If I have emphasized the most important difficulties which the negotiations on the free trade zone have encountered, it is in order to show the road which remains to be travelled in order to reach an agreement. But I have no doubt that, in a still unforeseeable form, agreement will be reached. For the desire of the Continent to see England associate itself closely with an integrated Europe is matched by Britain's desire not to remain outside an undertaking which cannot fail to affect her future profoundly.

IV

Faced with the formation of the Common Market and its possible extension in the form of a still larger free trade zone, many countries outside of Europe are naturally led to ask themselves two basic questions: Will the Common Market lessen trade between Europe and the rest of the world? And will it dry up the flow of European capital to Asia and South America, diverting it to the Community itself and to the African countries and territories associated with it?

There is no single, easy answer to these questions. Inevitably, a customs union or a free trade zone, whatever the precautions taken to protect the interests of outside countries, gives preference to goods originating in the member countries. But it cannot be concluded from this that the importation of agricultural products into Europe will be more restricted than it is today; indeed, the contrary is probable. The Common Market has been created in order to accelerate the economic development of the countries of which it is composed. Given the trade structure of Western Europe, the greater vitality of production and internal trade will require increased imports of raw materials, foodstuffs, equipment and, ultimately, industrial consumer goods.

Most outside countries are interested principally in European imports of raw materials and of foodstuffs. The possible increase of the production of these goods within the Community and even in the associated countries is limited. More important, a prime interest of the Community is to avoid developing its internal sources of supply so far, behind protective barriers, that its capacity to compete in the world market would be badly hurt.

Even a rapid reading of the treaty will show that this is indeed the spirit which has animated its drafters. A whole group of provisions is designed precisely to avoid any protectionist abuse. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system of tariff quotas and the possibilities which it presents deserve a careful examination on the part of outside countries.

All these considerations might appear rather theoretical if they were not supported by the concrete experience of the O.E.E.C. As with a customs union, the first effect was to create a system of preferences among the participating countries and to stimulate trade among them. But as they increased their productivity and their competitive capacity, imports from the rest of the world also increased markedly, and there was a progressive liberation of trade with third countries.

About the second question, which concerns the developing countries of Asia and South America, very little can be said except that there exists neither proof nor grounds for thinking that the Common Market will reduce the investments needed for their expansion. These are generally dictated by commercial considerations which will not be any less controlling after implementation of the Common Market. The capital needs of the six countries will certainly increase but their total resources and their lending capacity will increase also.

V

Much of the foregoing applies to the relations of the Common Market with the United States. But these relations are of particular importance for the Community, not only because the United States is the giant of the world and because the slightest of its movements always has important consequences, but also because it has played a considerable rôle in the genesis of the Common Market. Without Marshall Plan aid and the encouragement which the United States has unceasingly given to the idea of European integration since the war, it is doubtful that the Community would have been achieved—at least as rapidly as it has been. For the future, it is essential that the Common Market grow in close harmony with America. Many obstacles can thus be more easily overcome. Above all, this harmony is the guarantee that the building of Europe will be part of the building of a united and strong free world.

It is reasonable to suppose that in the long run American exports to the Common Market countries will develop more rapidly because of their union. The rise in Europe's standard of living will particularly stimulate the demand for imports of equipment and durable consumer goods. There is room for a considerable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increase in European production of machinery, refrigerators, television sets, etc. and, at the same time, increased imports of these same goods.

This expansion of trade between Europe and America would be considerably facilitated by a reduction of tariffs both in the United States and in the Common Market. The six governments have declared that they are anxious to contribute to the gradual removal of restrictions on international trade, and they would never oppose negotiations, within the framework of GATT, seeking a substantial lowering of tariff barriers in all the free world. France has already suggested a plan for a general reduction of customs duties by 30 percent, to be undertaken in stages.

The balance of payments situation in the United States will play a decisive rôle in the progressive elimination of quotas, which still hamper the entrance of American goods into Europe. If the gold and dollar reserves outside the United States continue their generally upward trend, trade may be freed further. If, on the other hand, the reversal of the past year should become permanent, European countries would experience serious difficulties in maintaining the degree of liberation already attained.

The Common Market will stimulate American private investment in Europe. A market of 161 million people disposing of an annual revenue of 125 billion dollars is more attractive than six markets having the same total capacity but separated from one another by tariff barriers which, though more or less easily penetrated, can be raised at any moment. It is therefore not unreasonable to count on a flow of American private capital which will ease the present shortage and help to achieve an equilibrium in its balance of payments. The United States will thereby contribute to the development of the European economy and to the realization of the objectives of the Common Market. It will be necessary, however, to guard against situations which would compromise the development of the Community, as, for example, such heavy concentration of American capital in certain industries as to give it control, for all practical purposes. National sensitivity is always close to the surface in the modern world, even though our fears are generally theoretical, and it is better not to irritate it if this can be helped. With this reservation, a considerable increase in American private investment in Europe is one of the most important perspectives which the Common Market opens up.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the problems created by the Common Market are many and important, there is none that cannot be solved with intelligence and good will. It is in the interest of all other free countries that Europe unite economically and develop its productive capacity rapidly; it is in the interest of Europe to build this unity and to assure this development in a prosperous free world enjoying a growth of international trade. Given this harmony of interests, there is no difficulty which cannot be overcome.

Whether economic Europe is the harbinger of a political Europe it is impossible to say. One can imagine a Common Market functioning satisfactorily without institutions other than those provided for in the treaty; there is no logical necessity which obliges the member countries to pursue the undertaking beyond the limits presently established. It is possible to imagine, however, that when economic unification is well advanced, the most serious obstacles to political integration will have vanished, and that there will have been forged a great number of bonds—visible and invisible—which will lead to common political institutions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DIFFERING FACES OF AFRICA

By Lord Hailey

WHAT follows is an attempt to examine systematically whether it seems possible for African developments to take place in harmony with the interests of our civilization. Will it be possible to establish a relationship with Africa that will avoid the difficulties that have arisen in the case of the Asian and Middle Eastern peoples?

Some word of caution is needed in approaching the various questions involved. One cannot easily categorize a whole continent, for the differences between its constituent countries are too many and too great. One has to resist the constant temptation to over-simplify. There is in the Assembly of the United Nations a group which seeks a short cut by the simple expedient of dividing Africa between those countries which are independent and those which are still subject to outside control. But such a simplification breaks down at the first realistic approach. Among the independent countries south of the Sahara there exists as wide a difference between the Union of South Africa and Liberia as there is between Ethiopia and Tunisia in the north. Among the dependent countries there is no common measure between political conditions such as those prevailing in Uganda and those of Angola. There are even more basic differences underlying those purely political factors which engage the first attention of the more cursory observer. There is a fundamental difference between the Bantu and the Negro peoples of the countries south of the Sahara, and there is a no less fundamental difference between the Bantu and Negro people of the South and the semi-Arabicized peoples of the North. The new Bureau of African Affairs recently established in the Department of State will indeed justify its creation if it begins by helping the American people to avoid thinking in terms of Africa as a whole and to learn to distinguish between the conditions in the diversity of countries of which the continent is composed.

That does not mean to say, however, that there are no common features observable among the changes which have occurred in Africa since the war. Evidence of one change in particular stands out almost everywhere and is for our present purpose of cardinal interest. Before the war the major concern of the student of Af-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rican affairs centered on the policies of the different European Powers which exercised control in Africa and on the attitude of the European communities in those areas where they constitute factors of importance. Today the focus of interest has changed. We now see a wide range of countries in which the African himself has begun to take a more definite part in determining his destinies. But the picture is very varied in its detail.

In the Union of South Africa the material standard of African life is higher than in any of the neighboring territories, but it is dependent on the European economy for this result. Even from the African point of view, there can be no possibility of a complete physical separation of European and African spheres of settlement. It is equally difficult to envisage the development of two separate economies which would give to the African a standard of life comparable with that now open to him. At the best, therefore, the future for the African must lie in securing a larger share in the European economy and in the political life from which he is at present excluded, rather than in the substitution of an African form of rule.

In Southern Rhodesia the African is admitted to the franchise, but the franchise qualifications are at present such as to allow him practically no chance of securing direct representation in the legislature. In the British dependencies of Central and East Africa he has a substantial—indeed in some cases a majority—representation in the legislature, and he now forms part of the ministries which are taking the place of the older executive councils. In the British West African territories his position is still stronger. Ghana now has complete independence under a purely African government. Nigeria, with a population greater than that of any other country on the continent, has a guarantee of achieving similar independence in 1959 or 1960, and meanwhile two of the three regions into which it is divided will acquire a status of self-rule. The circumstances which have prevented the more immediate grant of self-rule to a federal government of Nigeria are a common phenomenon. The prospect of the early transfer of power from an alien to an indigenous government has brought to the surface a series of internal differences of old standing which under an external control had been effectively relegated to the background. In Sierra Leone the final revision of the constitution is postponed for much the same reason as in Nigeria.

In French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa the em-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phasis lay throughout the prewar period on the traditional French concept of integration of the overseas territories with metropolitan France, rather than on the development of local institutions which might give birth to an aspiration for self-rule. The concept of integration regulated also the formation of the *Union Française* in 1946. But occasion was also taken to abolish the previous discrimination between the *citoyens* of French origin and the *sujets* of African origin. Both classes have since then joined in the election of an increased number of representatives to the parliament in Paris, and they are now predominantly African. An even more significant development followed in 1956. The *loi cadre* of that year provided for the creation of local parliamentary institutions, elected on an extremely wide franchise, and designed to occupy a position resembling that of the British colonial legislatures. Like them, they would supply the basis of a system of ministers exercising administrative functions and, like them, they would in the natural order of things comprise a considerable proportion of Africans.

There has not been a comparable development in the Belgian Congo, where the emphasis on the economic progress of the indigenous population has taken precedence over the granting of a political or administrative authority. It is significant indeed that neither the European residents of the Congo (who now number about 70,000) nor the African population have the franchise for representative institutions endowed as of right with legislative powers or exercising authority over the administration. The Portuguese hold even more strongly than the French to the concept of the unity of their overseas and metropolitan territories, but they do not on that account admit the African as such to share in the exercise of political power. He can, it is true, claim equal rank with citizens of Portuguese origin, but he must qualify for this privilege by proving that he possesses cultural and other qualifications enabling him to rank with Europeans. At present such *assimilado* form a very small proportion of the African population.

So much for the situation in the countries conventionally distinguished as lying south of the Sahara. The circumstances of the northern areas have lately been the subject of so much notice in the press of the world as to justify much less attention here. It is enough to recall that between 1951 and 1956 Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and the Sudan gained recognition as sovereign states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Italian Somaliland will become an independent state in 1960. Algeria is still in the throes of an open conflict which is basically due to conditions which had their origin at a period when there existed for many purposes a discrimination between the French settlers, numbering some one and a half million, and the Moslem population, numbering roughly 8 million in all.

Looking at the continent as a whole we see that there is thus a marked diversity in the progress made by Africans in respect of political status. But even where advance does not appear to have been substantial there is now evidence of what can best be described as a rising spirit of Africanism. This term seems to be more appropriate than that of "nationalism" in this connection, for many of the countries of Africa are artificial creations possessing no inherent unity or common history, and owe their existing form mainly to the competitive rivalries of the European Powers at the time when they established their protectorates over them. But the spirit of Africanism has not always manifested itself in a coherent form nor has it a common objective. Africa has not experienced a unified form of administration such as that of British India, which gave to a number of diverse peoples a cohesion that made it possible for Indian nationalists to organize a continent-wide campaign with a single objective.

In Africa, moreover, political aspirations are not born of the soil but emerge from contact with liberal European thought, and their objective tends accordingly to be conditioned by the philosophy of the colonial Power with which they have been in closest contact. The African of the British Protectorate of Uganda may well look forward to a régime of self-rule under a purely African government. The African of Senegal, on the other hand, may prefer to see a future in a progressive integration with the French Union and its institutions. The African of the Belgian Congo or Mozambique may aspire to see a time when by a process of *immatriculation* in the one case, or inclusion in the ranks of *assimilado* on the other, he can gain parity with citizens of Belgian or Portuguese origin. We cannot, in short, predicate that the aspirations of the African will always be political self-rule in the shape in which we see it established in the Sudan or in Ghana. We can, however, predict with certainty that it will manifest itself with increasing force in an assertion of the rights of Africans and in demands for the improvement in one form or another of their political and social status. With the expansion of economic op-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portunities we may look to see a general emergence of that middle class which has always taken a part in British West Africa not unlike that which it took in heading the liberation movement in British India. We may be sure also that the spirit of Africanism will continue to gain in strength from the stimulus received both from international opinion and from pressure applied by the leaders of the new independent states in Africa.

There are some competent observers who hold that the spirit of Africanism exhibits itself most fully not in projects of political advance but in the revival of the tradition of tribalism. They point out that while in Asia the indigenous peoples have readily grouped themselves in large political formations, the tribe remains today the institution which has most consistently commanded the loyalty of indigenous Africa. They reinforce their argument by quoting instances such as the strength shown by the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, or the stand made by the Ashanti in Ghana or the Buganda in Uganda for the constitutional recognition of their individual position. No one can doubt that the tribal tradition will continue to exercise its influence in indigenous Africa. There are, however, important areas in which the tribe has ceased to hold the allegiance of tribesmen, partly because some governments (as, for example, in the Union of South Africa or in the French dependencies) have refused to accord recognition to the local traditional authorities, and partly because economic changes have led to a widespread migration of tribesmen to labor centers and the rapid growth of urbanization. Even where the tribe still remains as the most significant of the institutions of African society the future seems actually to lie not with traditional authorities but with those educated elements which alone seem capable of creating and controlling political organizations on an effective scale.

Does the position thus described support the assertion, now made with so much confidence, that the rule exercised by colonial Powers is reaching its end? Here again we must resist the temptation to undue simplification. There are, of course, important areas, as for instance the Union of South Africa, where this question is entirely out of place. At the other end of the scale, there are a number of British territories in which the European settled community is relatively small, and where we may safely assume that the British Government will follow the precedent set in the case of Ghana and where (as the decision regarding the future

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Nigeria shows) the progress towards self-rule is now likely to be materially accelerated. But there will remain a number of British dependencies in East and Central Africa (of which the Rhodesias, Kenya and Tanganyika are typical) where the most crucial of the functions retained by the colonial Power is to stand as arbiter between the conflicting claims made by European, Asian and African communities to share in representation in the legislature and in the executive authority which is now becoming its natural corollary. We have, since the war, seen a continuous process of upgrading the part to be taken by the indigenous population; and this process will inevitably be quickened. But it is not likely that Britain will readily relinquish the position of arbiter until a stage has been reached in which the different communities can be trusted to adjust their respective parts in the legislative and administrative fields without her intervention. In this connection a crucial interest attaches to the effort being made in Rhodesia to work out a viable interpretation of the principle of "partnership," for on this hangs the decision whether the Federation can succeed in its ambition to secure dominion status.

In the French territories the question must be viewed from a different angle. It may be some years before the indigenous population, now so widely enfranchised, can show whether it prefers closer affiliation as part of the *Union Française* (which will connote the retention of some measure of central control) or the development of local legislatures on a scale which will embrace the essentials of self-rule. With the enactment of the *loi cadre* of 1956 France has entered on a course from which she will now find it difficult to turn back. It will be the vote of the Africans of French West and French Equatorial Africa which will decide their own constitutional future. It may be assumed that circumstances are unlikely to create any such large-scale conflict of community interests as has resulted in the open clash in Algeria. In the whole of the French territories south of the Sahara the European population, only a small part of which is permanently settled, numbers less than 100,000 against an indigenous population of over 25,000,000. Supporters of the French concept of colonial rule can claim that some indication of the trend of African thought on the issue of integration can be found in the fact that in the recent election to the local assemblies held under the *loi cadre* Africans voted for the inclusion of a noteworthy number of the local French residents among their representatives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The factors that bear on the future of the Belgian and Portuguese dependencies are more illusive. In the relatively short period of her colonial history, Belgium has not evolved any clear concept of the goal of colonial policy, but though she is likely to be liberal in other respects, she will clearly be chary of encouraging political institutions which may minister to a spirit of separatism. Indigenous opinion in the Congo is not so far vocal, nor has it developed the same organizations for self-expression as in the British and French territories. But it cannot be long before the striking growth of urbanization during the postwar years will produce groups concerned to press for the grant of increased consideration of African rights. Nor will it now be possible for the Belgian Government to disregard the strength of the influences originating outside the colony which are pressing in the same direction. In the Portuguese territories the general standard of education is relatively low, and the recognition officially given to the creation of a class of *assimilado* is tending to deprive the indigenous African population of its natural leaders. There may therefore be an extended period before the choice between further integration with metropolitan Portugal and the development of institutions of self-rule becomes a live issue for the indigenous population of Angola and Mozambique.

It is natural to ask at this stage how far the situation has been affected by the spread of Communism in Africa. In estimating the truth of an assertion made by Vice-President Nixon following his return from Africa that the continent has become a priority target for the Communists, it is proper to draw a distinction between Communism as a domestic political movement and the Soviet Union as an international political force. There is no evidence that Communism has so far been a serious subversive threat in Africa. The Union of South Africa has helped to confuse the issue by its Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which was a weapon frankly devised to aid the policy of *apartheid;* it went so far as to include in the definition of Communism those actions which might promote hostility between non-Europeans and Europeans. There can be no warrant for claiming that Africa has today a place in the front line of the world's fight against Communism, nor is there ground for urging that America should on that account bestir herself to assist Africa to gain independence of colonial rule. On the contrary, the premature removal of colonial rule might well create a vacuum which would be an in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vitation to Communist activity. It is significant that both in India and in Indonesia Communism has now attained a strength which it never showed during the period of British or Dutch control. That is not so much due to ideological reasons as because the removal of external control opens a field for domestic differences in which Communism may find a fertile ground for its activities.

There was undoubtedly a period when the position occupied by the African peoples justified the outside world in exhibiting an interest in them based largely on ideological grounds. But today the conditions are changing. The African is beginning to show an increasing responsibility for his own future. It is true that in the Union of South Africa his activities in this direction are severely restricted, but the conditions prevailing in the Union have no close analogy elsewhere. The Nationalist doctrine of segregation does not of course represent an end in itself. It is basically the result of a conviction that unless white supremacy is safeguarded at every conceivable point, any advance made by Africans may threaten the maintenance of the high standards of living which the white community has established for itself. Whatever view one may take of the ethical aspects of this belief or of the steps taken to translate it into action, there is some measure of practical logic in it, and it seems likely to prove strong enough to stand up against an expression of adverse opinion by the outside world.

The future may, however, hold two possibilities. The advance made by the native population may be such as will mitigate the fears felt by the white community for the maintenance of its standard of living; and it is proper in this connection to point out that in spite of the very obvious weighting of the social and economic services in favor of white interests, the Union spends more per head on educational and health measures for non-Europeans than any of the countries south of the Sahara. Alternatively (and this seems more likely), it is possible that the hand of the white community may be forced by conditions arising within its own economy. In the Union the advance made by the manufacturing industry is such that its contribution to the national income now exceeds that of either the agricultural or the mining industries, and non-white labor has made very notable advances in semi-skilled employment in it. Its further progress in this direction may well create a situation in which the white community will not find it possible to maintain the barriers which it is seeking to erect in order to maintain its social and political supremacy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the other countries of Africa south of the Sahara there is, it is true, still a considerable proportion of primitive peoples, and there are many regions in which education is still at a very elementary stage. But there are also many where an increasing body of the population are coming under the influence of an African leadership which every year shows itself more independent and more assertive. As experience in Asia shows, that is a feature which is likely to grow with astonishing rapidity, for the following acquired by indigenous leaders is the result of emotional impulse rather than of any calculation of advantage or disadvantage to the people most concerned. The personnel available for the exercise of indigenous leadership will increase rapidly with the extension of academic education. South of the Sahara the British have since the war created four colleges of full university status, and the French and Belgian territories will each have two institutions of a comparable standard. Political development will be further quickened by the growth of urbanization. A few years ago it was estimated that 27 percent of the indigenous population of the Union and 20.5 percent of that of the Belgian Congo could be described as urban.

If, therefore, Africa now has need of external aid, it is not so much in the ideological field as in measures designed to raise the standards of life of the indigenous people. It is characteristic of Africa that it has, as compared with Asia, shown itself to be far more dependent on external sources for the organization of the social services or the supply of capital for economic development. Here again the Union is in some measure an exception. In the seventies of the last century, the diamond industry began to provide the basis of a modern financial system; and in the eighties, diamonds supplied the initial capital for the development of the gold mines, besides serving to attract the interest of foreign investors in the openings provided by the Rand. Public finance continues to be mainly sustained from internal sources, and external debt has in recent years amounted to less than 6 percent of the total. But no other African territory can at present supply as much as half of its public loan finance from internal sources and there are many in which the part so provided remains negligible.

Private capital investment has, broadly speaking, been directed mainly to the development of mineral resources, but these are widely scattered, and there are large regions of Africa which have no minerals. Investment in industrial undertakings is prac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tically limited to the few countries in which the European community has developed a manufacturing industry, as most notably in the Union of South Africa, the Belgian Congo and, more recently, Southern Rhodesia. There are a certain number of agricultural or forest enterprises which have attracted external capital, as for instance the plantations of sisal in East Africa, of palm oil in the Belgian Congo, or of rubber in Liberia, but considerations of land policy now seem likely to restrict the expansion of this type of undertaking. Indigenous Africa would seem likely to provide little field for the investment of external private capital (other than in mining development) until the expansion of public services produces a general improvement in the standards of African life and creates an effective demand for consumer goods.

In the earlier period of colonial history, policy did not contemplate the grant of financial aid by the metropolitan country to a dependency. Colonial loans might be guaranteed, but direct grants-in-aid were normally confined to occasions of public calamity or the like. During the inter-war period, however, the growing realization of the part to be played by a modern state in promoting the social welfare of its public was projected also into the colonial field, a development which was signalized most noticeably in the terms of the British Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940–1945, which provided some $605,000,000 in free grants to the British Colonies. In the postwar years this new light on colonial rule, now reinforced by the recognition given to the need for raising the standards of life in the underdeveloped countries throughout the world, resulted in a systematic preparation of five-year or ten-year plans for the development of the dependencies of the different colonial Powers in Africa. The cost of the plans for the British dependencies was estimated roughly at $780,000,000; that of the plans for the French territories was of much the same order; the estimate for the Belgian Congo was somewhat above this amount; that for the Portuguese territories amounted to $222,000,000. In each case the cost was to be met from colonial revenues or loans, aided by direct contributions from the colonial Powers. In the British dependencies, for instance, the contribution amounted to roughly 18 percent of the total cost.

In the long view, the most effective method by which the outside world can assist the indigenous peoples of Africa appears to be the grant of aid to the governments concerned, either by way

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of state loan or by the direct supply of technical personnel. It must, however, be prepared to face the possibility that the progressive increase in the element of African control may seriously imperil the political and economic stability which the régime has acquired under colonial rule. In the study of African affairs today there is everywhere evidence of a standing difference of approach. On the one side is the idealist, convinced that the African needs only to be free in order to play a worthy part in a brave new world. On the other side is the colonial administrator, warned by his old-world experiences of the dangers inherent in economic inexperience and political immaturity. Somewhere between these must lie a middle path; but it is not always easy to recognize it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ANTARCTICA IN A TWO-POWER WORLD

By Walter Sullivan

THE bottom quarter of our planet is its most lonely region, consisting largely of ocean areas and Antarctica. Until the end of the last century no human being, so far as was known, had set foot on the Antarctic continent. Today some ten nations have about 40 outposts in that area and the time has come when the great Powers must decide what is their interest in this little-explored land mass and what to do about it.

Most of the stations there were set up to carry out observations during the International Geophysical Year, which runs for 18 months until the end of 1958. Although the I.G.Y. is supposed to be purely scientific, it is possible that some of these bases, including those of the United States and the Soviet Union, may become permanent. The red flag flies over Mirny and several inland stations, while the Stars and Stripes has been hoisted over six United States bases.

The Antarctic sites to be manned by each nation were agreed upon at an international conference held in Paris in the summer of 1955. Many of the camps were placed in regions claimed by other nations. The Soviet stations are in what Australia regards as part of its Capital Territory—comparable to the District of Columbia. The United States bases are in areas claimed by Argentina, Australia, Britain and New Zealand. The American station at the South Pole in effect trespasses on the territory of all seven claimants, since all the claims converge there, like so many slices of pie.

The I.G.Y. expeditions to Antarctica, which are part of a coordinated study of the earth and its environment, have reminded the world sharply of the existence of this last unexploited continent. Its potentialities, in an era when atomic energy is bringing about revolutionary changes in our concepts, are still uncertain. It unquestionably has mineral resources of great value, if they can be found and extracted. It is of definite strategic importance, especially to our allies in the Southern Hemisphere. It holds scientific information, such as that sought in the I.G.Y., which should benefit all mankind. Finally it is seen by some as a potential proving ground for international coöperation that may be significant to a world on the verge of space travel.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

The political history of Antarctica is remarkably brief. Discovery of the continent is claimed by each of the three major Powers in the world today. Admiral Bellingshausen, who commanded two ships of the Imperial Russian Navy, circumnavigated Antarctica during the year 1820–21. Although his voyage was important scientifically, the lands he reported sighting later proved to be insular. Nathaniel Palmer, an American sealing captain barely out of his teens, presumably saw the mainland late in 1820, but the British say that Edward Bransfield of the Royal Navy got there the previous summer.

Of the three, the British seem to have been the most clearly motivated by political ambitions. Drake Passage, around Cape Horn at the southern tip of South America, linked the Atlantic and Pacific and hence was a key waterway in that period of rival empire-building. Bransfield was told to investigate the possibilities of colonizing the lands believed to lie south of this passage and was instructed to "display every friendly disposition" to the natives. Actually, of course, Antarctica has no native land mammals, two-legged or otherwise.

The question of discovery has been bitterly disputed but has little political importance, for title to the various sectors is more likely to be settled by occupation and the exercise of sovereignty. Not until 1908 did any nation officially claim part of the continent. In that year Britain followed up the work of Bransfield by proclaiming the sovereignty of King Edward VII over Palmer Peninsula. (Since the designation "Palmer" implies its discovery by the American of that name, the British call the 1,000-mile peninsula "Graham Land.")

Fifteen years later New Zealand's sovereignty was proclaimed over the Ross Sea Dependency, the sector which now includes Little America and the western fringe of Marie Byrd Land. This was followed in 1924 by a French claim to Adélie Land, whose coast had been sighted initially in 1840 by both French and American expeditions. Agitation for staking a United States claim led to a policy statement by the then Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, which has been the basis of American policy ever since: "It is the opinion of this Department," he said, "that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a formal taking of possession, does not support a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

valid claim of sovereignty, unless the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country."

This was followed, a few years later, by Admiral Byrd's first expedition to Antarctica, during the course of which he claimed for the United States a large part of Marie Byrd Land, but our policy of publicly making no claims and recognizing those of no one else has continued to this day. Since World War II it has been outdated through the establishment of permanent Antarctic bases by Argentina, Australia, Britain and Chile.

In 1933 Australia claimed almost half the continent and after the return of Byrd's second Antarctic expedition in 1935 there were renewed demands for political action by the United States. This led, in the spring of 1938, to a request by President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the State Department prepare a policy study on the question of United States' interests in both the Arctic and Antarctic. The task was assigned to Hugh Cumming, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

Meanwhile Secretary of State Cordell Hull cabled our consulate in Capetown to brief Lincoln Ellsworth, who was about to sail on another of his Antarctic ventures, regarding actions that could be taken to strengthen the American position there. When, a few months later, Ellsworth made the first flight into the hinterland of the Australian sector, he dropped a copper cylinder containing a note claiming for the United States all inland territory within 150 miles of his route "so far as this act allows."

The State Department study, delivered to the President in January 1939, listed reasons why the United States should give serious consideration to the assertion of claims in both polar regions. These included the following: (1) The development of trans-arctic aviation. (2) Reports of valuable mineral and fuel resources in Antarctica. (3) The strategic interests of the War and Navy Departments. (4) Measures being taken by the Soviet, British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, French and Norwegian Governments to establish their polar claims more firmly. (5) The interest expressed a short time before by the German and Japanese Embassies in Washington concerning newspaper reports of possible United States' claims in Antarctica.

On January 7 the President initiated planning for what was to become the U.S. Antarctic Service. It was to carry out what, at that time, he described as annual colonization "at Little America and at the region south of the Cape of Good Hope (Queen Maud

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Land)." The bases were to be evacuated during the winter night.

A week later Norway laid claim to Queen Maud Land, the largest remaining slice of the pie. At that very moment an expedition sponsored by Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering was



nearing Queen Maud Land to lay the basis for a claim by Nazi Germany.

Plans for the American expedition were hastened and the Monroe Doctrine was, in effect, extended southward. The President asked Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to study the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possibility of a joint claim of the entire sector south of the Americas "in behalf of, and in trust for, the American Republics as a whole." Although the United States might prove to be the only American state active in Antarctica, the work would be done on behalf of all and the region, if it proved valuable, could be managed by an inter-American governing body, he said. It was probably the first suggestion for international control of part of Antarctica. The sentiment in Washington was expressed by Secretary Hull when, on May 24, 1940, he said that "considerations of continental defense make it vitally important to keep for the 21 American Republics a clearer title to that part of the Antarctic continent south of America than is claimed by any non-American country."

It was decided that the United States would establish two year-around bases at opposite ends of the only remaining unclaimed sector. Their chief task would be to explore the intervening coast, depositing documents and hammering brass markers into mountaintops to be used, later, as support for a claim. The unclaimed region was larger than Alaska, with over 1,700 miles of coastline, but because of perennially dense pack ice off shore it proved impossible to place either of the two bases within its boundaries. West Base was established at Little America, 200 miles to the west in the New Zealand sector. East Base was set up on Stonington Island, 450 miles east of the unclaimed region.

Plans for continuing operation of the U.S. Antarctic Service bases were shattered by World War II. The season following their establishment, ships were sent to fetch the men who by then, as official government representatives, had ceremoniously raised the Stars and Stripes at six remote points in Marie Byrd Land. Even before they could be evacuated the harshness of war came close to the shores of Antarctica.

During the night of January 13, 1941, two Norwegian whaling factory ships, moored together, wallowed in the sea north of Queen Maud Land. While their crews slept, a strange ship materialized from the fog. A boarding party scrambled over bloated whale carcasses floating alongside and up a ladder onto one of the ships. Within a few minutes both vessels had been seized and by the next day the German raider *Pinguin* had captured a third factory ship and eleven catchers—a large part of the Norwegian whaling fleet.

German raiders seemed to appear from nowhere, preying upon

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Allied ships in the Indian Ocean and other southern waters, then vanishing when warships went in pursuit. Several hundred thousand tons of shipping were captured or sunk, including the Australian light cruiser *Sydney*. Mines laid in Australian waters sank the *City of Bayville*, first United States vessel to go down in the war. It was obvious that the Germans were using sub-Antarctic waters as a refuge for their raiders. Allied ships mined harbor entrances at the Kerguelen Islands, which later were found to have been the chief German rendezvous. H.M.S. *Carnarvon Castle*, an armed merchant cruiser, was sent to see if the Germans were using any of the many harbors in the vicinity of Palmer Peninsula. The British vessel found no sign of the Germans, but near the abandoned whaling station on Deception Island a bronze tablet was discovered, which had been set up a year earlier by Argentina, claiming all of Palmer Peninsula and most of the rest of Britain's sector.

Because of Perón's known sympathy for the German cause Britain decided to act swiftly. In what was known as Operation Tabarin, small outposts were secretly set up at Deception Island and at Port Lockroy on another island 220 miles further down the peninsula. Thus were established the first permanent bases within sight of the Antarctic mainland. Others followed, at Hope Bay on the continent itself, and elsewhere near the 1,000-mile peninsula.

In July 1947, Chile, which had also made a claim to this region, consulted with Argentina and the foreign ministers of the two countries declared their willingness to negotiate a settlement of their rival claims. They pointedly rejected British rights in the area. The decision of these two nations to set up their own bases led to the first displays of naval power in the Antarctic. Early in 1948 a large part of the Argentine navy, including two cruisers and six destroyers, steamed into Bransfield Strait and landed a detachment of men four miles from the British base on Deception Island. Only five Britons were on hand at the time, but London sounded a clarion call and soon a British cruiser and frigate arrived on the scene. The Argentine squadron had left, having established a rival station. Meanwhile, President Gonzalez Videla of Chile, with suitable pomp and band-playing, had landed at Cape Legoupil on Palmer Peninsula, where a base was established. He was the first chief of state to set foot on the continent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fearful that an Antarctic dispute would divert Western strength from the greater issues of the cold war, the United States proposed to the seven nations claiming Antarctic territory that there be "some form of internationalization." It was an idea which may have had its roots in President Roosevelt's prewar memorandum on joint action by the American Republics. However, the proposal was not warmly received by the claimants. And the Soviet Union, which did not receive the American note since it had made no claim, announced that, in view of early Russian exploration in the area and the Soviet Union's more recent whaling interest, it would not recognize any solution to which it was not a party. Although no action was taken on internationalization, three contenders—Britain, Argentina and Chile—agreed to issue statements in which each government declared that, during the coming year, it did not intend to make displays of naval strength in Antarctic waters. These declarations have been renewed annually.

The cold war by now had given special importance to the Arctic, which lay between the chief antagonists, and United States military leaders were interested in a large-scale military exercise in a polar area sufficiently remote from the Soviet Union to avoid charges of sabre-rattling. The answer was Antarctica. There was also a desire to keep alive the American political stake in that region. Thus, in 1946, was born the largest exploratory venture in history, Operation Highjump, in which aircraft from a sizable Navy task force photographed much of the continent. The confidential directive, issued to leaders of the task force and recently made public, set as one of its tasks "consolidating and extending United States sovereignty over the largest practicable area of the Antarctic continent." Similar instructions were given to the ships of Operation Windmill, which sailed south a year later, and to the task force which went south in 1955 in the first stage of Operation Deepfreeze. The chief purpose of the latter was to install United States scientific stations in various parts of the continent for the I.G.Y. Because of the desire for the coöperation of the Soviet Union and other participants in the I.G.Y., those in charge of the American scientific program frowned on the introduction of a political element. Hence, in the Operation Plan for the following season (1956–57), the strengthening of claims was omitted as an objective.

The second largest expedition to head for Antarctica as a pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lude to the I.G.Y. was that of the Soviet Union. Although the Russians had been active in whaling north of the belt of pack ice that girdles the continent, this was their first exploratory expedition to Antarctica since the voyage of Bellingshausen. Their plans to send an expedition were made public at the 1955 preparatory conference in Paris at which it was agreed that the Soviet Union would occupy several sites in the sector claimed by Australia.

Thus, when the Russians, on February 14, 1956, hoisted their flag over Mirny to the booming of guns and their national anthem, the Australians had no cause for protest. Nevertheless they were soon expressing their concern, privately, at the seeming permanence of the Soviet installations on a continent which is less distant from Melbourne than the width of the Australian continent itself. Actually the prefabricated Soviet buildings resemble those at the seven American-built bases. They have to be solid to provide the necessary insulation and resist the winds of hurricane force prevailing in that region.

III

The extensive activities of the United States in Antarctica, including such unprecedented feats as the airlifting of a base to the mountain-ringed South Pole, 10,000 feet above sea level, have convinced many in the United States that it would be foolish to pack up and go home once the "Year" is over. The revolution in thinking brought about by the advent of atomic energy has also played a rôle. The new atomic-powered icebreaker being completed in the Soviet Union may be the first of a series of ships which can break a channel to any point on the coast of that continent. Atomic power packages are being developed which will largely eliminate the need for liquid fuels, constituting about 75 percent of the resupply cargo which must be carried to Antarctic stations and airlifted to remote camps such as that at the Pole.

New aircraft have brought this most remote of the continents within direct flying range. Development of the ideal vehicle for hauling cargo sleds across the hinterland ice sheet seems to be in the offing. Equipped with crevasse detectors, it would make possible safe travel in that hitherto perilous region. It has even been suggested that atomic energy could be used to melt off the ice cover where mineral resources lie beneath.

There has been a tendency, on the part of those who sought to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

overcome public apathy regarding the Antarctic, to overemphasize the known resources of the area. There has been talk of mountains of coal, of uranium and oil. Actually, with less than half of one percent of the land visited by surface parties, very little is known of the resources. A small vein of manganese ore was found early this year on an ice-free peninsula on the Wilkes Coast, suggesting the presence of rich mineral deposits in the area. Low grade coal has been seen at a number of points in the mountain system known as the Great Antarctic Horst, and this has led some to speculate that coal fields underlying the South Polar Plateau may be among the richest in the world. The mountains that extend for more than 1,000 miles along Palmer Peninsula are geologically an extension of the Andes, which are rich in gold, silver, tin and copper. Copper has been found in small quantities in the mountains west of McMurdo Sound. In fact it is reasonable to assume that a continent as large as Antarctica (far larger than Europe) has resources comparable to those of other land masses of that size. The problem is to find them and get them out at a cost which can compete with mining elsewhere.

Coal has long been mined at Spitzbergen in the Arctic. Lead ore, mined in Greenland, is stockpiled until ships, each summer, can breach the pack ice and haul it out. It is clearly possible that, at some point within the next century, reserves of some vital ore or fuel may become sufficiently depleted elsewhere to justify mining it in Antarctica.

From the geographical point of view this region does not approach the strategic importance of the Arctic, but unlike the ocean of drifting floes at the North Pole, it is a continent of such mighty dimensions that, even though largely ice-covered, it cannot be ignored. Its vastness provides a sanctuary from which aircraft could dominate the waters that, apart from the vulnerable Panama and Suez Canals, provide the only ready links between the Atlantic and Pacific and the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

In little over one month, during Operation Highjump, the snowy surface of the 700-foot-thick floating ice sheet at Little America was so compacted by tractor traffic to and from the air strip that a twin-engined Douglas transport, taxiing over it on wheels, hardly left any tire prints. Attempts were then made artificially to compact air strips on the Greenland ice sheet and on at least one occasion this was so successful that what was then the Air Force's heaviest transport plane operated from it on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wheels. Recent attempts during Operation Deepfreeze to do this at McMurdo Sound have failed, but if a reliable technique can be developed it will turn almost all of Antarctica into one vast potential airfield.

The chief strategic interest of nations down under, such as Australia, is to deny Antarctica to a hostile Power. The first military force to get ashore there would have a great advantage, for there are extremely few harbors. Almost the entire coast is made inaccessible, first by the offshore pack ice, and then by uniform ice cliffs that mark the margins of the continental ice sheet where it has slipped off the continent and become waterborne. There are virtually no invasion beaches.

It has also been suggested that, once ballistic missiles have sufficient range to reach any part of our planet, Antarctica would provide an advantageous base from which to launch thermonuclear weapons. Mobile launching sites would be hard to locate in that vast continent, yet a considerable part of the retaliatory power of the nation attacked might have to be devoted to destroying these sites at very little cost to the attacker. Even with manned nuclear airplanes, Antarctica might offer advantages as an air base over more populous areas.

Despite these considerations, the major Powers have not displayed any great interest in establishing a military foothold in the Antarctic. The Pentagon reportedly feels that its budget must be allocated to projects and areas closer to home. The Kremlin probably feels the same way. The Soviet and American expeditions are scientific and the Russians have displayed unusual openness in allowing an American observer to live at their headquarters in Mirny. A Soviet representative is stationed at Little America.

The stated justification for the vast sums spent by both Powers on their expeditions is the scientific knowledge which, it is hoped, will be gained. The clues which the Antarctic holds to the world's weather patterns and climate trends are of immediate importance, whereas the strategic aspects of the continent—though not negligible—are more remote.

IV

Because Antarctic logistics and operations require long-range planning, the United States must decide soon what course it will follow in Antarctica once the unwritten I.G.Y. truce on political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activity ends in December 1958. It cannot remain aloof, for we know now that any major Power can maintain bases in Antarctica indefinitely, the year round, for a variety of purposes, some of which may be inimicable to the United States and her allies.

There are three basic alternatives. One is for the United States to claim the sector which has not been spoken for. Another is some sort of joint claim, such as that envisaged by President Roosevelt in 1939. The third is a broader international solution, possibly involving the United Nations.

The disadvantage of the first is that it does not solve the problem of access to the unclaimed sector and does not clarify the status of the Soviet outposts. The inability of ships to reach the long coast of Marie Byrd Land has presented a problem to American policy-makers ever since the days of the U.S. Antarctic Service. Some of the most powerful icebreakers afloat—the *U.S.S. Edisto,* the *U.S.S. Burton Island* and the *U.S.S. Atka*—have tried in vain to do so. The only ship to succeed was the venerable *U.S.S. Bear,* wooden-hulled and one of the last U.S. Naval vessels to be propelled by sail. In 1940, which seems to have been a freak year, she sailed east from Little America inside the pack, which had been blown off shore, and made a landing on the ice shelf of the Ruppert Coast. The *Atka* might have been able to reach Thurston Peninsula in 1955 but had to turn back because of other commitments. Possibly the newer and more powerful *U.S.S. Glacier* will be successful some day, but the region remains traditionally difficult of access. Not until this year was a base established there —Byrd Station, which is reached by a 632-mile, crevasse-sliced highway from Little America.

The most obvious partner for the United States in a joint claim would be New Zealand. America's current operations in Antarctica have depended heavily on the coöperation of that island dominion. The maintenance base for the fleet of gigantic C-124 Globemasters which airlifted fuel, food and prefabricated buildings to the South Pole was placed at Harewood Field, near Christchurch, New Zealand. The Navy planes were based at another field near by. From there they flew into the Antarctic. Navy ships en route to Little America and McMurdo Sound almost invariably made their last call in New Zealand, which stands at the gateway to the Ross Sea.

Of the seven bases established by the United States, one, at Cape Hallett, is being manned jointly by men from the two coun-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tries. Both McMurdo and Little America are within the area claimed by New Zealand, but, apart from routine protests at the operation of United States post offices at Little America, the New Zealanders have not only been wholeheartedly coöperative, but have displayed hospitality that has left none of their American visitors unmoved.

This situation has led to discussion, by New Zealanders and Americans interested in the Antarctic, of various schemes for joint action in that region. For whereas the unclaimed sector which has been explored almost exclusively by Americans has proved inaccessible except via the New Zealand claim, the latter country does not have the resources to exploit her own sector. New Zealand's Dependency includes, at Marble Point on the west coast of McMurdo Sound, the best site for a major all-year airfield that has yet been found on the continent. It likewise boasts the chief mountain system, the Great Antarctic Horst, which stretches for 1,275 miles from Cape Adare to the point where it passes into the unclaimed sector. Valuable resources may be found in these mountains, especially where they front on the Ross Sea and hence are most accessible.

Among the schemes discussed on a non-governmental level has been a joint claim by both countries of the present New Zealand claim and the unclaimed sector. Another would be the ceding by New Zealand, in return for some American concession, of that portion of the Ross Ice Shelf on which Little America rests, plus the comparatively small land areas to the east of there. Yet another suggestion has been joint action by Australia, New Zealand and the United States to claim the areas already spoken for by the two Dominions plus the unclaimed sector.

A resolution, recently introduced in Congress, proposed United States sovereignty over the region between the 90th and 150th meridians, west. The 90th meridian is the boundary of the Chilean claim, whereas Britain's sector ends at the 80th meridian. To proclaim the Chilean line as the limit of American territory could be construed as support for Chile's claim, whereas use of the other border might be interpreted as favoring Britain.

All the present claimants are anxious to persuade the United States to thrust its finger into the Antarctic pie, since this would bring the might of the United States into the informal alliance that seeks to keep out unwelcome visitors. Australia is the most anxious in this respect. Australian concern at the presence of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet bases in what is considered a part of the Australian Capital Territory was reportedy expressed in strong terms to Secretary of State Dulles on his visit to Australia for the SEATO Conference in March of this year. Nevertheless, it seems generally agreed in Washington and in other Western capitals concerned that there should be no overt political action until the Russians have displayed their intentions in Antarctica. As one analyst of Western policy put it, "If we act now, they are sure to stay. Let us wait until the end of the I.G.Y. to see if they go home."

One of the arguments of present claimants against an international solution, with or without involvement of the United Nations, has been that it would "bring in the Russians." Now that the Russians are there, this reasoning is less valid. If they remain, after the end of the I.G.Y., no joint proclamations of sovereignty by the United States and its friends are likely to pry them loose.

This may ultimately prove the strongest argument for internationalization. India proposed that the United Nations General Assembly discuss such a solution at its last session, but the idea was shelved until the end of the I.G.Y. Success in this great experiment in international coöperation would certainly strengthen sentiment within the United Nations for such an approach to the territorial problem of Antarctica.

Likewise the only face-saving answer to the conflicting claims of Britain, Argentina and Chile may prove to be international. Such an idea has not been warmly regarded by the British Foreign Office. Nevertheless it appeals to those who, with Edward Shackleton, son of the man who blazed the trail to the South Pole, feel that such a step would be appropriate to a continent which is uninhabited and hence, in a sense, belongs to all mankind. This, he has written, would not betray the Antarctic heroes of the past, who "sought nobler goals than the mere expansion of national territory." International rule of this region on the fringes of our known world, he says, might even prove a useful rehearsal for the inevitable problem of sovereignty over the moon.

So novel—and so remote, geographically—is the problem of Antarctica's future that it has received comparatively little attention in the inner councils of the great Powers. If it cannot be solved on a national or regional basis, it will have to be dealt with either at a conference of all interested Powers or within the United Nations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: "HAVES" AND "HAVE-NOTS"

By Klaus Knorr

BRITAIN'S testing of thermonuclear bombs and her announced intention of acquiring an "appreciable" capacity for nuclear deterrence mark another stage in the development of what some melancholy observers have called "nuclear plenty." Yet though Britain has joined the select rank of the "atomic haves," she is hardly more than a minor member; and in order to be able to afford this membership she has—as the British White Paper on Defense makes clear—abandoned any attempt to maintain her former position as a world military power, for her ability to take independent military action outside Western Europe will be insufficient for anything but very small and local engagements. Although Soviet Russia's present supply of nuclear bombs and delivery facilities does not equal the American, it provides her with sufficient striking power to cripple the United States as a nation. The risk to both countries of annihilation in an all-out war between them is close enough to put them in the same military class. Britain is unlikely to gain this status. She will possess an appreciable deterrent power of her own and may be able to deal grievous blows to the Soviet Union. But she will find it much more difficult than the Soviets and the United States to protect her retaliatory capacity against surprise attack and she is hardly able to spare the huge sums needed to establish a strategic striking power approaching that of the two "superpowers" in scale, versatility and continuous innovation.

Britain's coming of age as the third thermonuclear power had been discounted for some time, and so caused neither surprise nor alarm. What has been agitating strategists for several years is the question of whether other nations will not follow suit—the so-called "fourth country" problem. Many shudder at the thought of more and more countries acquiring nuclear arms. Yet it must be assumed that, barring an effective scheme for nuclear disarmament, this will happen, either as a result of "have-nots" receiving nuclear weapons and means of delivery from the "haves" or because they are able to manufacture them themselves. Disregarding the first possibility for the moment, the governing factors will be mainly two: the local availability of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the specific resources required, and the ability and willingness to allocate them for the purpose.

Before we can speculate meaningfully on these factors we must specify the kind of atomic capability which is in view. Is it a capability approaching that of the British, based, that is, on a considerably wide family of weapons, including the hydrogen bomb? Or is it a capability limited to the use of what in current jargon are called "nominal" weapons—atomic bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima, that is, with a destructive power of between 20 and 40 kilotons of T.N.T.? Such bombs have a low "yield" compared with megaton hydrogen weapons; but, as Hiroshima demonstrated, they are capable of inflicting far from "nominal" damage, and possesson of them is therefore a matter of consequence.

Since it takes only a few kilograms of plutonium to produce a single so-called nominal bomb, any nation with nuclear power reactors, or even large research reactors, will be able to make a few of these bombs before long. To design and produce a relatively primitive weapon that can be dropped from an airplane is not a task calling for large special facilities or a substantial diversion of scientific or other resources such as would overtax all but the biggest and industrially most advanced nations.

At the present time, France is clearly the first candidate for the honor of becoming a nuclear newcomer without outside aid. Her nuclear and other resources are large enough for her to begin weapons production at any time and, once the decision has been made, to produce several dozen Hiroshima-type bombs within a few years. It can also be taken for granted that without going outside their own resources Canada, Sweden, Belgium, Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia could begin production of nominal bombs within from five to seven years; and Communist China, Japan, India, Switzerland, Italy and Western Germany probably have similar possibilities. Assistance from allied countries in the form of material or know-how would of course accelerate the process and might add other countries to the list.

However, while developments in the field of nuclear science and technology will give an increasing number of countries the possibility of starting a limited military program, they would face a problem of a wholly different order if they tried to establish a substantial and diversified weapons system, including thermonuclear bombs, and the correspondingly large and com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plex apparatus needed to deliver these bombs on their targets. This task demands such a huge supply of scarce resources—materials, electric power, fabricating capacity, scientific and engineering skills and finance—that very few nations will be able to undertake it, even within two decades, without substantial help from abroad. France and Western Germany would seem to be the only possible candidates in Europe, and Japan, Communist China and perhaps India the only possible candidates in Asia. Each would of course have to give the task over-riding priority—a condition carrying grave political and economic implications. Even then, none of the countries mentioned can achieve success for a good many years. Possibly new technological discoveries might lessen the difficulties, and of course help from outside would do the same. But for the foreseeable future the fourth (or *n*th) country problem probably will consist of the likelihood that additional countries will acquire relatively low-yield atomic bombs rather than that they will assume the rank occupied by the three present "haves."

Even though a nation has the capacity for an atomic weapons program it may well hesitate before rushing to join the club of the "haves." The entrance fees are high and so are the liabilities of membership.[1] In most cases, the chief inhibiting factors will be four. First, the experience of the "haves" shows emphatically that anything but a minor atomic arms program will be a strain on the national economy and especially on scarce scientific and technical resources; and since it will work to the detriment of consumption and investment, governments will be confronted with awkward economic and political choices. Second, there is a certain degree of public revulsion, partly moral, against the idea of developing or using nuclear weapons. The sentiment varies from country to country; it is particularly sharp at present in Western Germany, Japan and India. Third, there is widespread apprehension in many countries that by developing a nuclear capacity a nation makes itself a more likely target for nuclear attack. Fourth, some potential aspirants to the nuclear club may pause before incurring the ill will of other countries. Western Germany, for instance, might fear that the hostile Soviet reaction would lessen still further the chances for German reunification. Recent events in Hungary and Poland indicate that Moscow will

[1] Western Germany in addition faces a legal barrier in the form of the Paris Agreements of 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have to reject the idea of independent atomic arms programs in any of the satellites. Before Communist China went in for a nuclear arms program she would weigh its possible effects on public opinion in the neutralist countries of Asia.

On the other hand, there are powerful considerations working in the opposite direction. One is the economy argument. Though the experience of the United States has been to the contrary, there is still a general assumption that a shift from conventional to atomic defense will yield financial economies. What is politically even more appealing is the hope that it will mean savings in military manpower and hence a cut in the length of conscription, or even the end of conscription. The British White Paper made a great deal of this argument.

Second, and more important, are considerations of international prestige. Certain countries—notably those which formerly ranked as Great Powers—may seek to join the nuclear "haves" as a means of recovering part of the status lost since the last war. At present, this motivation is especially strong in France.

Third, and probably most important of all, is the feeling that unless a nation has its own atomic capacity it is more open than it would be otherwise to acts of aggression or to nuclear blackmail on the part of the "haves." This anxiety has different grounds in different countries. Communist China is obviously concerned by the American deployment of nuclear arms in the Far East, including "Matadors" on Formosa. Neutral Sweden seems at this moment determined to bolster her defenses against a Soviet attack by acquiring some nuclear weapons capable of threatening retaliation against Leningrad. It would be surprising if Switzerland did not also come to feel a similar need for safeguarding her armed neutrality. Canada might become uneasy if she concluded that nuclear weapons from the United States might not be available to her instantaneously in the event of a Soviet attack.

The British White Paper affirms Britain's dependence on collective defense, yet it states that "the only existing safeguard against major aggression is the power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons" and that although Britain can make only a modest contribution in comparison with the United States "she must possess an appreciable element of nuclear deterrent power of her own." The motivation behind the British decision is doubtless complex. But a careful scrutiny of British statements, both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

official and unofficial, reveals two strands of thought which are also encountered in other parts of Western Europe. One is the desire to gain a modicum of freedom from the existing military dependence on the United States and thus to broaden British policy choices whenever the foreign policy interests of the two allies are in conflict. The other involves a doubt so delicate that it is seldom given forthright expression. Would the United States, asks the skeptic, knowing that in the event of full-fledged war with the Soviet Union it would suffer casualties by the tens of millions and a paralyzing blow to its economy, would it in fact be willing to unleash SAC for the protection of all or any part of Western Europe? Some Western European observers believe that no country will ever use nuclear striking power for the protection of another country, no matter how closely allied, if indeed it will even dare to do so for its own protection, and hence that possession of a nuclear deterrent is indispensable to the security of any country.

Finally, once a fourth and then a fifth country come into possession of nuclear weapons, the example will almost inevitably produce further converts; for it will sharply reinforce the considerations of security and prestige described above.

Jules Moch warned the London disarmament conference on July 3 that if the proposed suspension of tests of nuclear weapons did not end the nuclear arms race the French Government would feel free to resume its liberty of action. Another significant straw in the wind was the action July 2 of the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag to prevent the passage of a government bill which, they feared, might jeopardize national security by constitutionally restricting atomic development to "peaceful purposes."

Thus it seems likely that unless some substantial move towards disarmament foreshadows clearly the early dismantling of nuclear weapons systems, France will produce atomic bombs, and if so, other nations will sooner or later follow suit. Indeed, as of today the chances seem better than even that a limited pact would only delay the development of a nuclear capacity in a number of nations. The "have-nots" will no doubt appreciate any measures calculated to diminish the likelihood of nuclear warfare. But they will also realize that anything short of a complete solution is likely to freeze the present nuclear status quo. Surely, this is what a simple ban on testing and on further production of nuclear arms would suggest. Furthermore, there

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is some feeling in Western Europe that the United States may not always be the most realistic guardian of its own interests; that it might too trustingly enter into a far-reaching disarmament agreement with Moscow, the effect of which would be to disarm itself more effectively than the Soviet Union.

II

Whether or not there is any progress toward limitation of atomic armaments, American and Soviet policies will obviously determine in part which countries obtain nuclear capabilities and how quickly. The two great nuclear Powers can delay or hasten the process as a whole, and specifically they may assist some aspirants while withholding help from others.

We do not know the Kremlin's attitude toward this problem. The mere fact that the Soviet rulers have not made any public statements about it is not conclusive evidence of their indifference. Indeed, since they are aware of the agitation in Washington over the prospect that nuclear weapons will spread, and of the belief held there that the two super-Powers have a common interest in the problem and can therefore collaborate to solve it, a display of unconcern on the part of the Soviet Union would be natural since it would strengthen its bargaining position at disarmament conferences.

The Soviet Union has, of course, warned all the NATO "have-nots"—and Western Germany with special fierceness—against permitting any nuclear build-up on their territories. This is easy enough to understand, since to Moscow such action would appear chiefly as an extension of American power. Moscow may also be quite confident of its ability to prevent the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by its satellites, even though (doubtless reluctantly) it may have to accede to any demands by Peking for assistance in this field. Perhaps Moscow assumes that outside of Western Europe and China the fourth-country problem is actually a minor one, that the existence of a few atomic bombs in South Asia or the Middle East may be dangerous locally but hardly would present an uncontrollable risk for the Big Two.

In other words, it is the immense thermonuclear capacity of the United States which in the eyes of Soviet leaders is the real danger. They may calculate that a minor build-up of nuclear striking power in the NATO countries of Western Europe is only an appendage to American striking power and will add only mar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ginally to this danger. If so, the Soviet Union is unlikely to respond to the spread of nuclear capacities to fourth countries in Western Europe with more than diplomatic fireworks. It might register acute alarm about the development of a national nuclear force by Western Germany, but would be most unlikely to take action which would risk war with the United States. Whether any possible anxiety on this score may eventually make the Soviet Union more eager for the success of disarmament negotiations is uncertain. A ban on testing, strongly favored by the U.S.S.R., would inhibit potential fourth countries; but there are other reasons for the Soviet Union to advocate it.

The United States has been deeply concerned about the fourth-country problem for a number of years. This is shown in the control features of our bilateral agreements for helping other countries to set up research and power reactors. It is no secret that this concern was one reason for the American readiness to do business at the disarmament conference in London. The very idea of atomic bombs at the disposal of, say, Egypt or Israel conjures up a nightmare in American minds. But it is in American relations with Western Europe that the question confronts Washington in its full complexity. NATO's effective ground strength in Western Europe is far from the 30 divisions deemed necessary to serve as a shield; as it stands at present, it constitutes little more than a trip wire. Yet even the 30 divisions are to be only a shield, complemented by the sword of SAC and the British Bomber Command. To be a sturdy enough shield, SHAPE doctrine requires that the 30 divisions be equipped in part at least with nuclear arms. However, trip wire or shield, the security of Western Europe rests essentially on the thermonuclear deterrent.

Under these circumstances, how is the United States to meet whatever desire may be expressed in Western Europe for the possession of a retaliatory capacity, either under West European collective control or that of individual states? One understands why Western European states seek a larger freedom of action, but it is highly dubious that some local nuclear capability would add to it appreciably. If NATO were a real defense community, with one unified military establishment, there would be no military, economic and political sense in adding a minor European deterrent to the big deterrent based primarily, and more safely, on North America. The sensible thing would then be for Western Europe to help maintain SAC in full power. But to create a real

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense community would require a fairly complete integration of the foreign policies of all NATO members, and this does not exist today nor does it seem politically feasible as a project for the future.

Nor is it easy to dispel the anxieties felt in Western Europe that in the hour of need SAC might not be available. This is so discomforting a question that Americans have been loath to face it squarely since their monopoly of the hydrogen bomb disappeared. It seems fairly clear that only the protection of the most vital American interests would justify running the risk of thermonuclear devastation of the United States and millions of American deaths. Can Americans guarantee that any President and Congress will unhesitatingly run this risk in defense of, say, West Berlin, or Western Germany, or Denmark? Probably the decision would in fact be that once such a retreat had been accepted the final showdown would be inevitable, and hence that the ordeal had best be faced at once. At any rate, the question fortunately is not likely to arise in this stark form. The United States may continue to feel that its future and that of West Europe are bound together whatever the risks involved. But even if, in the future, our determination to defend Europe should be cast in doubt, Soviet Russia must assume that aggression will probably bring SAC into play as long as our announced policy is not altered and especially as long as American troops and SAC units are stationed in Europe. As long as this condition prevails, the Soviet Union cannot afford to attack Western Europe without *simultaneously* attacking the United States itself; for to do otherwise would deprive it of the advantage of striking a surprise blow and would expose it to the first attack. The presumption that SAC would be triggered automatically into action should deter an attack on any part of the NATO alliance.

III

American uneasiness over the nuclear aspirations of NATO countries originates in the fear that if they are satisfied it will be the beginning of a progressive diffusion of nuclear capabilities, with the probability that they will fall into highly irresponsible hands. What Americans really fear is not the "fourth country," but perhaps the tenth or twelfth. They also have a premonition that once NATO countries are less dependent for their security on the United States they will be more tempted to drift away

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the alliance; this would produce a degree of Western disunity which the Soviet Union would exploit assiduously. There are other factors also. There is the fear that if Western Germany possessed nuclear arms it might run dangerous risks in the effort to attain German reunification. There is the fear that the development of nuclear deterrence by Western European countries would weaken them economically and in addition lead them to make a further reduction in the ground forces which they are expected to contribute to NATO. Finally, there is the concern that the appearance of additional nuclear countries may complicate the disarmament problem.

These worries are not without justification. Yet it seems that they have not been thoroughly enough analyzed. The present rather ill-defined position of the United States has disadvantages too. Perhaps Washington is foregoing a chance to manipulate in the interests of the United States a development which may very well turn out to be irresistible. Sober reflection may serve to lessen the American apprehensions. In the long run, it is the highly industrialized countries—and this for many years means countries in Western Europe—that can develop a relatively substantial nuclear capacity. Very likely the possession of nuclear arms will have a chastening effect on the leaders of those states instead of encouraging them to rash actions. Furthermore, it is improbable that our NATO allies, even when equipped with nuclear weapons, will feel sufficiently independent of American aid and protection to pursue policies importantly in conflict with vital American interests. Finally, the United States need have no fear that its European allies might use nuclear weapons against it, whereas Moscow has grounds for fearing that satellites possessing nuclear weapons might use them to gain their independence.

In three ways the United States might derive actual advantage from supporting the spread of nuclear capabilities in Western Europe. First, it would add, marginally at least, to the present deterrent power of the United States and the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Soviet preparations for aggression would have to take account of more bases of counterattack, and this would complicate Soviet military planning as well as put an extra load on the Soviet delivery system and defense budget. Second, given the European doubts concerning the certainty of American protective action in a crisis, it might be that some nuclear capability of their own would render Western European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries less susceptible to Soviet nuclear blackmail. Third, for the United States to distrust and disapprove of West European aspirations in the nuclear field would be bound to weaken the NATO partnership, and might impair it seriously; whereas to support those aspirations would conceivably strengthen it.

The complicated repercussions that might follow the development of nuclear capabilities in additional countries are hard to predict in detail; hence it is difficult to estimate the effect on the relative strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. From what has been said, however, it may be inferred, though tentatively, that the net results are unlikely to be very bad for the United States, and may possibly be beneficial. If accepted, this conclusion would mean that American policy should do more than tolerate fourth-power aspirations in Western Europe; it should actively support them, aiming specifically to reduce the possible disadvantages and to increase the possible advantages.

This brings us to the question whether or not the United States should supply nuclear weapons to such of its NATO allies as want them. For some time the United States has actually been edging toward a new position on this matter. Regarding so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons, the United States has been offering to its NATO allies appropriate launching equipment without nuclear warheads. This move foreshadowed a decision to supply the warheads in the event of Soviet attack. On July 17, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles formally announced this decision which was publicly endorsed by President Eisenhower the following day.

The wording and timing of the announcement make it clear that at least one of its purposes was to gain approval from the have-nots in NATO of the American disarmament proposals for stopping the production of nuclear weapons on a fixed date. Mr. Dulles pointed out that no disarmament scheme could assure the controlled disposal of existing weapons and that the United States would therefore not agree to a plan that left it without some means of thermonuclear retaliation. ". . . We do not ourselves want to be in a position," he added, "where our allies are wholly dependent upon us. We don't think that is a healthy relationship. Therefore we are studying ways whereby, through perhaps a NATO stockpile of weapons and various arrangements of that sort, there can be assurances to our allies that if they are attacked, if war comes, that they will not then be in a position of suppliants, as far as we are concerned, for the use of atomic weapons." As Mr.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dulles indicated, the implementation of the new policy has not been worked out fully. He intimated, however, that the weapons concerned, though under an American commander in NATO custody, would probably remain in United States ownership, and that they would be actually handed over to NATO forces only in the event of a war emergency. This is, indeed, as far as Washington can go without new legislation.

Bold as this statement seems, it is doubtful that it is bold enough. In fact it has brought little change to the defense realities of Western Europe, and it is really significant only in so far as it is a first step in the development of a new policy. Our NATO allies are unlikely to be satisfied with an arrangement that gives them only very conditional access to the new weapons. They may not feel sure of receiving nuclear arms when needed as long as they are owned by the United States or are in the custody of American troops in Europe. Furthermore, an emergency may come so suddenly and develop so quickly that there might not be enough time for these weapons to be effectively integrated in the various NATO forces.

The question remains, therefore, whether the NATO allies should not be offered such arms prior to any actual war crisis. To do so would require an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, and before Congress would agree its members would want to know that safeguards could be established so that military secrets would not pass into the wrong hands. This is a formidable hurdle, but probably not insurmountable. By showing a readiness to make nuclear weapons available to its NATO allies, the United States would act in the full spirit of a close partnership for defense. As already noted, this would strengthen NATO, boost West European resistance to Soviet threats, increase the retaliatory power which is relied on to deter Soviet aggression and diminish the possibility that any Western European states might act inimically to American interests. Furthermore, if it gave or sold ready-made weapons to its allies the United States would save them from the heavy expenditures that they would have to incur in duplicating (in part at least) the research, development and production effort already made by the United States. This would help to keep the national economies of these allies from being subjected to excessive and needless strains. Further, it would minimize the testing of nuclear explosives and thereby its harmful effects. Finally, if the United States supplied nuclear arms to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its allies within the NATO framework, it would be in a position to assure that they were under collective rather than individual national control. This would minimize whatever danger there might be that imprudent action on the part of one NATO country would precipitate a deadly crisis for all of them.

Such an American policy would be much more constructive than simply to accept, or even grudgingly to assist, the development and production of nuclear weapons either by single Western European nations or by a West European group of nations corresponding to Euratom or the West European Union. An American policy of drag and drift seems to have nothing to commend it. However, for the bolder policy to have the best chance of showing positive results the United States would have to demonstrate that the move was not in any respect a first step in a withdrawal to Fortress America but a fresh assertion of its understanding of the full implications of the NATO alliance and its realization of the need to keep it vigorous and powerful.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N.Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

TIDES OF CRISIS. By ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. New York: Reynal, 1957, 328 p. $4.00.

This is, as Mr. Berle puts it, "a non-technical, somewhat conversational introduction to problems of foreign affairs." After making a fairly rapid survey of the nature and location of our principal areas of crisis, the author turns to the useful attempt to exorcise six "ghosts" of the past—Capitalism, Communism, Nationalism, Imperialism, Race Superiority and Spiritual Supremacy—all of which cripple our ability to think clearly about problems of the present and future.

LIMITED WAR: THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY. By ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, 315 p. $5.00.

This study is directed to the question, "How can the United States employ military power as a rational instrument of foreign policy when the destructive potentialities of war exceed any rational purpose?" The answer, in the author's view, lies in the development of a strategy of limited war.

GLOBAL STRATEGY. By AIR VICE-MARSHAL E. J. KINGSTON-MCCLOUGHRY. New York: Praeger, 1957, 270 p. $4.50.

The author of "The Direction of War" continues the development of an interservice approach to the problems of general strategy. While reflecting the tremendous political and military uncertainties of the present, it is a thoughtful effort to work out new organizational and operational concepts.

GEORGE KENNANS POLITIK DER EINDÄMMUNG. By JÜRGEN REISS. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1957, 100 p. DM. 11.

A close analysis of what is thought to be George Kennan's containment policy. It is possible that the author has taken the American "containment-liberation" debate a little too earnestly.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. By BRIGADIER GENERAL WASHINGTON PLATT. New York: Praeger, 1957, 302 p. $4.00.

In this effort to develop principles for strategic intelligence production the author offers some cogent observations on the more general intellectual process of gathering, interpreting and presenting data. Of particular interest is his discussion of the importance of timeliness in such production.

THE COMING CAESARS. By AMAURY DE RIENCOURT. New York: Coward-McCann, 1957, 384 p. $6.00.

Operating within a cyclical theory of history, the author foresees a new age of Caesarism, with Americans playing the rôle of the Romans.

THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF MAN. By LEWIS MUMFORD. New York: Harper, 1956, 249 p. $3.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. Mumford's meditations on the future of man, his self-transformation to a new stage, do not mesh very helpfully with the massive quandaries of the statesman or diplomatist.

THE INTERPLAY OF EAST AND WEST. By Barbara Ward. New York: Norton, 1957, 152 p. $3.50.

In these Beatty Lectures, delivered at McGill University in 1955, Miss Ward explores the points of possible coöperation and conflict between Orient and Occident in the hope of finding some way to achieve the ultimate moral unity of mankind.

BLUEPRINT OF DECEPTION. By Vladimir Kabes and Alfons Sergot. The Hague: Mouton, 1957, 365 p. (New York: Lounz, $5.00.)

An extensive indictment by a Czech and a Polish lawyer of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers as a Communist front organization.

CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN MODERN NATIONS. Edited by Philip W. Buck and Martin W. Travis, Jr. New York: Norton, 1957, 865 p. $8.95.

A substantial symposium of studies of both the organization and content of foreign policy in the world today. The treatment is by country or region: the United States, Latin America, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, Asia, France, the Netherlands and the U.S.S.R.

DAS STAATSNOTRECHT IN BELGIEN, FRANKREICH, GROSSBRITANNIEN, ITALIEN, DEN NIEDERLANDEN, DER SCHWEIZ UND DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA. By Hans Ballreich and Others. Cologne: Heymann, 1955, 268 p. DM. 29.

Comparative studies of the government's emergency powers in Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States.

CONFISCATION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW. By P. Adriaanse. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956, 193 p. Guilders 12.50.

A legal study of a problem which is expanding in the twentieth century with the extension of the principle of public utility.

THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Charmian Edwards Toussaint. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1956, 288 p. $7.50.

An analysis of the legal and the institutional aspects of the Trusteeship System.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND DEPENDENT PEOPLES. By Emil J. Sady. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1956, 205 p. $1.50.

This book, consisting of chapters dealing with dependent peoples, will be part of a more general study of "the United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare" in the Brookings Institution Series on the U.N.

OPERATION DEEPFREEZE. By Rear Admiral George J. Dufek. New York: Harcourt, 1957, 243 p. $5.00.

An interesting account of the establishment, in 1956, of a series of stations in the Antarctic in connection with the International Geophysical Year. The author was in command of Task Force 43.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF AIRCRAFT. By J. P. Honig. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956, 214 p. Guilders 12.50.

A legal study dealing with such topics as sovereignty over the air space, rights in aircraft, and civil and criminal jurisdiction over aircraft.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ALLIED BLOCKADE OF GERMANY, 1914–1916. By Marion C. Siney. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957, 339 p. $6.50.

An extensive analysis of the legal, political and diplomatic aspects of the Allied blockade in the first half of the war. A subsequent volume is to cover the years 1917–1919.

DIE PROBLEME DES RAPALLO-VERTRAGS. By Theodor Schieder. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956, 98 p. DM. 4.80.

A useful analytical study of German-Soviet relations in the early 1920s when both Powers were cautiously seeking a way out of their diplomatic isolation.

GERMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1936–1940. By Frank William Iklé. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956, 243 p. $4.00.

A monograph, based on both German and Japanese sources, on the rapprochement of the two Powers from the Anti-Comintern Pact to the Tripartite Treaty.

PARIS-MOSKAU. By R. J. Guiton. Stuttgart: Vorwerk, 1956, 336 p. DM. 14.80.

A useful but somewhat disconnected study of French-Soviet relations since 1944; apparently based on Western sources only.

CITIES AND MEN. By Sir Harry Luke. London: Bles, 1956, 254 p. 25/.

The third and last volume of this most interesting autobiography of a much-travelled British public servant takes us to such places as Sierra Leone, Palestine, Malta, Fiji, South America and the Caribbean in the years 1924–1954.

PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT. By Seymour J. Rubin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956, 107 p. $3.50.

Lectures on the status and protection of private foreign investment under international law.

ACTUALITÉ INTERNATIONALE ET DIPLOMATIQUE: 1950–1956. By Claude-Albert Colliard. Paris: Éditions Montchrestien, 1957, 685 p. Fr. 1600.

This extensive collection of texts relating to international relations in the years 1950–1956 is a sequel to "Droit International et Histoire Diplomatique" which first appeared in 1948.

ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. II: 1956. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1957, 990 p.

The second volume of this yearbook includes articles on Suez, Morocco and Indochina, together with a chronology and bibliography.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES. Edited by Adolf Sturmthal. Ithaca: Institute of International Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1957, 382 p. $4.50.

Essays on collective bargaining in Great Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy and the United States, with a concluding essay in comparison by the editor.

HALF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN. By S. M. Keeny. New York: Association Press, 1957, 254 p. $3.50.

An informal report by the Director of the Asia Regional Office, United Nations Children's Fund.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MANAGEMENT GUIDE TO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS. Edited by Dan H. Fenn, Jr. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957, 308 p. $4.50.

The book, based on the proceedings of the 26th National Business Conference, comprises a number of papers dealing with overseas business and its relation to the national interest, problems of management of overseas operations, and some foreign views of U. S. investment abroad.

AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY RELATIVE INCOME. By J. R. Bellerby and Others. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956, 369 p. $6.75.

This effort to establish the income ratio between agriculture and industry is based on research in the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, the United States and Sweden.

WIRTSCHAFTSFRAGEN DER FREIEN WELT. By Erwin von Beckerath and Others. Frankfurt/Main: Knapp, 1957, 650 p. DM. 42.

This *Festschrift* in honor of Ludwig Erhard contains over 50 essays on a wide variety of contemporary, practical economic questions.

YOU AND THE ATOM. By Gerald Wendt. New York: Morrow, 1956, 96 p. $1.95.

A popular exposition of atomic energy, its sources and peaceful uses.

The Second World War

CHURCHILL—ROOSEVELT—STALIN: THE WAR THEY WAGED AND THE PEACE THEY SOUGHT. By Herbert Feis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 692 p. $6.95.

The story Mr. Feis has to tell is by now a familiar one—the history of the "Big Three" coalition from 1941 to the collapse of Germany in 1945. Most of his sources are familiar, too, although he has enjoyed access to the papers of W. Averell Harriman. Still, this is an important, and fresh, book. Mr. Feis writes with the advantage of 15 years' perspective, he has a talent for threading his way through a complex diplomatic crisis, and his unobtrusive judgments on wartime policies are both balanced and penetrating.

THE LOST OPPORTUNITY. By Alexandre Cretzianu. London: Cape, 1957, 188 p. 18/.

The lost opportunity referred to by Mr. Cretzianu, a Rumanian career diplomat before the Communist seizure of power, is the decision of the Western Allies not to launch a major invasion of southeastern Europe in the Second World War.

THE INVASION OF FRANCE AND GERMANY, 1944–1945. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1957, 360 p. $6.50.

This 11th volume of Professor Morison's magistral "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II" recounts the part played by American and Allied naval forces in the landings in Normandy and Southern France as well as the mopping-up operations in 1945.

THE SIGNAL CORPS: THE TEST (DECEMBER 1941 TO JULY 1943). By George Raynor Thompson and Others. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1957, 621 p. $4.50.

This second in the sub-series on the Technical Services in the official history of the United States Army in World War II deals with the Signal Corps in the first months of actual test in the field.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE TURN OF THE TIDE. By Arthur Bryant. Garden City: Doubleday, 1957, 624 p. $6.95.

This history of high strategy through the Quebec Conference of 1943 (a sequel is to follow) is based on the personal diaries of Lord Alanbrooke, wartime Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The conversion of the immediate impressions and thoughts of a diary into a historical narrative is always difficult. In the present case Sir Arthur Bryant has worked together an account which is interesting, often intimate, and quite controversial—especially in its judgments of other British and American leaders—but which somehow does not add greatly to our knowledge of the war.

OPERATION SEA LION. By Peter Fleming. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957, 323 p. $5.00.

An absorbing and beautifully written narrative of the German preparations to launch, and the British to repel, an invasion of England in 1940. In the author's view Operation Sea Lion was doomed to failure from the outset and the Germans did well not to launch it.

GRAND STRATEGY. VOLUME II: SEPTEMBER 1939–JUNE 1941. By J. R. M. Butler. London: H.M.S.O., 1957, 603 p. 42/. (New York: British Information Services, $7.82.)

Of the six volumes on grand strategy appearing in the official "History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series," this is the third to be published. Professor Butler, who is editor of the series, here deals with the organization and execution of the war plans of the contending Powers from the outbreak of hostilities to the German invasion of Russia.

THE DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. By Basil Collier. London: H.M.S.O., 1957, 557 p. 50/. (New York: British Information Services, $9.29.)

This volume, from the same series as the above, approaches the subject of home defense from an "inter-service viewpoint," *i.e.* the defense of Britain against air, naval and land forces, as well as the V-1 and V-2 rockets.

BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE FAR EAST, 1943–46. By F. S. V. Donnison. London: H.M.S.O., 1956, 483 p. 40/. (New York: British Information Services, $7.46.)

This first of a series on military administration of occupied territories deals with Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong. A valuable contribution, part of the U.K. Military Series on the "History of the Second World War."

CIVIL DEFENCE. By Terence H. O'Brien. London: H.M.S.O.; and Longmans, 1955, 729 p. 37/6. (New York: British Information Services, $6.98.)

This volume differs from Collier's study in being chiefly concerned with the non-military defense of Great Britain: the organization of the A.R.P., fire brigade measures, shelters, etc. Appropriately, it is part of the United Kingdom Civil Series.

INLAND TRANSPORT. By C. I. Savage. London: H.M.S.O.; and Longmans, 1957, 678 p. 47/6. (New York: British Information Services, $8.84.)

Another volume in the Civil Series (see above), dealing with the British Government's inland transport policy: railways, road transport, coastal shipping and canals.

LA MARINE À L'ÉPREUVE. By Jacques Mordal. Paris: Plon, 1956, 250 p. Fr. 600.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LA BATAILLE DE DAKAR. By Jacques Mordal. Paris: Ozanne, 1956, 317 p. Fr. 750.

The author of a number of studies of naval engagements deals in these two books with several melancholy naval episodes during the Vichy period. His political sympathies are with the Pétain régime.

THE ITALIAN NAVY IN WORLD WAR II. By Commander Marc'Antonio Bragadin. Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1957, 380 p. $5.75.

An English translation of a substantial naval history, which appeared in Italy nine years ago.

ZERO! By Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi with Martin Caidin. New York: Dutton, 1956, 424 p. $5.00.

A view of the Pacific war as seen by a Japanese pilot and the engineer who developed the Zero fighter.

THE UNDAUNTED. By Ronald Seth. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, 327 p. $6.00.

An outline which tries to cover the wartime resistance movements in Western and Southern Europe. At times the treatment is too brief to be of much value.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1955. By Hollis W. Barber. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1957, 346 p. $6.00.

In this volume of the series published by the Council on Foreign Relations are discussed the Geneva "summit meeting" and the ensuing Soviet campaign for "peaceful coexistence;" the final consummation of the Austrian State Treaty; the bringing into force of the revised Western European Union; threats of war in Israel and the Taiwan Strait; the Bandung conference; and Soviet politico-economic penetration of the Middle East and South Asia. Like its predecessors, the volume includes timely maps and cartoons, as well as a chronology and index.

THE PRICE OF POWER. By Herbert Agar. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, 199 p. $3.50.

An interpretative essay on American life and politics since 1945, a singularly difficult period of frustration, crisis and unavoidable responsibility.

AMERICAN DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. By Timothy W. Stanley. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956, 202 p. $3.25.

An analysis of the organization and function of the American defense and national security structure in the years since the end of World War II.

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924–1952. By Robert A. Divine. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, 220 p. $4.00.

A history and analysis of American immigration policy from 1924, when a permanent quota system was enacted, to the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act.

THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Bernard C. Cohen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 293 p. $6.00.

Taking the Japanese peace settlement of 1951 as a case study, Mr. Cohen examines the various components of the political process that determined American policy on this occasion—public opinion, interest groups, the press, the Executive and Congress.

AMERICAN NATIONALISM: AN INTERPRETATIVE ESSAY. By Hans

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KOHN. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 272 p. $5.00.

Long a student of the subject, Mr. Kohn here turns to the particular, and in some respects unique, qualities of American nationalism. A stimulating essay, a great merit of which is the author's ability to compare and contrast.

THE UNITED STATES IN HISTORY. By JAMES T. SHOTWELL. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956, 234 p. $3.50.

An essay, sober but optimistic, on the meaning and ends of American history, by the President Emeritus of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

GLAD ADVENTURE. By FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 356 p. $6.00.

The autobiography of a lawyer and diplomat, son-in-law of Woodrow Wilson, who served as Assistant Secretary of State under Cordell Hull, was High Commissioner to the Philippines and helped to establish UNRRA.

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. New York: Dodd, 1956, 301 p. $5.00.

As the title indicates, these are the findings and recommendations of a group of lawyers who made an extensive study of the Federal personnel security programs. A valuable contribution to a difficult and controversial subject.

IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION. By ALGER HISS. New York: Knopf, 1957, 424 p. $5.00.

Although most of what Mr. Hiss has to say in support of his innocence will be familiar to those who followed the trials and later appeals, he does bring forth some new evidence, especially with respect to the famous typewriter. He does not, however, meet some of the most telling aspects of the prosecution's case, nor does he attempt to deal with some of the wider issues of the time, notably the problem of Communist espionage, which inevitably bear upon the weighing of evidence.

THE COMMUNIST TRIALS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION. By JOHN SOMERVILLE. New York: Cameron Associates, 1956, 256 p. $3.50.

A criticism of the prosecutions under the Smith Act, based on the dubious, or circular, premise that Communists are revolutionary only in a "revolutionary situation."

A HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. By EUGENE H. ROSEBOOM. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 568 p. $8.50.

A popular history of our quadrennial "set-tos," from Washington to Eisenhower.

SECOND CONSUL. By EDGAR WIGGINS WAUGH. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, 244 p. $3.75.

John Adams once said, "I am Vice President. In this I am nothing, but I may be everything." This apparent anomaly of the American vice-presidency and what to do about it are the subjects of Mr. Waugh's study.

THE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY PROGRAMS. By MURRAY R. BENEDICT AND OSCAR C. STINE. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1956, 510 p. $5.00.

A detailed study, on a commodity-by-commodity basis, of the various programs which have been adopted in the United States in the postwar years. It becomes evident that each commodity requires a specific program to meet its own conditions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Europe

EUROPÄISCHES NIEMANDSLAND. By Wolfgang Höpker. Düsseldorf: Diederichs, 1956, 164 p. DM. 5.80.

The author discusses, with some apprehension, the possibility of a neutral zone in Europe extending from Scandinavia through Germany and Austria to Jugoslavia and Greece.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1820–1953. By Michael P. Fogarty. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1957, 461 p. $6.75.

A broad and useful survey, by a British economist, of the history, nature and significance of the Christian Democratic movements in Europe. In the author's view Christian Democracy may indeed bring about a renewed unity of the Christian tradition in Western society.

LAND AND LABOR IN EUROPE 1900–1950. By Folke Dovring. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956, 480 p. Guilders 28.50. (New York: Heinman, $10.00.)

A substantial comparative study of various aspects of the agrarian question in Europe in the twentieth century—settlement, tenure and agricultural coöperation. A concluding chapter by Karin Dovring discusses law reform as a propaganda theme.

UNITED KINGDOM TRADE WITH EUROPE. By F. V. Meyer. London: Bowes, 1957, 197 p. 21/.

In this monograph on Anglo-Continental trade Mr. Meyer challenges the charge that the United Kingdom has been oblivious of Europe's needs in her recent economic foreign policy.

REGARDS NEUFS SUR LE PARLEMENT. By François Muselier. Paris: Seuil, 1956, 191 p. Fr. 360.

An amusing but instructive introduction to the French parliament and to electoral and parliamentary practice.

SWEDEN'S FOREIGN POLICY. By Samuel Abrahamsen. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957, 99 p. $2.50.

An analysis of the concept of neutrality as interpreted by Sweden since World War I, a concept which Swedish opinion shows little sign of abandoning.

DER SCHLIEFFENPLAN. By Gerhard Ritter. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1956, 200 p. DM. 19.80.

A leading German historian makes an extensive examination of the background and development of the Schlieffen Plan. Useful in demolishing some of the myths that have grown up around the plan, the work is not very sure-footed in its purely military and strategic analysis.

THE SS: ALIBI OF A NATION, 1922–1945. By Gerald Reitlinger. New York: Viking, 1957, 502 p. $6.50.

An able, scholarly and full history of the principal instrument of Nazi terror. As the subtitle indicates, the author does not accept the theory that the S.S. alone was responsible for or aware of the atrocities of the Hitler era.

DIE SS. By Ermenhild Neusüss-Hunkel. Hanover: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1956, 143 p. DM. 7.50.

An analysis of the rôle and function of the S.S. in the internal and foreign ag-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gressions of the Nazi dictatorship.

THE LABYRINTH. By Walter Schellenberg. New York: Harper, 1956, 423 p. $4.95.

These posthumously published memoirs of the S.S. general who became head of the German Foreign Intelligence Service offer plenty of cloak-and-dagger action together with some useful insights into the heart of the Nazi system.

CONSPIRACY AMONG GENERALS. By Wilhelm von Schramm. New York: Scribner, 1957, 215 p. $3.95.

This interesting addition to the literature of the abortive coup of July 20, 1944, deals with events in Paris, where the conspiracy reached the brink of success despite the failure to kill Hitler. The German edition, "Der 20. Juli in Paris," was noted here in October 1954.

MEIN LEBEN. By Erich Raeder. Tübingen: Schlichtenmayer, 1956, 317 p. DM. 15.80.

This first volume of Admiral Raeder's memoirs concludes with the German-British naval agreement of 1935. Not very broadly conceived, it contains nevertheless a good deal of substantial information.

PRESSECHEF BEI EBERT, HINDENBURG UND KOPF. By Walter Zechlin. Hanover: Schlüter, 1956, 234 p. DM. 14.

The political and diplomatic memoirs of the Weimar *Reichspressechef* and former Minister in Mexico.

DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON NORDAMERIKA UND DIE REPARATIONEN 1920–1924. By Dieter Bruno Gescher. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1956, 226 p. DM. 16.80.

A monograph on the rôle of the United States in the German reparations question up to the inauguration of the Dawes Plan.

DIE DEUTSCHE SOZIALDEMOKRATIE UND DER NATIONALE STAAT 1870–1920. By Hermann Heidegger. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1956, 401 p. DM. 20.

A study of the evolution of the Social Democratic Party's attitude toward the national state, especially during the years of war and revolution from 1914 to 1920.

THE REICHSWEHR AND THE GERMAN REPUBLIC, 1919–1926. By Harold J. Gordon, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 478 p. $8.50.

A very solid monograph, based on the Seeckt, Gessler, Epp and Groener papers, on the recreation of the German Army after World War I. It is the author's conclusion "that the army was less of a disruptive element within the body politic of the Weimar Republic than it has often been believed to be."

WISSENSCHAFT IM TOTALITÄREN STAAT. By M. G. Lange. Stuttgart: Ring, 1955, 295 p. DM. 18.

A useful study of the imposition of Marxism-Leninism on scholarship and thought in the Soviet zone of Germany.

DER BUNDESRAT. By Hans Schäfer. Cologne: Heymann, 1955, 137 p. DM. 14.80.

An analysis of the federalist organ of the German *Bundesrepublik*.

EIN HEER IM SCHATTEN DER PARTEIEN. By Ludwig Jedlicka. Graz: Böhlau, 1955, 200 p. Schillings 86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A well-documented study of Austria's military development and problems in the inter-war period, 1918–1938.

STORIA D'ITALIA NEL PERIODO FASCISTA. By Luigi Salvatorelli and Giovanni Mira. Turin: Einaudi, 1956, 1142 p. L. 6000.

This is a major contribution to our understanding of the Mussolini era. Written with restraint yet devastating in the story it narrates, it demonstrates both the chaotic and contradictory nature of Italian Fascism and the conditions which promoted its rise, survival and eventual destruction.

ITALY. By Gerardo Zampaglione. New York: Praeger, 1956, 282 p. $6.50.

A mediocre general history of modern Italy.

THE VATICAN STORY. By Bernard Wall. New York: Harper, 1956, 247 p. $3.95.

Under this colloquial title Mr. Wall takes us on an informal, informative and often gossipy tour of the Vatican and its occupants.

THE YOKE AND THE ARROWS: A REPORT ON SPAIN. By Herbert L. Matthews. New York: Braziller, 1957, 203 p. $3.75.

Mr. Matthews, an experienced journalist in Spanish affairs, here assesses the 18 years of the Franco régime. The period of the Civil War is now seen in fuller perspective, the present situation is regarded as relatively stable, the future still uncertain.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

LES FRONTIÈRES EUROPÉENNES DE L'U.R.S.S., 1917–1941. By Chantal Beaucourt and Others. Paris: Colin, 1957, 354 p. Fr. 1300.

A symposium of studies under the direction of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle dealing with the Soviet Union's frontier disputes with its Western neighbors—the Baltic States, Finland, Poland and Rumania—in the years between the Revolution and the Nazi attack of 1941.

LE MARXISME EN UNION SOVIÉTIQUE. By Henri Chambre. Paris: Seuil, 1955, 509 p. Fr. 1200.

This able and comprehensive study by a French Catholic scholar examines the application and institutionalization of Marxism in the Soviet Union, with particular emphasis on the evolution of ideology and practice in the fields of law, morals, religion and economics.

RUSSIA SINCE 1917. By Frederick L. Schuman. New York: Knopf, 1957, 508 p. $6.50.

Although Professor Schuman's purpose is to attempt a new synthesis and revaluation, the effect is blurred at times. The author's varying views of today, yesterday and two decades ago tend to jostle one another despite his effort to clarify the major issues of interpretation through numerous editorial footnotes.

REWRITING RUSSIAN HISTORY. Edited by C. E. Black. New York: Praeger, 1956, 413 p. $7.50.

A symposium of essays dealing with the rewriting, re-evaluation and fabrication of Russian history in the Soviet era.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE EAST, 1920–1927. By Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957, 478 p. $10.00.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE WEST, 1920–1927. By Xenia Joukoff Eudin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AND HAROLD H. FISHER. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957, 550 p. $10.00.

These two companion publications of the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace provide a very useful selection of documents, translated and with introductory narrative, relating to Soviet foreign policy in Asia and Europe in the 1920s.

RUSSIA IN TRANSITION, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. New York: Coward-McCann, 1957, 245 p. $4.50.

A collection of somewhat embattled but always interesting essays, by the biographer of Stalin and Trotsky, dealing with the background of Soviet society as well as with the changes since Stalin's death.

RUSSLAND UND DER MESSIANISMUS DES ORIENTS. By EMANUEL SARKISYANZ. Tübingen: Mohr, 1955, 419 p. DM. 29.60.

As the title indicates, this book is in the tradition which emphasizes the messianic and chiliastic impulse in Russian history and thought. Interesting, but one-sided and rather poorly organized.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. By BORIS MEISSNER AND JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR. New York: Praeger, 1956, 276 p. $5.00.

This book comprises, in effect, an essay by a leading German scholar on the Nineteenth Party Congress and its aftermath, a briefer piece by Mr. Reshetar on the Twentieth Congress, a list of members of the Central Committees as of 1956, plus Party statutes and some Soviet articles. Helpful for Kremlinologists but already being overtaken by events.

THE CHURCH IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By MATTHEW SPINKA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 179 p. $3.25.

A study of church-state relations in Soviet Russia under the three patriarchs, Tikhon, Sergei and Alexei.

SOVIET AFFAIRS. London: Chatto and Windus, 1956, 147 p. 12/6. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, $3.00.)

Essays on a variety of Soviet topics, prepared in seminars at St. Antony's College, Oxford.

LEGAL PROBLEMS UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION. EDITED BY ZYGMUNT NAGORSKI. New York: Association of Polish Lawyers in Exile in the United States, 1956, 132 p. $1.50.

This first volume of studies by Polish lawyers in exile in the United States contains a number of essays on Soviet and Polish law.

MOSCOW AND THE UKRAINE, 1918–1953. By BASIL DMYTRYSHYN. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956, 310 p. $5.00.

A doctoral dissertation on the theory and practice of Bolshevik nationality policy in the Ukraine from 1918 to the death of Stalin.

BOLSHEVISM IN TURKESTAN, 1917–1927. By ALEXANDER G. PARK. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, 428 p. $6.75.

A detailed and careful analysis of the aims and methods of Soviet policy in Central Asia in the first decade after the Revolution.

THE WINTER WAR. By VÄINÖ TANNER. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957, 274 p. $5.00.

The former Social Democratic Foreign Minister of Finland gives an interesting and illuminating personal account of Finnish-Soviet relations in 1939 and 1940. The original Finnish edition appeared in 1950.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTEMPORARY POLAND: SOCIETY, POLITICS, ECONOMY. Edited by Alicja Iwańska. Chicago: University of Chicago (for the Human Relations Area Files), 1955, 578 p.

This study, in the form of a working draft, is available for consultation in research libraries.

A HISTORY OF HUNGARY, 1929–1945. By C. A. Macartney. New York: Praeger, 1957, 2 v. $20.00.

Professor Macartney, the leading Western authority on Hungary, has in these two volumes written an exceedingly detailed political and diplomatic history, from the depression to the end of the Second World War, with much the greatest emphasis being placed on the unhappy war years. While the reader may not share some of the author's political sympathies, an important virtue of the book is that it organizes and presents all the evidence, including much that is unfavorable to Professor Macartney's own preferences. A major work.

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION. Edited by Melvin J. Lasky. New York: Praeger (for the Congress for Cultural Freedom), 1957, 318 p. $5.00.

An extensive documentary history of the events of October and November 1956: leaflets, radio broadcasts, newspaper items and the eyewitness accounts of foreign observers.

KARDINAL MINDSZENTY WARNT. St. Pölten (Austria): Verlag der Pressvereins-Druckerei, 1956, 381 p. Schillings 84.

A selection of speeches, pastoral letters and press statements by Cardinal Mindszenty in the years 1944–1946.

LA TRAGÉDIE HONGROISE. By François Fejtõ. Paris: Horay, 1956, 314 p. Fr. 690.

A view of the Sovietization of Hungary and the 1956 uprising, from the outside, but by a well-informed Hungarian exile of the left.

MEMOIRS. By Admiral Nicholas Horthy. New York: Speller, 1957, 268 p. $6.00.

The autobiography, without benefit of much documentary material, of the late Regent of Hungary. A translation of "Ein Leben für Ungarn" (noted here July 1953).

NATIONAL COMMUNISM AND SOVIET STRATEGY. By D. A. Tomasic. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957, 222 p. $4.50.

In attempting to assess the significance of "Titoism" to the international Communist movement Professor Tomasic suggests that it might prove to be an asset to Communist world strategy, or it might indicate a basic weakness of Communism. The barometer reading is cloudy and unsettled.

THE COAL RESOURCES OF YUGOSLAVIA. By Melrad Mellen and Victor H. Winston. New York: Praeger, 1956, 328 p. $6.00.

This publication of the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee provides a detailed and technical description of the coal deposits, reserves and uses in Jugoslavia.

LA YOUGOSLAVIE SOCIALISTE. By C. Bobrowski. Paris: Colin, 1956, 237 p. Fr. 750.

Largely an examination of Jugoslav economic policy and development in the Tito era.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The British Commonwealth of Nations

IN DEFENCE OF COLONIES. By Sir Alan Burns. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 338 p. $5.75.

The author, for nine years Permanent United Kingdom Representative on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, here makes a vigorous counterattack against criticism of British "colonialism," stands up for Britain's record and opposes claims of other nations to British colonial territories.

BRITAIN, COMMONWEALTH AND EMPIRE, 1901–1955. By Paul Knaplund. New York: Harper, 1957, 541 p. $6.00.

A reflective narrative and interpretation of the development of the British Commonwealth in the present century.

YOUR ENGLAND. By Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart. New York: Putnam, 1956, 303 p. $4.00.

In the form of a relaxed, anecdotal autobiography, a Scot pays his affectionate respects to the English.

BULK BUYING FROM THE COLONIES. By Charlotte Leubuscher. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1956, 206 p. $4.80.

A study of the way in which the bulk purchase of commodities by the United Kingdom Government has become a major issue in British colonial policy.

THE CIVIL SERVICE IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE. Edited by William A. Robson. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 191 p. $3.50. (London: Hogarth, 21/.)

A collection of essays, the majority of which deal with the development, structure and problems of the British Civil Service.

LES FINANCES PUBLIQUES BRITANNIQUES, 1939–1955. By Jean-Pierre Martin. Paris: Médicis, 1956, 228 p. Fr. 1500.

The fourth volume in a useful series which has included studies on Belgium and the Netherlands, Germany and France.

MEN AND POWER, 1917–1918. By Lord Beaverbrook. New York: Duell, 1957, 447 p. $6.50.

This first volume of memoirs is a scrappily organized book but valuable for its reproduction of numerous letters and accounts of the leading figures in the last years of the First World War.

WINSTON CHURCHILL ET L'ANGLETERRE DU XXe SIÈCLE. By Jacques Chastenet. Paris: Fayard, 1956, 583 p. Fr. 1000.

The author of books on Pitt, Wellington and Queen Victoria appraises Churchill as the "axial figure" of twentieth century Britain.

RICHARD AUSTEN BUTLER. By Francis Boyd. London: Rockliff, 1956, 124 p. 15/.

A concise and revealing portrait by a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*.

The Middle East

A HUNDRED HOURS TO SUEZ. By Robert Henriques. New York: Viking, 1957, 206 p. $3.00.

An interesting if somewhat hastily produced report on the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in the autumn of 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GUILTY MEN, 1957: SUEZ AND CYPRUS. By Michael Foot and Mervyn Jones. New York: Rinehart, 1957, 264 p. $1.95.

A denunciation, from the direction of the left wing of the Labor Party, of the Eden Government's record in the Middle East crisis of late 1956. For a political tract it shows a remarkable amount of careful work in assembling the evidence and of well-reasoned argument.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. By Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi. Baltimore: Penguin, 1957, 141 p. 50 cents.

Two established scholars give a reasonably objective account of the Suez crisis, survey the ruins of British policy and make some suggestions for the future.

LES SECRETS DE L'EXPÉDITION D'ÉGYPTE. By Merry and Serge Bromberger. Paris: Éditions des 4 Fils Aymon, 1957, 269 p. Fr. 795.

Two French journalists present a number of *"révélations"* concerning the 1956 attack on Egypt, especially with respect to Israeli-French planning and coöperation prior to the invasion. The book has caused considerable controversy in Europe.

THERE GOES THE MIDDLE EAST. By Alfred M. Lilienthal. New York: Devin-Adair, 1957, 300 p. $4.00.

Following the theme of his earlier writings, the author lays most of our troubles in the Middle East to Zionism and the failure of the United States to meet legitimate Arab aspirations because of blindness in its support of Israel and the effectiveness of Zionist propaganda. Many valid points suffer from overstatement.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1948. By Edgar O'Ballance. New York: Praeger, 1957, 220 p. $4.75.

A detailed, chiefly military, account.

EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE GULF OF AQABA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By L. M. Bloomfield. Toronto: Carswell, 1957, 240 p. $5.00.

A Canadian lawyer discusses the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway and suggests a U.N. trusteeship over the southern Sinai Peninsula as a solution to the conflicting claims of Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

ISLAM AND THE WEST. Edited by Richard N. Frye. The Hague: Mouton, 1957, 215 p. Guilders 15. (New York: Lounz, $5.00.)

These proceedings of a Harvard Summer School Conference follow the general theme: "Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey—an Islamic renaissance?"

LAND REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A STUDY OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ. By Doreen Warriner. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1957, 197 p. $2.90.

Miss Warriner, a leading authority on peasant farming, supplements her earlier study, "Land and Poverty in the Middle East" (1948), by reviewing the results of the agrarian reform measures which have been undertaken and by relating them to the problem of economic development.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE RECORD OF ISRAEL. By A. Granott. London: Eyre, 1956, 301 p. 21/.

A sequel to the author's "The Land System in Palestine" (1952), the present work summarizes land policy in the state of Israel, discusses agrarian reform in other areas and makes its own proposals for the future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BEDOUIN COMMAND. By Lt.-Col. Peter Young. London: Kimber, 1956, 203 p. 21/.

The personal account of a regimental commander in the Arab Legion from 1953 to 1956.

SYRIA AND LEBANON. By Nicola A. Ziadeh. New York: Praeger, 1957, 312 p. $6.50.

A general survey of the recent political, social and economic development of the two countries.

SULTAN IN OMAN. By James Morris. New York: Pantheon, 1957, 146 p. $3.50.

An able and spirited British journalist accompanies the Sultan of Oman on a tour of his domain. A light dish but surprisingly nourishing.

AFGHANISTAN. Edited by Donald N. Wilber. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956, 501 p. $8.75.

A handbook on the politics, sociology and economics of Afghanistan, one of a series of such monographs being produced under a Human Relations Area Files subcontract.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AFGHANISTAN. By Donald N. Wilber. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956, 220 p. $5.50.

A useful reference.

South and Southeast Asia

THE TRANSFER OF POWER IN INDIA. By V. P. Menon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 543 p. $8.50.

A detailed and authoritative account of the events leading up to the withdrawal of British power and the partition of India. The author was advisor to Lord Mountbatten and subsequently an official in the Indian Government.

THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT. Edited by A. B. Lal. Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House, 1956, 296 p. Rs. 15.

PARLIAMENT IN INDIA. By W. H. Morris-Jones. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press (in coöperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1957, 417 p. $8.50.

Of these two studies of India's Parliament, the first, edited by A. B. Lal, comprises a series of essays by a number of Indian scholars and M.P.s. Professor Morris-Jones' work is a solid analysis of the operation of parliamentary democracy in India—organization, procedure and prospects.

THE INDIAN CAPITAL MARKET. By V. R. Cirvante. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 226 p. $2.65.

A doctoral dissertation comprising both a theoretical and institutional analysis of the Indian capital market.

GANDHI IN FREE INDIA. By T. K. N. Unnithan. Groningen: Wolters, 1956, 266 p. (New York: Lounz, $4.00.)

A study of Gandhi's ideas on society and social change and their applicability to the major problems of India today.

CEYLON AND HER CITIZENS. By I. D. S. Weerawardana and Marguerite I. Weerawardana. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 272 p. $1.20.

A popular textbook on civic affairs in Ceylon.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE UNION OF BURMA. By Hugh Tinker. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1957, 424 p. $6.75.

This is a general survey of Burmese history, politics and society since the achievement of independence in 1948. While the years have witnessed numerous serious problems the author is optimistic about Burma's future—should her northern neighbor not try to move in.

WESTERN ENTERPRISE IN INDONESIA AND MALAYA. By G. C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithorne. New York: Macmillan (in coöperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1957, 321 p. $5.75.

The present study, which seeks to analyze the part played by Western enterprise in Asian economic development, is a companion volume to the authors' earlier work on Western enterprise in China and Japan, published in 1954.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

TERRIFIANTE ASIE. By Pierre and Renée Gosset. Paris: Julliard, 1956, 2 v. Fr. 1560.

A somewhat impressionistic and picturesque tour of Asia by two well-travelled French journalists. The second volume is devoted to Communist China.

IM NEUEN CHINA. By Lily Abegg. Zürich: Atlantis Verlag, 1957, 285 p. Swiss Fr. 15.80.

A political, social and economic study of the new China made on the spot by a Swiss journalist with intimate and expert knowledge of the old China. An appendix contains a useful list of high officials in all the government ministries.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA, 1912–1928. By Franklin W. Houn. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957, 246 p. $4.50.

A study of the various forms of governmental structure that were adopted in turn from the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution to the summer of 1928. It is the author's thesis that the failures of these earlier experiments contributed to a loss of faith in constitutional government.

THE KOREA KNOT. By Carl Berger. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, 206 p. $5.00.

A brief review of the background of the Korean War, its conduct and its implications. The material is generally familiar.

THE CAPTIVES OF KOREA. By William Lindsay White. New York: Scribner, 1957, 347 p. $4.95.

A comparison of the respective treatment of prisoners by the two sides in the Korean War.

NORTH BORNEO, BRUNEI, SARAWAK (BRITISH BORNEO). New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956, 287 p.

This study, in the form of a working draft, is available for consultation in research libraries.

Africa

MOROCCAN DRAMA, 1900–1955. By Rom Landau. San Francisco: American Academy of Asian Studies, 1956, 430 p. $6.00.

This survey of Morocco's vicissitudes in the twentieth century is strongly sympathetic to the nationalist cause but not very satisfactory as a piece of organized historical analysis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RÉALITÉS ET PROMESSES SAHARIENNES. By Daniel Strasser. Paris: Encyclopédie d'Outre-Mer, 1956, 236 p. Fr. 1500.

A useful survey of the industrial resources and potentialities of the Sahara.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF EAST AFRICA. By Zoë Marsh and G. W. Kingsnorth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 262 p. $3.00.

A good brief history of Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Kenya.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Leo Kuper. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, 256 p. $3.50.

A sociological study of the background and course of the 1952 passive resistance campaign among the Africans and Indians of the Union of South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA IN TRANSITION. By Alan Paton. New York: Scribner, 1956, 91 p. $5.00.

The exceptionally effective photographs by Dan Weiner are accompanied by a concise explanatory text by the novelist Alan Paton.

Latin America and the West Indies

COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA. By Robert J. Alexander. New Brunswick (N.J.): Rutgers University Press, 1957, 449 p. $9.00.

The author of "The Peron Era" discusses the background, nature and prospects of the Communist movements in Latin America. In his conclusion he offers some policy prescriptions based in part upon his judgment that the most effective opponents of Communism "are those elements of the Democratic Left which are trying in a democratic way to bring about the social revolution which is so necessary to the future of Latin America."

LE NOUVEAU PANAMÉRICANISME. By René-Jean Dupuy. Paris: Pedone, 1956, 256 p. Fr. 1800.

On the development of inter-American relations in the last 20 years and the trend toward a more institutionalized form of federalism.

TREINTA AÑOS DE APRISMO. By Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956, 247 p. Pesos 22.

Essays on the Aprista movement and its significance for domestic and international issues.

ARGENTINIEN. By Werner Hopp. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1955, 247 p. DM. 12.50.

A general regional survey and guide.

INDUSTRIAL TAX-EXEMPTION IN PUERTO RICO. By Milton C. Taylor. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957, 172 p. $3.50.

A case study on the way in which tax subsidies may be used for industrializing underdeveloped areas.

THE CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS. Edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956, 324 p. $4.50.

This sixth volume in the Caribbean Conference Series of the University of Florida comprises some 20 essays on a variety of political, constitutional and administrative topics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D. C. *European Coal and Steel Community:* 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Africa south of the Sahara; a selected, annotated list of writings, 1951–1956, comp. by H. F. Conover. Washington, Library of Congress, 1957. 269 p. $2.00

Invest, trade, prosper with Liberia. Monrovia, Dept. of State, 1957. 40 p.

Yearbook, 1956. Kitwe, Northern Rhodesia, Chamber of Mines, 1957. 126 p.

Armaments

Guided missiles in foreign countries. Prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., by Eilene Galloway, April 1957. Washington, 1957. 73 p. (Com. print.)

Atomic Energy

Amending the atomic energy act of 1954. Report, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany S. 1549, Mar. 27, 1957. Washington, 1957. 4 p. (S. Rept. 191.)

——. Report, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 5866, Mar. 26, 1957. Washington, 1957. 4 p. (H. Rept. 228.)

——. Act, approved April 12, 1957. Washington, 1957. 1 p. (Public 85-14.—H. R. 5866.)

Atomic energy legislation through 84th Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 1956. Washington, 1957. 166 p. (Jt. Com. print.)

The International Atomic Energy Agency. Washington, 1957. 11 p. (Dept. of State. International Organization and Conference Series I, 33.) 15¢.

Report on the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by Congressional Advisers. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 1957. Washington, 1957. 28 p. (Jt. Com. print.)

A Target for Euratom; report submitted by Mr. Louis Armand, Mr. Franz Etzel and Mr. Francesco Giordani at the request of the Governments of Belgium, France, German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. [Luxembourg, European Coal and Steel Community, 1957.] 104 p.

West Berlin reactor. Hearing, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 6, 1957. Washington, 1957. 17 p.

Disarmament

Control and reduction of armaments. Staff studies, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, 1957. (Com. prints.)

7. Disarmament and security in Latin America. 29 p. *8.* Attitudes of Soviet leaders toward disarmament; replies from experts on the Soviet Union to Subcommittee questionnaire. 106 p.

Eastern Europe

Report, Special Study Mission to Europe on Policy toward the Satellite Nations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Je. 4, 1957. Washington, 1957. 25 p. (H. Rept. 531.)

The Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia–August 1956. Report of Senator Russell B. Long on a study mission, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 29, 1956. Washington, 1957. 38 p. (Com. print.)

Economic Conditions

World economic growth and competition. Hearings, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, Joint Economic Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 10–13, 1956. Washington, 1957. 175 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European Integration

Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom. [Documents.] Washington [European Coal and Steel Community], 1957.

Final act. 5 p. Convention relating to certain institutions common to the European communities. 4 p. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 57 p. Annexes. 39 p. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and annexes. 56 p.

Un Témoignage sur la Communauté des Six, by Pierre Wigny. Luxembourg, European Coal and Steel Community, 1957. 121 p.

Financial Policy and Exchange

Amendment of Anglo-American financial agreement. Hearing, Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. J. Res. 72, Mar. 15, 1957. Washington, 1957. 28 p.

——. Report, Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany S. J. Res. 72, Mar. 18, 1957. Washington, 1957. 6 p. (S. Rept. 166.)

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. J. Res. 72, Apr. 2, 1957. Washington, 1957. 13 p. (H. Rept. 293.)

——. Act, approved April 20, 1957. Washington, 1957. 1 p. (Public 85-21.–S. J. Res. 72.)

Extension of Export-Import Bank act of 1945. Hearing, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 4136, Mar. 19, 1957. Washington, 1957. 40 p.

——. Report, Mar. 25, 1957. Washington, 1957. 4 p. (H. Rept. 221.)

——. Report, Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 4136, May 16, 1957. Washington, 1957. 5 p. (S. Rept. 331.)

——. Act, approved Je. 17, 1957. Washington, 1957. 1 p. (Public 85-55.–H. R. 4136.)

International Law

Study [by Inter-American Juridical Committee] to serve as the basis for the preparation of a second draft text of rules on reservations to multilateral treaties. Washington, Pan American Union, 1957. 58 p.

International Tensions

The Nature of conflict; studies on the sociological aspects of international tensions, by the International Sociological Association. Paris, UNESCO, 1957. 314 p. (Tensions and Technology Series.) $4.00.

Latin America

Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives. Report to the Chiefs of State of the American Republics. Washington, Author, 1957. 65 p.

Inter Latin American trade; current problems. Report of the first session of the Trade Committee of the Economic Commission for Latin America and main background documents. N. Y., 1957. 105 p. (1957. II. G. 5.) $1.25.

Guatemala; a case history of communist penetration. Washington, 1957. 72 p. (Dept. of State. Inter-American Series 52.) 30¢.

Near East

Events in the Middle East; a select chronology, 1946–57. Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 11, 1957. Washington, 1957. 25 p. (Com. print.)

The Middle East and Southern Europe. Report of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey on a study mission, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Jl. 1, 1957. Washington, 1957. 32 p.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

North Atlantic Treaty Organization; its development and significance. Washington, 1957. 61 p. (Dept. of State. General Foreign Policy Series 116.) 30¢.

NATO status of forces agreement criminal jurisdiction provisions. Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 28, 1957. Washington, 1957. 7 p. (Com. print.)

Operation of Article VII, NATO status of forces treaty. Hearing, Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 9, 1957. Washington, 1957.

Expressing the sense of the Congress that efforts should be made to invite Spain to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. Con. Res. 115, Mar. 19, 1957. Washington, 1957. 4 p. (H. Rept. 206.)

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. Con. Res. 115, Apr. 8, 1957. Washington, 1957. 2 p. (S. Rept. 212.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Raw Materials

Petroleum survey: 1957 outlook, Oil lift to Europe, Price increases. Hearings, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 7–Mar. 22, 1957. Washington, 1957. 505 p.

——. Preliminary report, Apr. 9, 1957. Washington, 1957. 48 p. (H. Rept. 314.)

Relief and Rehabilitation

Mutual security act of 1957. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., May 22–Je. 28, 1957. Washington, 1957. 6 pts.

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 2130, Je. 7, 1957. Washington, 1957. 2 pts. (S. Rept. 417.)

The Foreign aid program. Hearings, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 20–Apr. 15, 1957. Washington, 1957. 745 p.

——. Report, May 13, 1957. Washington, 1957. 38 p. (S. Rept. 300.)

Foreign aid activities of other free nations. A study prepared at the request of the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, by Stuart Rice Associates, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., May 1957. Washington, 1957. 93 p. (Study no. 11.)

Views of private American citizens abroad on the foreign aid program. A summary prepared for the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 1957. Washington, 1957. 20 p. (Com. print.)

Review of the budget formulation and presentation practices of the International Cooperation Administration. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 4–10, 1957. Washington, 1957. 189 p.

——. Report, May 15, 1957. Washington, 1957. 19 p. (H. Rept. 449.)

Overseas operations of the United States government. Report by Hon. Allen J. Ellender, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 4, 1957. Washington, 1957. 525 p. (S. doc. 31.)

Extension of Public Law 480 (Agricultural trade development and assistance act of 1954). Hearing, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 85th Cong., on S. 671, S. 1127 and S. 1314, March 20, 1957. Washington, 1957. 50 p.

——. Report, Mar. 26, 1957. Washington, 1957. 14 p. (S. Rept. 188.)

——. Hearing, Committee on Agriculture, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 1905 [and others] Mar. 29, 1957. Washington, 1957. 78 p.

——. Report, Committee on Agriculture, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 6974, May 9, 1957. Washington, 1957. 18 p. (H. Rept. 432.)

Sweden

Economics in modern Sweden, by K. G. Landgren. Washington, Library of Congress, 1957. 117 p. $1.00.

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance. Final report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 12, 1957. Washington, 1957. 668 p. (S. Rept. 139.)

A New emphasis on economic development abroad; a report to the President of the United States on ways, means and reasons for U.S. assistance to international economic development. Washington, International Development Advisory Board, 1957. 18 p.

Manual on economic development projects. N.Y., 1957. 325 p. (E/CN. 12/426.)

Technical cooperation through American universities. Washington, International Cooperation Administration, 1957. 40 p.

United States

Department of Defense appropriations for 1958. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 30–Apr. 18, 1957. Washington, 1957. 6 pts.

——. Report, May 21, 1957. Washington, 1957. 115 p. (H. Rept. 471.)

——. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 7665, May 23–Je. 21, 1957. Washington, 1957. 1581 p.

United States defense policies since World War II. House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 14, 1957. Washington, 1957. 87 p. (H. doc. 100.)

Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and related agencies appropriations for 1958. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 29–Mar. 12, 1957. Washington, 1957. 2 pts.

——. Report, Committee on Appropriations, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 6871, April 12, 1957. Washington, 1957. 31 p. (H. Rept. 351.)

——. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 6871, Apr. 30–May 10, 1957. Washington, 1957. 1249 p.

——. Report, May 14, 1957. Washington, 1957. 15 p. (S. Rept. 303.)

——. Conference report, May 28, 1957. Washington, 1957. 7 p. (H. Rept. 492.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

——. Act, approved Je. 11, 1957. Washington, 1957. 15 p. (Public 85-49.—H. R. 6871.)

LEGISLATION on foreign relations; with explanatory notes. Washington, 1957. 281 p. (Com. print.)

BUILDING a world of free peoples. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 5–May 4, 1957. Washington, 1957. 4 pts.

EFFECTS of foreign aid on the United States economy. Washington, International Cooperation Administration, 1957. 13 p.

DENIAL of passports by Department of States to correspondents wishing to visit Communist China. Hearing, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 28, 1957. Washington, 1957. 37 p.

RETURN of American prisoners of war who have not been accounted for by the Communists. Hearing, Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. Con. Res. 140, May 27, 1957. Washington, 1957. 63 p.

II. PAMPHLETS

ADMINISTRATION AND FOREIGN POLICY, by A. W. Macmahon. Urbana, Univ. of Illinois, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 1957. 24 p. (Edmund J. James Lecture on Government. Univ. of Illinois Bulletin, Vol. 54, no. 44.)

AMERICA IN THE WORLD TODAY, by Walter Lippmann. Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota, 1957. 16 p. (Gideon Seymour Memorial Lecture Series.)

AMERICAN GOODS IN CANADIAN MARKETS, by F. L. Rogers. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1957. 37 p. (Contemporary Affairs Series 26.)

AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERESTED IN ASIA; a reference directory, by Ward Morehouse. N.Y., Conference on Asian Affairs, 1957. 510 p. $9.50 (cloth). $7.50 (paper).

THE AMERICAN ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS ON PEOPLE'S CAPITALISM at Yale University, November 16–17, 1957; digest report by David M. Potter. N.Y., Advertising Council, 1957. 60 p. 25¢.

BONN. INSTITUT FINANZEN UND STEUERN. Finanz und Steuerreform. Bonn, Author, 1957.
19. Am Ende der 2. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestags. 6 p. *20.* Eine Warnung des Bundesfinanzministers. 4 p.

BONN. INSTITUT FINANZEN UND STEUERN. Schriftenreihe. Bonn, Author, 1957.
15. Pt. 6. Der Bundeshaushalt. 123 p. *46.* Steuern und konstruktive Wirtschaftspolitik, by Reinhard Kamitz. 22 p. *47.* Funktionen und Auswirkungen der verschiedenen Abschreibungsmethoden im Blickpunkt der praktischen Betriebswirtschaft, by J. E. Duisburg. 74 p. *48.* Die Saarländische Unsatzbesteuerung nach dem Mehrwert in wirtschaftspolitischer Sicht, by Heinz Mesenberg. 36 p. *49.* Landerhaushalte, 1952–1954. 64 p.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE STUDIES, ed. by J. E. Lane. N.Y., Author, 1957.
3. Researches in the social sciences on China. 89 p. *4.* Researches in the social sciences on Japan. 84 p.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY MASTERS' ESSAYS AND DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS ON ASIA, 1875–1956, comp. by East Asiatic Library. N.Y., Columbia University Libraries, 1957. 96 p.

DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG. Sonderhefte, Neue Folge, Reihe A. Berlin, Duncker, 1957.
39. Das Erzproblem der Deutschen Eisenindustrie, by Ferdinand Freidensburg. 100 p.

DIRECTORY OF AMERICAN VOLUNTARY AND NON-PROFIT AGENCIES INTERESTED IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. N.Y., American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, 1956. n. p.

EASTERN ECONOMIST PAMPHLETS. New Delhi, Eastern Economist, 1957.
41. Indian agriculture, 1950–75, by V. Ramamurti. 44 p. R. 1. *42.* A report on productivity, by M. C. Munshi. 62 p. Rs. 1/8.

EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA; a survey for industrialists. London, Federation of British Industries, 1957. 86 p. 6s.

EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION. Publications. Brussels, Author, 1957.
23. European integration and social security. 57 p. *24.* La formation du Zollverein (1815–1867); une leçon pour l'Europe contemporaine. 24 p.

FRIENDS OF ATLANTIC UNION. [Publications.] London, Author, 1957.
NATO is not enough; two approaches to an Atlantic Assembly, by Donald McLachlan and Geoffrey de Freitas. 27 p. 1s. 6d. Paying for NATO; how common finance can help the defence of the West, by A. M. Warburton and J. B. Wood. 43 p. 2s. 6d.

HEADLINE SERIES N.Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1957. 35¢.
122. New era in eastern Europe, by Jack Raymond. 62 p. *123.* Middle East in turmoil, by H. W. Baldwin. 62 p.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY. N.Y., United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, 1957. 36 p. 30¢.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND THE RULE OF LAW. The Hague, International Commission of Jurists, 1957. 144 p.

INCREASING THE WEALTH OF NATIONS; the quest for economic development, by Albert Lauterbach. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1957. 40 p. $1.00.

INDONESIA IN 1956; political and economic aspects, by B. H. M. Vlekke. N.Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957. 92 p.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE. Reports. N.Y., 1957.
32. Suez Canal developments, 1957; Egyptian conditions for use—international reaction. 30 p. *33.* The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF); precedents, creation, evolution. 55 p.

THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE DOLLAR, by F. H. Klopstock. Princeton, Princeton Univ., International Finance Section, 1957. 26 p. (Essays in International Finance 28.)

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC FUTURE IN ASIA, by Donald Stout. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1956. 110 p.

JAPANESE SOCIETY AND POLITICS: the impact of social stratification and mobility on politics, by A. B. Cole. Boston, Boston Univ., 1956. 158 p. (Boston University Studies in Political Science 1.)

KIELER STUDIEN. Kiel, Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, 1957.
41. Die Steuern im Vereinigten Königreich; unter Berucksichtigung der Entwicklung seit dem ersten Weltkrieg, by Herbert Weise. 2 pts. DM. 40.

KIELER VORTÄGE. Kiel, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, 1957.
10. Gedanken zur Kreditpolitik, by Karl Bernard. 16 p. *11.* Probleme der Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in der Zeit von 1950–1955, by Helmut Koziolek. 22 p.

MAN'S NEW HOPE; a religious approach to foreign aid, by J. W. Nixon. N.Y., Church Peace Union, 1957. 112 p. 50¢.

MEMORANDUM. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Center of International Studies, 1957.
12. Trade policy and American leadership, by Miriam Camps. 36 p.

NATO; shield of freedom. N.Y., American Council on NATO, 1957. n. p.

NEEDED: a new foreign aid policy, by H. C. Petersen. N.Y., Committee for Economic Development, 1957. 28 p.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS. N.Y., National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957.
54. Bank stock prices and the bank capital problem, by David Durland. 68 p. $1.00.

ORGANIZING WORLD TRADE; a challenge for American lawyers, by R. N. Gardner. N.Y., Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1957. p. 202–226.

L'ORIENT, FOYER DE GUERRE; conférence prononcée par Jacques Soustelle . . . 23 Novembre 1956. Paris, Conférences des Ambassadeurs, 1956. 26 p. Fr. 80.

DAS OST-EMBARGO, by H. J. Lambers. Frankfurt am Main, Metzner, 1956. 43 p. (Dokumente, Heft 21.) DM. 6.80.

PEOPLE WORKING TOGETHER; a report on the Fourth National Conference on International Economic and Social Development. Washington, National Conference on International Economic and Social Development, 1957. 64 p. 25¢.

PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, by J. P. Warburg, N.Y., Current Affairs Press, 1957. 8 p. 25¢.

LA REFORMA AGRARIA, by L. E. Heysen. Mexico, La Organizacion Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores, 1957. 55 p.

REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONFERENCE, June 16–17, 1956. London, David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1956. 76 p. 4s.

REVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER; a symposium. New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs, 1956. 144 p.

SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT. N.Y., American Zionist Council, 1957. 21 p.

STANVAC in Indonesia. Washington, National Planning Assoc., 1957. 118 p. (United States Business Performance Abroad 6.) $1.00.

A SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NINE CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES; February 1956–February 1957. N.Y., Assembly of Captive European Nations, 1957. 106 p.

SYDAMERIKA, by Erik Bach. Copenhagen, Det Udenrigspolitiske Selskab, 1957. 83 p. (Udenrigspolitiske Skrifter, Serie II, 4.) Kr. 2.50.

RAND CORPORATION. Research Memoranda. Santa Monica, Calif., Author, 1956–57.
1842. Implications of nuclear weapons in total war, by Bernard Brodie. 33 p. *1845.* Leaders of Communist China, by H. C. Hinton. 299 p. *1874.* The politics of Soviet de-Stalinization, by R. C. Tucker. 54 p. *1881.* The psychological factor in Soviet foreign policy, by R. C. Tucker. 33 p. *1896.* The Soviet Union and the atom: the "secret" phase, by Arnold Kramish. 82 p.

WHAT DO AMERICAN STUDENTS THINK OF INDIA; based on a survey of twelve American colleges, by P. M. Balasundaram. N.Y., Author, 1957. 28 p. $2.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OXFORD books of exceptional interest

Survey of International Affairs, 1954

By CORAL BELL. Edited by FREDERICK C. BENHAM. This volume places considerable emphasis on the Far Eastern crisis which precipitated Mr. Dulles' remarks on "brinkmanship." It deals with the Berlin and Geneva Conferences, the South East Asia Defence Treaty, the Suez Canal Problem, Persian oil, the Turco-Pakistani Treaty, and discusses the failure of E.D.C., agreements on Western European Union, and Western Germany's entry into NATO. $7.20

Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth

Volume I, Third Edition

By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. This first volume of two deals with the constitutional laws of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ceylon, and the Republic of Ireland. Changes have been made throughout this edition. Volume II will deal with India and Pakistan. $8.00

Islamic Society and the West

Volume I: Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century, Part II

By SIR HAMILTON GIBB and HAROLD BOWEN. This volume concludes the introductory survey of the institutions of Islamic society in the Ottoman Empire before Western influences became apparent. The authors cover a variety of topics from taxation and finance, to the status of the communities of Jews and Christians. $5.60

Land Reform and Development in the Middle East

By DOREEN WARRINER. An examination of the major changes brought about by agrarian reform in Egypt, mechanized farming in Syria, and flood control and irrigation in Iraq. In addition to discussing the social, economic, and political effects of these improvements, the author argues that only all three in conjunction can effectively raise living standards. $2.90

At your bookseller

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Inc.

114 Fifth Avenue, New York 11

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMAN REARMAMENT AND ATOMIC WAR

The Views of German Military and Political Leaders

by Hans Speier, The RAND Corporation

". . . a remarkable book. . . . I have read everything I could lay hands on concerning German attitudes toward rearmament, atomic war, and American and Russian foreign policy. I would trade all the literature on the subject for this one book. . . . The views [Dr. Speier] presents are intensely illuminating. Germany faces total destruction if atomic warfare breaks out . . . the Germans have been doing some very hard thinking on the diplomatic moves of America and Russia."— Dr. Alvin Johnson, President Emeritus, New School for Social Research.

xiv + 272 pp. *$5.00*

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY — Myth or Reality?

by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Vassar College

A penetrating analysis of the implications of bipartisanship for American foreign relations. Professor Crabb, with perceptive insight, demonstrates that bipartisanship has neither met the expectations of its most dedicated adherents nor justified the condemnations of its severest critics. Five major episodes are examined: the construction of the United Nations, the European recovery program, the North Atlantic Pact, postwar relations with China, and crises in the Middle East. A clearly thought out book upon a widely misunderstood subject.

279 pp. *$4.50*

WEST GERMAN LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY

by Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, The RAND Corporation

Six political scientists, basing their observations largely on first-hand interviews, examine the political attitudes of German leaders. Their purposes are to assess the viability of the West German Republic, both as a democratic regime and as a partner of the West, and to anticipate foreign policy developments in West Germany. Contents: *The Development of German Foreign Policy Institutions,* by Samuel L. Wahrhaftig; *Party Leaders and Foreign Policy,* by Henry J. Kellermann; *Political Views of the West German Civil Service,* by John H. Herz; *West German Trade Unions: Their Domestic and Foreign Policies,* by Otto Kirchheimer; *The Politics of German Business,* by Gabriel A. Almond; and *Mass Media in West German Political Life* and *Trends in West German Public Opinion,* by W. Phillips Davison.

x + 323 pp. *$7.00*

Order from your bookstore, or from

ROW, PETERSON AND COMPANY

Evanston, Illinois

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton UNIVERSITY PRESS

Churchill - Roosevelt - Stalin

The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought

By Herbert Feis

In one masterfully written volume, Herbert Feis tells the story of the historic coalition formed by the United States, Britain, and Russia in their race to defeat the Axis in World War II. "A brilliant account. No better history of the great coalition is likely to be written until the Russian records become available . . . Mr. Feis had access to most of the original records in the main current of this passionate period. He has carefully and lucidly told the tale."—*N.Y. Times Book Review.* "Displays mastery of detail and incisiveness of analysis."—*N.Y. Herald Tribune Book Review.* *704 pages. $6.95*

The Transfer of Power in India

By V. P. Menon

The full, definitive account of the events leading up to the partition of India and the transfer of power from England. "For anyone who wants to know what makes Nehru's India run, why the enmity between India and Pakistan, why India often takes what seems to us a peculiar slant on things, this book is indispensable. It treats of complexities that can be covered otherwise only by reading through a small library."—*N.Y. Times Book Review.*
544 pages. $8.50

Party Politics in India

The Development of a Multi-Party System

By Myron Weiner

Why has a multi-party system developed in India? What effect is this multiplicity of parties likely to have on India's chances for building a stable democratic political framework within which economic development can take place? What are the prospects for the emergence of a strong democratic opposition? In this first major study of India's developing party system, the author employs a series of party case studies to explore these questions and assess India's chances at building a stable political life. *Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.* *334 pages. $5*

Order from your bookstore, or

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, Princeton, New Jersey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER INC.

15 WEST 47th STREET • NEW YORK 36



BOOKS THAT MAKE HISTORY

MILOVAN DJILAS

THE NEW CLASS

An Analysis of the Communist System

The most widely discussed book of recent times! A political bombshell that every major newspaper in the West has hailed as a major force in the fight against Communism. Featured in LIFE and *Reader's Digest*; Book-of-the-Month Club alternate for November. $3.95

IMRE NAGY

ON COMMUNISM

In Defense of the "New Course"

Another revealing glimpse of Communism in action as seen right at the top. A justification by Nagy of his ill-fated liberalization program, it describes top-level policy making and also demonstrates that there is no room for freedom in Communism. $5.50

BOOKS THAT RECORD HISTORY

MELVIN J. LASKY, Ed.

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

A WHITE BOOK

This is *the* book on the October uprising; a thorough documentation, the most complete and authentic history to date, that the *New York Times* said is better than the U.N. report. Sept. selection Reader's Subscription. $5.00

KONRAD SYROP

SPRING IN OCTOBER

The Polish Revolution of 1956

A detailed account of the dramatic events in Poland that marked the first victorious rebellion against the dictates of Moscow since Tito's break with Stalin; told by one of the West's outstanding experts on Poland, a senior analyst for the B.B.C. $4.50

BOOKS THAT INTERPRET HISTORY

D. van der MEULEN

THE WELLS OF IBN SAUD

A graphic account of the rise of the Saudi family and the emergence of Saudi Arabia from ancient Moslem ways into the modern materialism of the Western world. The author, a former Netherlands Minister to Arabia and friend of Ibn Saud, provides excellent political insights and personal glimpses. $5.50

SIR JOHN SLESSOR

THE GREAT DETERRENT

A collection of lectures, articles and broadcasts on the development of strategic policy in the nuclear age by one of the world's foremost authorities, a far-seeing observor. Sir John is Marshal of the R.A.F. and Chief of the Air Staff. Introduction by Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, USA (Ret.) $6.00

BOOKS THAT MATTER

SALVADOR de MADARIAGA

SPAIN

A Modern History

The leading Spanish intellectual and man of letters presents here a magnificent biography-in-depth of his native land. Based on the British edition of 1952 but containing extensive revisions and four new chapters covering events to 1957; first U.S. edition. $7.50

ANDREW BOYD

AN ATLAS OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Maps by W. H. Bromage

72 newly-drawn maps focus on the most important territorial disputes, alliances, political trends and economic factors in our modern world. A brief text accompanies each, as explanation and summary. $3.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION?

The U.N. and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change

By LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD. What are the possibilities of peaceful change—in liberating captive nations and in granting freedom to colonial possessions? Speaking from first-hand experience and from much previously unpublished official source material, Lincoln Bloomfield takes a fresh and much needed look at this problem from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy. $4.50

INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM

A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security

By GEORGE LISKA. A richly detailed analysis of both real and projected attempts at international integration—from the 19th-century Concert of Nations to the U.N. The author discusses the search for new forms of international relations in the U.N. and the League of Nations and considers the ways and means of breaking through the dilemma of regionalism versus universalism. $5.00

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

New Enlarged and Revised Edition

By EDWIN O. REISCHAUER. "If an American of today can read only one book on Japan, this is the one it should be."—*The Saturday Review.* Completely revised and brought up-to-date, this famous book presents, in the light of today's policies and problems, Japan's past and present, her society and psychology, and her vitally important relations with the western world. $5.50

ARGENTINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1880-1914)

By THOMAS F. McGANN. Utilizing much new material, this colorful analysis gives a comprehensive view of Argentina during the years which saw her rise as a major Western influence. Her society, culture, politics, economics are all discussed, as well as the origins of the United States-Argentina rivalry and antagonism. $6.50

Through your bookseller, or from

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

79 Garden Street, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Excellent. Many sided. Good perspective and good writing."—LOUIS FISCHER

Charles W. Thayer

Author of BEARS IN THE CAVIAR

THE UNQUIET GERMANS

From inside Germany—a frank, humane, worldly and authoritative report by a former American diplomat who has been involved with the Germans most of his life. In addition to a penetrating examination of German youth, Mr. Thayer reveals many vital aspects of this vigorous nation. He considers its political leaders (many of whom he knows intimately), the major parties, the Nazi left-overs; discusses the effects of the Allied Occupation, the chances of re-unification, the Soviet accomplishments in East Germany, and offers some informed speculation as to what we can expect of the Germans in the future. $4.00

A unique contribution to American political history

Adlai E. Stevenson

THE NEW AMERICA

Edited by Seymour E. Harris, John Bartlow Martin and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

With an introduction by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Seymour E. Harris

"Here is the program and the political beliefs of the loser in the 1956 Presidential campaign. But the loser's ideas are not lost. THE NEW AMERICA, which is the name Adlai Stevenson gives to his program, raises questions and makes proposals for the great issues which face the American people and the world today. These questions and the issues they deal with must and will be answered by the American people. This book will be widely read and will be well thumbed by men who will come back to it often as the debate goes on and, one by one, solutions are reached for the great problems with which Adlai Stevenson deals in this book. Americans had better read it."—THOMAS K. FINLETTER.

$4.50

At all bookstores

HARPER & BROTHERS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What is its impact today?

LENINISM

By ALFRED G. MEYER

The theories and practices of Lenin—as often unrealistic and contradictory as they were brilliant—still play an essential part in the thinking and acting of every communist leader today. Here, enhanced by frequent quotations, is an objective study of the aims of Lenin and the influence of his thought—the party and the revolution as he saw them, the "Leninist state" in theory and practice, and, most significant and challenging of all, his concept of 20th-century society and the prospects for socialism inherent in it. A vitally important book that offers a better understanding of the words and actions of Russia's leaders today. $5.50

The Soviet business world—an inside view

FACTORY AND MANAGER IN THE USSR

By JOSEPH S. BERLINER

Based on personal interviews with former managerial officials and on Soviet publications, this book gives a fascinating view of the actual Soviet business world and of the many risks involved in successful management. From 1938 to the most recent post-Stalin reforms, here are the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian industrial system, the many obstacles facing the factory manager, and the ways in which he is forced to meet them. An indispensable aid in understanding the nature of the Soviet economy, as well as any reorganization which may occur. $7.50

Books from the Russian Research Center
Harvard University

Many other aspects of Soviet affairs are fully treated in authoritative books from the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Write for a list of Russian Research Center Studies now available. Dept. R-13.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
79 Garden St., Cambridge 38, Mass.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EYE-WITNESS REPORTS ON TWO AREAS OF VITAL INTEREST TO EVERY AMERICAN

HEROES BEHIND BARBED WIRE By Kenneth K. Hansen, *Colonel, USA, former Chief of Psychological Warfare, Far East Command*

An authentic story of the 88,000 Chinese and North Korean prisoners who chose to remain on freedom's side of the Bamboo Curtain—a little-known but immensely significant aspect of the final outcome in Korea. Colonel Hansen describes how these prisoners, disillusioned with communism, refused repatriation to their homelands in spite of continuous threats from spies and communist agents. The heartening, often amusing story of these "anti-communist heroes" reveals clearly the disastrous loss of face suffered by communism in Asia at a crucial period in modern history.

353 pages, illustrated, $5.95

THE UNITED STATES IN GERMANY 1944-1955 By Harold Zink, *Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University*

Written by the first Chief Historian of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and including much material from unpublished notes and on-the-spot memoranda, this book is a carefully balanced survey of the overall American experience in Germany from 1944 to 1955. Professor Zink has constructed a vivid picture of the American military government and of the Allied Civil Administration in Germany—their organization, leaders and policies, enumerating some of the most complex problems the United States has faced in its entire history. This story of America's growth from a fledgling in international affairs to a world leader is both informative and interesting reading to every American who recognizes our responsibilities to the rest of the free world.

384 pages, $7.50

D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 120 ALEXANDER STREET, PRINCETON, N.J.

Problems of Communist China

The Foreign Trade of Communist China.
Monetary Affairs in Communist China.
Revenue and Disbursement of Communist China.
The Communist Program for Literature and Art in China.
Students in Mainland China.
Communist China, 1956.
People's Resistance in Mainland China.
Index to material on Communist China held by the Union Research Institute.

At present 19 monographs on Problems of Communist China are available. For any further information in respect of our publications, please write to

UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE

P.O. Box 5381, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Lifting the Bamboo Curtain

MAO'S CHINA

Economic & Political Survey

by YGAEL GLUCKSTEIN

From official Chinese Communist publications emerges this definitive close-up of the Mao regime and its efforts to modernize and mold China into an industrial and military giant at any cost.

At your bookstore or write to:
BEACON PRESS
FA-10 BEACON HILL, BOSTON, MASS.

Send me:
☐ MAO'S CHINA $8.50
☐ Your new catalog

Name_____
Street_____
City_____ State_____
☐ Check ☐ Money Order enclosed
Sorry, no C.O.D.'S 6

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"If an American of today can read only one book on Japan, this is the one it should be"

—THE SATURDAY REVIEW

The United States and JAPAN

By

EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

THIS invaluable study of Japan and her relation to the West has now been totally revised and brought up to date. A stimulating, fascinating book for all who would understand Japan's past and present, her society and psychology, and her vitally important place in the world today. $5.50

Through your bookseller or from

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS



Regular Direct Services to

CUBA

JAMAICA

COLOMBIA

EAST AND WEST COASTS OF

CENTRAL AMERICA

★

57 years of dependable freight service

United Fruit Company

Pier 3, North River, New York. 131 State St., Boston.
Isthmian S.S. Co., Mercantile Trust Bldg., Baltimore.
321 St. Charles St., New Orleans.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now ready! Two new volumes of

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

In order to reduce the lag between publication of the volumes and the years they cover, two volumes in this series were prepared this year and are now available.

Volume for 1955

By HOLLIS W. BARBER

This was the year of the famous Geneva meeting "at the summit," the later conference of Big Four Foreign Ministers, and the inauguration of Moscow's campaign to win over the uncommitted and "neutralist" states of the Middle East and Africa. The author presents a detailed analysis and appraisal of these and other developments, with particular attention to their impact on America's world position. He thus provides essential background for the understanding of today's international issues.

Volume for 1956

By RICHARD P. STEBBINS

The year 1956 inaugurated an exceptionally dangerous period of world history and confronted the American people with novel problems involving every aspect of international affairs. Revolutionary outbreaks in Eastern Europe and armed conflict in the Middle East inflicted heavy damage on both the Western and Soviet alliance systems and brought important changes in the world balance of power. Here is the story of America's role in these crucial events—the living tissue of American foreign relations in another of history's decisive years.

At bookstores *$6.00 each volume*

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS FOR THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
58 EAST 68 STREET, NEW YORK 21

OUT-OF-PRINT AND HARD-TO-FIND BOOKS

supplied. All subjects, all languages. Also Genealogies and Family and Town Histories. Incomplete sets completed. All magazine back numbers supplied. Send us your list of wants. No obligation. We report quickly at lowest prices.

We also supply all current books at retail store prices—*postpaid*, as well as all books reviewed, advertised or listed in this issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

AMERICAN LIBRARY SERVICE
117 West 48th Street, Dept. F,
New York 36, N. Y.

N.B. WE also purchase libraries and collections of books as well as single volumes. Also long runs of magazines. Please send lists of books you wish to dispose.

Looking from all sides . . .

BACKDROP TO TRAGEDY

The Struggle for Palestine

by WILLIAM R. POLK, DAVID STAMLER & EDMUND ASFOUR

Three men . . . each well-qualified in his field, examine the emotional, psychological and economic factors behind the explosive Middle East situation. They are an American specialist, an English Jew, and a Palestinian Arab.

At your bookstore or write to:
BEACON PRESS
FA-10 BEACON HILL, BOSTON, MASS.

Send me:
☐ BACKDROP TO TRAGEDY $4.95
☐ Your new catalog

Name_____
Street_____
City_____ State_____
☐ Check ☐ Money Order enclosed
Sorry, no C.O.D.'S 21

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stimulating New Books from Beacon!

Interested in History and Social Science?

THE GERMAN IDEA of FREEDOM

by **LEONARD KRIEGER**

A brilliant and cogent analysis of an explosive combination of an individualized society and authoritarian politics.

the ILLUSION of the EPOCH

Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed by **H. B. ACTON**

Lively, lucid and exciting enough to hold the non-specialist, this systematic study of the philosophical views of Marx, Lenin and Stalin is a thorough, authoritative, incisive and original piece of scholarship.

At your bookstore or write to:

FA10 **BEACON PRESS**
BEACON HILL, BOSTON, MASS.

Send me:

☐ THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM $7.50

☐ THE ILLUSION OF THE EPOCH $6.00

☐ Your New catalog

Name_____

Street_____

City_____ State_____

☐ Check ☐ Money Order enclosed

Sorry, no C.O.D.'S $

Announcing Publication of the

BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE USSR

by the

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

A unique biographical work compiled by the research staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, Germany. Invaluable for researchers, students, journalists, radio and television commentators. Especially valuable for data on lesser-known Soviet figures who often come unexpectedly to the top through frequent changes and shifts. Includes over two thousand biographies of the Soviet elite.

The gathering of data was made possible by the use of a research staff of former Soviet scholars who had at their disposal a library of 25,000 volumes of Soviet books and 5,000 volumes of Soviet journals and newspapers, including rare complete editions of *Pravda,* which were scanned especially for biographical data. Other sources were biographies accompanying Stalin and other awards, reports of the Soviet Academy of Science elections, minutes of Communist Party congresses and conventions, encyclopedias, and an Institute fact file of 60,000 cards.

PUBLICATION DATE: LATE 1957

Published by

SCARECROW PRESS

257 Fourth Ave., New York, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Deadline Data on Foreign Affairs

Current and background information on every country in the world, all important international organizations, pacts, & conferences.

"As a part of a continuing effort to release staff labor for greater concentration on local and national clippings, as well as to lessen the load on the subject files, we recommended the purchase of a new service called *Deadline Data on Foreign Affairs.* This provides a subscriber with 2,500 (5 x 8) cards which give a comprehensive, concise picture of the current developments in all foreign countries and includes all important international conferences, organizations and pacts. It is revised weekly. The cabinet, incidentally, is included in the subscription price.

"Elliott Andrews of the *Providence Journal Bulletin* has used this system for about seven months and finds it excellent. His library has discontinued the marking of foreign affairs clips and uses this service exclusively. Chester Lewis of *The New York Times* has four subscriptions to the service."

—Milton A. Prensky, Research Director, News Department, *Washington Star,* at the Boston meeting of the Newspaper Division of the Special Libraries Association, quoted in *Editor & Publisher,* June 1, 1957.

DEADLINE DATA, Inc.
1078 Madison Avenue, New York 28, New York

Please send me complete information on how I can benefit from "Deadline Data on Foreign Affairs."

Name .....

Organization .....

Address .....

City ..... Zone ..... State .....

AMONG OUR SUBSCRIBERS

Baltimore Sun
Boston Globe
Brookings Institution
Central Intelligence Agency
Chase Manhattan Bank
Christian Science Monitor
Cleveland Council on World Affairs
Columbia Broadcasting System
Encyclopaedia Britannica
Foreign Policy Association
Hill & Knowlton International
International Business Machines, Inc.
Look Magazine
National War College
New York Times
New York University
Newsweek
Ohio State University
Philadelphia Inquirer
Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance
Socony Mobil Oil Company
United Nations
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
U.S. Information Agency
U.S. News & World Report
WCCO-TV (Minneapolis)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

She helps people find the products and services they want. Vonna Shelton, telephone representative in Minneapolis, Minn., checks the advertisements business men have placed in the classified directory.

PHOTOGRAPH BY ANSEL ADAMS

This telephone girl is a big help to businesses

When you think of a telephone woman you probably think of the operator. But there are many other women in the telephone company who do interesting and important jobs for you. And they, too, have the "Voice with a Smile."

For example, Vonna Lou Shelton handles a very necessary service in the business man's world. She contacts hundreds of concerns in the Minneapolis area—helps them plan and place their advertising in the Yellow Pages of the telephone directory.

Friendliness, good judgment, and follow-through have won for Mrs. Shelton the confidence of business men who appreciate good, competent service and painstaking efficiency.

Vonna Lou's life is filled with people. Among her principal off-the-job interests are her husband and Sunday School class. She's a program chairman of a missionary society. Sparks many a fund-raising campaign. Goes to college to study piano and takes lessons to improve her golf.

Like so many folks in the telephone company, Mrs. Shelton has made a lot of friends—on her own, and on the job. "I don't know of any other work," she says, "that would bring me so close to all my neighbors. Our customers get to think of us as their personal representatives. I like that a lot."

YELLOW PAGES

Working together to bring people together . . . **Bell Telephone System**

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1958. Vol. 36, No. 2. Published quarterly at 10 McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and business offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year to any address. Second-class mail privileges authorized at Lancaster, Pa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



NOBODY CAN SERVE YOU OVERSEAS LIKE FIRST NATIONAL CITY

Head Office: 55 Wall Street, New York

70 OVERSEAS BRANCHES, OFFICES AND AFFILIATES

77 OFFICES IN NEW YORK

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

First in World Wide Banking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ENJOY FIRST CLASS LUXURY



Beautiful Jetstream lounge offers the ultimate in décor and comfort.*

NOW! MORE TWA AMBASSADOR SERVICE

EUROPE

More luxury overseas than ever! TWA Ambassador service aboard the new, mighty Jetstream... **non-stop** New York to London, Paris, Rome or Lisbon. Or to Madrid, Frankfurt, Zurich. Or fly magnificent Super-G Constellations! En route, enjoy complimentary cocktails, hors d'oeuvres, full-course meals with vintage wines . . . world-famed TWA hospitality. (Sleeper Seats and full-length berths available.) Fly non-stop trans-Atlantic from New York or take the swift Jetstream Polar route from California. Make reservations today. See your travel agent or call your nearest TWA office.

Fly Jetstream First Class Ambassador—non-stop coast to coast in the U. S. . . . relax in giant Siesta Sleeper seats.

FLY THE FINEST

FLY TWA

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES

**Jetstream is a service mark owned exclusively by TWA*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Progress Is Our Most Important Product...

PEOPLE...OUR MOST VITAL CONCERN

People everywhere in the world benefit from General Electric's 77 years of research, engineering, planning and manufacturing skill. General Electric products are manufactured in 130 factories in the U. S. A. plus factories in many countries around the world. This policy helps in the industrial development... creates employment and makes living more enjoyable for everyone. Look for the G-E monogram on the products you buy — it's a sign you can trust. *International General Electric Company, 150 East 42nd Street, New York 17, New York, U. S. A.* C-57-1

GENERAL ELECTRIC

—U. S. A.—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



a cargo of hope for him

This is a special ship, and it meets a special need. It is the need you see today throughout Asia, Africa and the lands of the Pacific – the demand for machines to do work better and faster.

Throughout this area Standard-Vacuum tankers are plowing the seas, deep-laden with the petroleum required for new industry. Stanvac finds, transports, refines and supplies oil to those who need it—all within the area where Stanvac operates.

Peoples of these areas dream of building a new kind of life for themselves and their children. And Stanvac is doing its best to help them make this dream come true.

STANDARD-VACUUM OIL COMPANY **POWERS PROGRESS**

White Plains, New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Established 1873 *Incorporated 1926*

MATHER & CO.

226 WALNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 6 WAlnut 5-0118



Insurance Brokers and Average Adjusters

MATHER, LTD.

225 BROADWAY, NEW YORK 7 BArclay 7-5023

Branches or Correspondents in Major Centers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE BANK OF NEW YORK

Founded 1784

•

New York's First Bank

Capital Funds over $43,000,000

---

48 Wall Street, New York 15, N. Y.

530 Fifth Avenue

63rd Street and Madison Avenue • 73rd Street and Madison Avenue

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

...on science and impossibility

"Scientific knowledge is derived from observations of the world. Our imaginations, however, are not bounded by this constraint—we can easily imagine physical nonsense. Not everything is possible. We sometimes get the opposite impression because new scientific discoveries force us to modify an old theory, and give rise to new and unexpected possibilities. But the point is that the old theory was verified for some class of physical phenomena, and a domain of validity was established. The new theory, however radically it may differ from the old one in its conceptual basis, must always agree with the old theory in the predictions it makes for that class of phenomena. Despite the greater generality of quantum mechanics, Newton's laws still apply to macroscopic objects. Parity is still conserved for the strong interactions. The old impossibilities still remain. Within the limits defined by the impossibilities, there is plenty of room for man's inventiveness to operate. In fact, the game is even more challenging that way."

—Richard Latter, Head of the Physics Division

THE RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

A nonprofit organization engaged in research on problems related to national security and the public interest

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chase Manhattan sifts the facts

about foreign trade

From every commercially important part of the globe, a stream of facts and figures flows into the International Department of Chase Manhattan.

Some are the answers to direct questions asked by importers and exporters. Others are the facts requested by Chase Manhattan specialists themselves in order to keep informed on world trade conditions.

More than 51,000 correspondent banks and branches are interconnected with Chase Manhattan . . . and they are located in every commercially important trade center in the world. That assures the businessman of fast, fresh, *locally informed* information and banking services for his needs.

Whatever your foreign banking needs may be,
"Why don't you talk to the people at Chase Manhattan?"

THE
CHASE MANHATTAN
BANK
CHARTERED 1799

HEAD OFFICE: 18 Pine Street, New York 15, N. Y.

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

OVERSEAS BRANCHES
London
Paris
Frankfurt/Main
Beirut
Tokyo
Osaka
Havana
Marianao
San Juan, P.R.
Santurce
Rio Piedras
Panama
Colon
David
Cristobal
Balboa

Offices of Representatives:
Washington, D.C.
Bombay
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Continental Europe (Paris)
Mexico, D.F.
Rome

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

YEAR OF CRISIS
Communist Propaganda Activities in 1956

By Evron M. Kirkpatrick

More than a colossal, illustrated reference of the techniques employed by Communists in 1956, this systematic survey unveils their permanent propaganda apparatus and reveals how it is adjusted to take care of new contingencies on a world-wide scale.

44 tables Bibliography $5.50

THE PACIFIC DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES

By John Wesley Coulter

An up-to-date survey of the Pacific Islands administered by the United States: Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, the Mariana Islands, Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, the Marshall Group, Pingelap and Mokil. These studies by a distinguished geographer show the effect of Western civilization and American influence on the indigenous cultures.

Tables, maps, climate graphs $6.75

GREAT CITIES OF THE WORLD
Their Government, Politics and Planning

Edited by W. A. Robson

An authoritative series of studies describing the growth, significance, government, politics and planning of 24 great cities of the world. They show how these widely scattered cities are facing social, political, financial and administrative problems which are essentially similar and what steps are being taken to overcome them. Lavishly illustrated $11.00

DEMOCRACY IN ENGLAND

By Diana Spearman

A refreshing re-examination of English democracy from the eighteenth century struggle for parliamentary democracy up to recent proposals for Reform of the House of Lords, colonial self-government and constitutional questions in debate. The author of *Modern Dictatorship*, Diana Spearman has been a candidate for Parliament and active in politics in England. $6.00

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED